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FOREWORD 
 
The Aviation System Monitoring and Modeling (ASMM) Project of NASA’s Aviation Safety  
Program was successful, and its contributions to aviation safety, the products it produced, and the 
lessons learned are worth documenting. To a large degree, the success of ASMM was due to steps 
taken during the initial phase of project development to identify what information significantly 
impacts current aviation safety, and the aviation transportation system as it evolves in the future. 
This process was accomplished by including members with operational experience in aviation safety 
on the ASMM team at the outset, and by acquiring the perspectives on information requirements 
through end-user-needs studies. These studies entailed extensive personal interviews with the end 
users (e.g., at the air carriers and at the air-traffic-control facilities). The interviews were conducted 
with individuals by three-person teams composed of two members with operational experience in 
the domain of the interviewee and one representing the perspective of the ASMM Project goals. A 
key aspect contributing to the success of the project was the effective extraction of information from 
diverse data sources and recognition that it could be deemed as operationally significant information 
only by the end user. The first versions of the ASMM concepts and products were based on the 
initial perceptions of informational requirements gained through these interviews, but that was  
simply the starting point of the iterative process in collaboration with the end users. This iterative, 
evolutionary development is reflected throughout this documentation of the products of the ASMM 
Project. It provided essential feedback to ensure continuously that relevant products were produced, 
and that the products were easy to transfer for commercialization to the vendors and/or the user 
community as they matured. The ASMM Project management recommends this approach: “Involve 
the end user throughout,” in developing future capabilities when success ultimately relies on the end 
users’ perception of their operational value and relevance. 
 
Irving C. Statler 
ASMM Project Manager 
 
x 
 
 
 
1 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
Air transportation, one of the most important modes of transportation, is also one of the safest.  
Nevertheless, the public demands that safety levels continuously improve and that the absolute 
number of aviation accidents continue to decline, even as air-traffic levels increase.  
 
On February 12, 1997, after the tragedy of TWA 800, President William J. Clinton declared, 
 
“We will achieve a national goal of  
reducing the fatal aircraft accident rate by 80% within 10 years.” 
 
In response to this presidential declaration, the administrator of NASA announced that NASA would 
undertake a new program in aviation safety in support of this objective. NASA quickly formed the 
Aviation Safety Investment Strategy Team (ASIST) in collaboration with the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which organized a 
series of five workshops to examine the options and recommend an approach for NASA to develop 
the enabling technologies that address the president's goal. The exceptional and dedicated participa-
tion from all sectors of the aviation industry in the development of NASA’s strategy was  
remarkable. 
 
Subteams were formed to focus on each of the following: 
• Consequences of Human Error 
• Weather 
• Flight Critical Systems and Information Integrity 
• Human Survivability 
• Aviation Systemwide Monitoring, Modeling, and Simulation 
 
The result of these deliberations was a recommendation for a three-thrust program covering  
• Accident prevention: Preventive technologies to eliminate accident precursors 
• Accident mitigation: Stay-alive technologies to decrease fatalities in survivable accidents 
• Aviation System Monitoring and Modeling (ASMM): Technologies to identify existing accident 
precursors in the aviation system, and to forecast and identify potential safety issues to guide the 
development of future safety technology. 
 
The ASIST recognized that, although the ultimate metric was fatal accidents, this metric was diffi-
cult to use as a metric for measuring research progress because so few accidents occur each year and 
their circumstances vary greatly. Consequently, the ASIST suggested that the challenge to NASA 
was to develop technologies and methodologies to accurately identify accident precursors from the 
much larger set of incident reports and from operational data acquired by flight-data recorders (as 
depicted in figure 1.0.1). 
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Figure 1.0.1. The Heinrich Pyramid of Data. 
 
 
Following the ASIST workshops, formative planning and preliminary studies of approaches were 
conducted during the years of FY98 and FY99. NASA’s Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) was 
initiated in FY00 with the goal of developing technologies that, depending upon implementation, 
could reduce the aircraft accident rate by a factor of 5 within 10 years, and by a factor of 10 within 
20 years.1 
 
One of the projects within the AvSP, the ASMM Project, addressed the need to provide decision-
makers with systemwide analysis tools for identifying and correcting the predisposing conditions 
that could lead to accidents. Systemwide analysis is a concept with extraordinary potential benefits 
and challenges, because of the complex objectives and relationships in a modern aviation transporta-
tion system involving a diversity of manufacturers, operators, and regulators. NASA has an impor-
tant role in modern aviation as a nonpartisan, honest broker, and ASMM is an initial step towards 
technologies that enable proactive management of safety risk from a systemwide perspective. This 
report documents the achievements of the ASMM Project during the life of the AvSP from FY00 to 
FY05.  
 
 
                                                 
1 After 9/11 the AvSP became the Aviation Safety and Security Program (AvSSP).  
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2.0  A PERSPECTIVE ON PROACTIVE MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY RISK 
 
Suppose you are the vice president for safety of a company whose customers enter through the front 
door, depart through the back door, and in between are exposed to some hazardous processes. How 
do you know how well your organization is fulfilling its responsibility to protect its customers from 
harm? Can you be content so long as (almost) every customer leaves your premises reasonably safe 
and sound? Is it acceptable if your statistical analyses show that, of every hundred customers that 
enter the front door, only 0.005 fail to make it out the back? Are you willing to wait until one of 
your customers is unable to make it through the back door before you investigate the safety of the 
processes in your facility? 
 
This ratio is quite representative of the aviation industry. A great deal of time, money, and effort are 
invested in forensic analyses of every accident even though, in such (fortunately) rare events, the 
factors entailed in the next one will, most likely, be totally different. But, how does the vice president 
for safety of Lower Slobovia Airlines know how well they are operating in between these rare events? 
Or how about the manager of the air traffic control (ATC) facility at that major hub at Slivovitz, the 
capital of Lower Slobovia? Or the minister of aeronautic transportation of Lower Slobovia? 
 
As global air transportation continues to expand, the number of aircraft accidents will become unac-
ceptable to society if accidents continue at the current rate. Therefore, efforts are now being invested 
worldwide to find an approach to reducing still further the already very low rate of aviation acci-
dents. The extremely low frequency of these events presents ASMM with a significant challenge in 
developing appropriate methods for analysis of these rare events to understand precursors and esti-
mate future impact. 
 
Worldwide, the aviation-safety culture is changing from one of primarily reacting to the last accident 
to a proactive approach to identification and alleviation of life-threatening conditions and events. 
This cultural change underlies many new national and international activities, including, for exam-
ple, the FAA-Industry Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) program (see appendix A), the 
UK CAA Operational Flight Data Monitoring (OFDM) program, the Commercial Aviation Safety 
Team (CAST), the European Aeronautics Vision, the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) initiatives on use of flight data, the Global Aviation Information Network (GAIN), the 
Eurocontrol Performance Review Commission, positions and initiatives of the unions, including, the 
Airline Pilots Association (ALPA), the Allied Pilots Association (APA), and the National Air  
Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), the JAA (Joint Aviation Authorities) Safety Strategy 
Initiative (JSSI), etc. 
 
This cultural shift was reflected in the following statement made by the FAA Administrator, Marion 
C. Blakely, at the North American Safety Conference on February 5, 2003:  
 
“For one, we need to change one of the biggest historical characteristics of aviation safety  
improvements --- our reactive nature. We must get in front of accidents...anticipate them...and use 
hard data to detect problems and disturbing trends.” 
 
The General Accounting Office (GAO) evaluation report titled “Safer Skies” (2000) said that addi-
tional performance measures were needed and precursors associated with past accidents should be 
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used to track safety baseline and improvements from interventions. The FAA Internal Studies, 2004 
Strategic Plan said it was necessary to identify risks before they lead to accidents. 
 
All of this recent activity is a reflection of the recognized need for a comprehensive, accurate, and 
insightful method for continuously monitoring the operational performance of aviation transporta-
tion. Aviation policy makers need reliable measures of the frequencies or the trends of aviation-
safety incidents, particularly as capacity becomes constrained and the skies are more and more 
crowded. Technology developers need to know whether new equipment or procedures inserted into 
the aviation system are producing expected improvements and/or unwanted side effects. Aircraft 
manufacturers require feedback on their equipment performance and characteristics under the wide 
range of conditions present in an operational environment to identify and correct precursors, espe-
cially now that aircraft life spans are stretching towards 40 years or more. Airline operators juggle to 
maintain viability in a continuously changing economic environment and need information for 
situational awareness of global safety issues as well as their own operations. Pilots, air-traffic con-
trollers, mechanics, or anyone working in aviation transportation need a communication channel to 
report personal observations of safety incidents without intimidation, punishment, or retribution. 
 
It is conducive to the economic growth of the aviation industry and avoidance of the cost and trauma 
of fatal aviation accidents to provide decision-makers with regular, accurate, and insightful measures 
of the performance and safety of the National Air Transportation System (NATS). It is conducive to 
sound decision-making on interventions to provide technology and procedure developers with reli-
able predictions of the systemwide impacts of the changes they are introducing into the aviation 
system. 
 
The government and the world aviation community continue to routinely amass large quantities of 
data that could be sources of information relevant to aviation safety. Increasingly, the accumulation 
of these data outpaces the community’s ability to put them to practical use. It is difficult to extract 
operationally significant information from each of these data sources. It is difficult to combine  
information related to the same subject when they come from diverse, heterogeneous sources. Often 
safety data cannot be retrieved after they have been put into computerized storage because of the 
way that the data were formatted and organized. The ability to monitor continuously, convert the 
collected data into reliable information, and share that information for collaborative decision-making 
is the basis for a revolutionary, proactive approach to managing an aviation-transportation system 
for prevention of accidents. This paper describes the process of proactive management of safety risk, 
the technical challenges it entails, and the manner in which the NASA Aviation Safety Program 
attempted to meet those challenges through its ASMM Project. 
 
A proactive approach to identifying and alleviating life-threatening conditions in the aviation system 
entails a well-defined process of identifying hazards and vulnerabilities, evaluating their causes, 
assessing risks, and implementing appropriate solutions. This process is not a trivial undertaking. It 
requires continuous monitoring of system performance in a nonpunitive environment; learning from 
normal operational experience; comparing actual performance to expected performance; identifying 
the precursor events and conditions that foreshadow most accidents; understanding the confluence of 
factors that cause these events; designing appropriate interventions to minimize the likelihood of 
their occurrence; and having a system in place to monitor the efficacy of the interventions. 
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Furthermore, performance must be viewed from a total system perspective, including all aspects of 
the NATS. The aircraft, its subsystems, its flight crew, the air-traffic controller, the dispatcher, the 
flight mechanic, the operational environment including weather, organizational culture, training, 
policies, business practices, and procedures are all elements of the complete system, and, invariably, 
contribute interactively to its performance. 
 
In this complex operating environment of aviation with its many dynamically interactive compo-
nents, identifying the precursors of the next accident poses a special challenge. A safety incident or 
an aviation accident is usually the consequence of a confluence of multiple latent and proximate 
factors. In her book titled “Safeware: System Safety and Computers,” (1995), Nancy Leveson says, 
 
“…all hazards are affected by complex interactions among technological, ecological, sociopolitical, 
and cultural systems.” 
 
People are key components of the aviation system, and human error is cited as a contributing factor 
or cause of 60% to 80% of aviation incidents and accidents. Interestingly, a report from the Aviation 
Safety Reporting System (ASRS) office shows that the ASRS analysts attributed over 60% of about 
121,000 reported incidents to “human performance” (ASRS, 2005). The attribution of “human error” 
is a social- and psychological-based judgment of human performance made in hindsight that is, in 
forensic analysis, invariably biased by knowledge of the outcome (Woods et al. (1994)). However, 
human performance is relied upon to resolve uncertainties, conflicts, and competing demands inher-
ent in large, complex systems and to provide flexible response to the inevitable unexpected event. 
Human performance is as complex as the domain in which it is exercised and cannot be judged 
independently of that domain. Human behavior is context-dependent, and little can be understood of 
the causes of human error without understanding the prevailing as well as the more distal conditions 
conducive to error. The humans interact with, or are impacted by, all the other elements (including 
humans) in the aviation system. These interactions influence human performance in ways that may 
enable or aggravate accidents or incidents. In addition, persons’ own actions or inactions can reflex-
ively affect their performance capabilities. Much depends on being able to determine how complex 
systems have failed and how human(s) contributed to the outcome of such failures. Consequently, 
the question is, “Why do professional, well-trained, highly motivated operators of the aviation  
system make mistakes that contributed to an incident or accident?” The focus of the ASMM Project 
was on uncovering and understanding those conditions that elevate the probability of downstream 
human errors and that, in turn, may contribute to aviation-safety incidents or accidents. Knowledge 
about these systemic features that could be the precursors of incidents or accidents assists in the 
understanding of how they shape human behavior and provides insight into improving the perform-
ance of the system. 
 
In this report, the term precursor is used to mean the symptom of a systemic problem that is a conflu-
ence of causal factors conducive to undesired system behavior (e.g., human fatigue, organizational 
culture, equipment failure, or procedural discrepancy) that, if left unresolved, has the potential to 
result in increased probability of an accident. A precursor is a measurable deviation from expecta-
tions or the norm, and it is important that it not be viewed as being synonymous with causality. The 
term “causal factors” means both the latent and the proximate factors that constitute the context in 
which the event occurred and includes: 
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• Conditions necessary for the occurrence of a precursor 
and 
• Conditions that increase the probability of occurrence of that precursor. 
 
Consequently, in the approach to the study reported here, we are searching for the causal factors of 
the precursor incident or trend and not of the anomalous consequences, per se. It is the problem 
(i.e., the causal factors of the precursor) that must be treated; not the symptom (i.e., the precursor 
itself). A process of routinely identifying and minimizing the causal factors that are conducive to a 
human making a mistake is the essence of the ASMM concept of proactive management of safety 
risk of the NATS. 
 
Proactive risk management entails a cyclic process of learning continuously from normal operational 
experience with the following four primary steps (as depicted in figure 2.0.1): 
• Identifying—collecting data to monitor the system performance continuously and comparing 
with established standards or expectations to identify potential risks. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.0.1. A strategy for improving safety of aviation operations. 
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• Evaluating—diagnosing the factors contributing to or aggravating the potentially hazardous 
event, estimating the likelihood of future occurrences or confluence of these factors, and assess-
ing the severity and possible impacts of an anomalous consequence. 
• Formulating—proposing changes in design, training, and/or procedures to mitigate recurrence of 
the event, assessing the systemwide safety risk of the intervention, estimating benefits and costs, 
and developing a strategy for implementing the identified change(s). 
• Implementing—implementing on a small scale or in prototype, evaluating the performance of the 
intervention, refining, establishing performance standards, and then monitoring the system to  
assess the efficacy of the intervention and to identify unwanted side effects. 
 
In current aviation transportation operations, the key function that is often missing from this cyclic 
process is that of having in place a system for monitoring in order to assess the effectiveness of the 
intervention. 
 
At each of these stages in the cyclic process of proactive management of system-safety risk, airline 
domain experts, air-traffic managers, and other providers of aviation services make key decisions in 
a collaborative manner to set the performance standards, gain insight from monitoring, propose the 
changes, and develop the intervention strategies. The technical challenges are to provide these  
experts with automated tools that assist them in these collaborative decision-making processes so as 
to enable the proactive management of safety risk. Decision-makers must be able to focus quickly on 
those events with the highest likelihood of occurrence and most severe potential consequences. 
Automated tools, such as those developed by ASMM, can facilitate this work. Computational  
sciences and information technology can extract useful information from large, heterogeneous, 
dispersed data sources to help the decision-maker gain insight into operations. However, even the 
most advanced adaptations of information technologies and computer sciences cannot replace the 
human expert with automated decisions. 
 
The ASMM Project had the goal to provide the methodologies, the computational tools, and the 
infrastructure to assist the experts in making the best possible decisions. 
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3.0  THE ASMM PROJECT: THE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The ASMM Project has developed computational tools that enable human experts to focus their 
attention on the most significant events, and assist them to identify the factors that distinguish unsafe 
operations from routine operations. One of the goals of the ASMM Project was to provide decision-
makers with regular, accurate, insightful information on the performance and safety of the aviation 
system. The products of the ASMM Project described in this report enable identification of condi-
tions, events, and trends of operational conditions that could compromise safety. Another goal was 
to provide technology and procedure developers with reliable predictions of the systemwide effects 
of the changes they are introducing into the aviation system. 
 
The objectives of the ASMM Project were to: 
• Convert a bounty of raw aviation operational data drawn from many sources—aircraft flight data 
recorders, ATC radar tracks, maintenance logs, weather records, and aviation-safety incident  
reports—into insightful interpretations of the safety of the NATS. 
• Develop methodologies and tools to enable efficient monitoring of the NATS by routinely proc-
essing large masses of both textual and quantitative data pertaining to all aspects of the perform-
ance of the NATS.  
• Develop tools to extract and display reliable information from large databases with which  
experts can gain insight into the performance and safety of the NATS and can identify situations 
that may indicate changes to levels of safety.  
• Assist and encourage stakeholders in the NATS in the use of these tools for their operational 
evaluation and continuous evolutionary development.  
• Develop fast-time simulations that enable reliable predictions of systemwide effects of proposed 
technological or procedural changes. 
 
Data sources of information about incidents and trends, precursors, and their causal factors are to be 
found in the extensive data-collection systems that already exist across the aviation industry. Infor-
mation about precursors resides in a variety of diverse, heterogeneous data sources that range from 
purely quantitative accident and operational data to textual data in the forms of free text reports and 
surveys of operational experiences. These sources cover the gamut from totally objective to totally 
subjective sources of information, and all of these sources are needed to understand not only what 
happened, but why. The objective, quantitative data provide information to understand “what” hap-
pened, but information must also be extracted from qualitative, textual data sources to help the 
domain expert understand the subjective aspects of “why” an incident occurred. 
 
As indicated in figure 3.0.1, these data exist in the form of accident reports resulting from forensic 
analyses; in the form of quantitative operational data, experiential reports, and surveys that are the 
bases of diagnostic analyses; and in the form of domain expert knowledge that is currently the pri-
mary basis of prognostic analysis. The challenge to the ASMM Project team was to develop auto-
mated capabilities to extract information reliably from all these sources, integrate that information, 
and display operationally significant results. These capabilities would enable the domain experts to 
gain insight into the performance and safety of the NATS, to gain insight into the precursors of the 
next accident and their causal factors, and to identify situations that may indicate changes to levels 
of safety requiring mitigating actions. 
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Figure 3.0.1. Where are precursors to be found? 
 
 
Discovery of precursors requires knowledge of where to look, and how to look. The sources of 
information that will enable domain experts to identify incidents as precursors of the next accident 
are in large heterogeneous, distributed databases collected and owned by various organizations 
across the entire community. Information must be extracted from all these databases and merged in 
order to give the decision-maker a complete picture of the systemwide situation. How to look at 
these sources entails recognition of operational context and multiple operations that identify syn-
chronicity across multiple data sources, and exploit sequential pointers from one dataset to another. 
Consequently, the ASMM Project has developed automated tools for extracting information from 
both quantitative numerical data and qualitative textual data, and for recognizing information from 
any data source that may be relevant to a particular query. Information extracted from quantitative 
data sources helps the domain expert understand the objective aspects of what happened, and from 
qualitative data sources to understand the subjective aspects of why an incident occurred. Each 
ASMM tool contributes insights into the complete picture of an event, and supports the complemen-
tary processes of causal analysis and safety-risk assessment. Causal analysis and safety risk assess-
ment, together with analysis of associated costs and benefits, are all required in order for experts to 
formulate appropriate interventions. 
 
The ASMM Project addressed a primary technological barrier to proactive management of aviation-
safety risk; namely, the capability to extract meaningful and reliable information from very large, 
dispersed, heterogeneous databases efficiently with minimal labor to provide domain experts with 
the insight for causal analysis and safety-risk assessment. 
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ASMM pioneered in the application of advanced computational sciences and information technolo-
gies to  
• mine aviation databases to identify automatically patterns in the data that may be the precursors 
without advance knowledge of what to look for, and  
• present meaningful displays of these events with which to judge their operational significance. 
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4.0  THE ASMM PROJECT: THE APPROACH 
 
The ASMM Project consisted of four elements that emphasize the exploitation of state-of-the-art 
information technology to capitalize on aviation data. The elements were called Data Analysis Tools 
Development, Intramural Monitoring, Extramural Monitoring, and Modeling and Simulations. 
 
The Data Analysis Tools Development element provided for the research that resulted in software to 
process data into information that presently can be performed only by experts with much time and 
effort. Capabilities were developed to process textual and numerical aviation data, and to recognize 
relevant information in diverse databases. The ASMM tools convert these data into displays of 
meaningful information to help analysts achieve the insight needed to understand the circumstances, 
focus their attention on operationally significant events, and propose mitigating actions. Within this 
element, the concepts were developed to prototypical stage, at which point they were transferred to 
the Intramural Monitoring and Extramural Monitoring elements for test and evaluation in opera-
tional conditions. 
 
The Intramural Monitoring element is intended to provide individual air-service operators (i.e., air 
carriers and ATC facilities) with the tools needed to monitor their own performance and safety 
continuously, effectively, and economically within their own organizations. The prototypical tools 
resulting from Data Analysis Tools Development were tested and evaluated under this element of the 
ASMM Project in collaboration with air carriers, FAA, and vendors of current data analysis software 
with whom NASA entered into Space Act Agreements (SAAs). 
 
The Extramural Monitoring element complements Intramural Monitoring and is a comprehensive 
systemwide statistically sound survey mechanism for monitoring the performance and safety of the 
overall NATS and for detecting and evaluating the effects of new technologies as they are inserted 
into the system by seeking the perspectives of the front-line operators (i.e., flight crews, air-traffic 
controllers, cabin crews, mechanics, etc.). 
 
The Modeling and Simulations element of ASMM addresses the need to support predictions and 
safety-risk assessments by developing and validating systemwide models and simulations. The data 
collected from all the activities under Intramural and Extramural Monitoring have been used to 
support the development and validation of models of the NATS. 
 
Although the products of these four elements of the ASMM Project all have standalone value, they 
have been planned and developed in concert to be complementary, interdependent, and interrelated 
in gaining a full picture of system performance. The information extracted by the tools of these four 
elements must be merged into a systemwide framework enabling aviation policy makers to collabo-
rate in aviation-safety-risk management. This information must be shared while respecting the pro-
prietary rights to some sources of data and sensitivities to potential misuse if they are released 
outside the owning organization. Although this sharing was not achieved during the life of the 
ASMM Project because of concerns for potential misuse of proprietary data, it is being addressed in 
the future activities that are described later in this report. 
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The following sections describe the activities and products of each of these elements and show how 
they relate to enabling each of the four steps in the cycle of proactive management of risk. The 
objective is to assist the human analyst in finding the precursors underlying events or trends that 
could compromise the safety of the system operations, in identifying potential adverse consequences 
of technological and procedural changes, and in assessing the safety risks to the NATS. 
 
In another view of the cycle depicted in figure 4.0.1, the specific activities to which the ASMM tools 
to be described in this report contribute are indicated in orange. 
 
Identifying: 
The first step in the cycle of proactive management of risk is to monitor the system continuously by 
collecting, codifying, and classifying the various data from the system into repositories that can be 
mined subsequently for safety insights. The databases containing information relevant to aviation 
safety are very large, heterogeneous (textual and digital), diverse, distributed sources from which 
information must be extracted and merged to gain a complete picture of a situation. The information 
(not the data) must be displayed in a way that makes it easy for the domain expert to interpret and 
compare with expectations or performance standards. The decision-makers must gain sufficient 
insight to identify those events that present potential risks. 
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Figure 4.0.1. The elements of proactive management of safety risk. 
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The research carried out under the Data Analysis Tools Development element of the ASMM Project 
produced advanced software to facilitate efficient, comprehensive, and accurate extraction of infor-
mation from large, heterogeneous databases throughout the NATS. These data sources consist of 
qualitative data (textual, categorical, and survey data) and quantitative data (digital flight-recorder 
data, radar-track data). The ASMM tools and methodologies establish meaningful linkages among 
the information extracted from these diverse data sources and enable visualization of operationally 
significant patterns and trends.  
 
Prototypical tools were developed to convert these data into graphical displays of meaningful infor-
mation to help analysts achieve the insight needed to understand the circumstances and propose a 
mitigating action. As a result, data can be better classified, more easily prioritized, and more readily 
combined with data from other sources, and data patterns can be better understood. Data-processing 
costs decline because the analytic capability of humans are supplemented and enhanced with auto-
mation. As they were developed, the conceptual prototypes were tested and evaluated on existing 
operational databases.  
 
Some of these databases, such as the ASRS (see appendix C) and NTSB databases, reside in the 
public domain. Others, such as each air carrier's digital flight-recorded data archives, store proprie-
tary information and reside in the private domain. Accordingly, the ASMM approach to monitoring 
the system entailed a dual strategy of creating two distinct, independent, but complementary,  
capabilities.  
 
The capability developed under the element called Intramural Monitoring entailed a “bottom-up” 
approach that is intended to provide air-service operators with the tools needed to monitor their 
performance continuously, effectively, and economically within their own organizations. The pri-
mary products of this activity are the Aviation Performance Measuring System (APMS) for process-
ing aircraft flight-recorder data and the Performance Data Analysis and Reporting System (PDARS) 
for processing ATC data. 
 
The APMS provides an advanced capability for managing, processing, and analyzing digital flight-
recorded data. The objective of the APMS research project was to develop the methodologies and 
tools to demonstrate to U.S. air carriers that very large quantities of flight-recorded data can be 
monitored, processed, and analyzed routinely, efficiently, and economically. The suite of integrated 
APMS tools is designed to convert flight-recorded data into information that will be useful feedback 
to the air carrier for ensuring the quality, reliability, and safety of performance of his/her operations 
in support of each company’s own FOQA programs (see appendix A) and Advanced Qualifications 
Programs (AQP) (Chidester, (2001)). APMS developed tools that significantly extend the capabili-
ties of the current commercially available analytic methods that are mainly designed to count prede-
fined exceedances. This activity established and maintained collaborations with the air carriers and 
their FOQA vendors to obtain the perspectives, the operational data, access to other relevant data-
bases, and the users’ evaluations in the operational environment that are essential to evolving a suite 
of data-analysis tools offering maximum benefits at minimal cost. 
 
APMS was a program to test and evaluate software tools for analyses of flight-recorded data. 
• Requirements were initially based on user-needs studies. 
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• The program was built upon exceedance-based FOQA programs. 
• The program included enhanced commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) tools for exceedance-based 
programs. 
• The program developed advanced concepts, methods, and tools. 
• The program was an engine of technology transfer. 
 
APMS was intended to provide the air-service operators with the tools needed to monitor their own 
performance and safety continuously, effectively, and economically within their own organizations. 
An objective was to provide a suite of tools for converting flight data into information customized to 
each individual user among the diverse operating personnel, and, thereby, to encourage them to 
share their information for cooperative proactive decision-making. APMS assists an operator in 
understanding how its aircraft are being operated normally and routinely on the line, and assists the 
flight-safety analyst to identify atypical, statistically extreme, and safety-related events and trends 
routinely, empirically, and inductively to support safety and economic decisions.  
 
Intramural Monitoring of ATC was addressed with the PDARS, an ATC radar-track monitoring 
capability developed collaboratively by NASA and the FAA.  
 
PDARS was a program to test and evaluate software tools for analyses of radar-track data. 
• It routinely collects, extracts, processes, and merges ATC data. 
• It routinely computes quantitative performance measures. 
• It produces and disseminates performance-measurement reports. 
• It aids identification of operational problems and causal analysis. 
• It accesses system-design and simulation tools for “what-if” studies. 
• It archives basic operational data and performance statistics. 
 
This project was carried out in collaboration with the ATC community (FAA and NATCA) to obtain 
the perspectives, the operational data, access to other relevant databases, and the users’ evaluations 
essential to evolving a suite of data-analysis tools to support the identified informational needs of 
air-traffic management. When ASMM ended in FY05 and full responsibility for PDARS was  
assumed by the FAA, all 20 U.S. Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC) facilities in the conti-
nental U.S., 13 major terminal radar approach control facilities (TRACON), 5 regional offices, and 
the Command Control Center in Herndon, Virginia, were all using PDARS and receiving daily 
reports customized to each facility. By agreements among the individual facilities, these reports are 
shared among the facilities. PDARS performance measurements relate to system throughput, delays, 
system predictability, and other key ATC performance indicators (den Braven and Shade (2003)). 
 
The capability developed under the element called Extramural Monitoring entailed a “top-down” 
approach that is intended to provide a systemwide view of the performance of the NATS based on 
data considered in the public domain. The primary product of this element was a comprehensive 
systemwide survey mechanism called the National Aviation System Operational Monitoring  
Service (NAOMS) for monitoring the overall performance and safety of the NATS with provision 
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for detecting and evaluating the effects of new technologies as they are inserted into the system. 
NAOMS achieved scientific integrity by using meticulously designed survey instruments and a 
carefully crafted statistical sampling design customized to each constituency. 
 
The objective was the permanent field implementation of a NAOMS responsible for developing and 
maintaining a comprehensive and coherent survey of the operators of the aviation system (i.e., its 
pilots, controllers, mechanics, dispatchers, flight attendants, and others) on a regular basis. That 
objective was not achieved largely because of the cost of designing and implementing the statisti-
cally sound survey for each new constituency and the lack of adequate funds.  
 
A crucial, practical measure of NAOMS’ success was its ability to support the aviation community 
in its assessment of safety risks and the efficacy of government/industry interventions. Accordingly, 
NAOMS cultivated a close working association with the aviation industry and organized labor, 
including the CAST. CAST views NAOMS as being a valuable tool for measuring the systemwide 
impacts of the interventions that their Joint Safety Analysis Teams (JSAT) developed. NAOMS 
actively supported this process by incorporating core safety event questions that addressed CAST 
priorities and by developing topical questions that addressed focused safety concerns. Consequently, 
the value in viewing the aviation system through the eyes of its operators was clearly demonstrated 
on the basis of the survey conducted with nearly 28,000 interviews of Part 121 commercial pilots. 
 
Currently, aviation databases capture information about specific parts of the NATS, but no existing 
database addresses its performance and safety as a whole. NAOMS established a new national capa-
bility that, if implemented as a continuing service, would 
• quantitatively track aviation safety trends;  
• acquire information about, and pointers to, precursor events through statistically valid survey 
techniques for measuring incident rates;  
• monitor the impacts of technological and procedural changes to the NATS; and  
• contribute to the development of a data-driven basis for safety decisions.  
 
The concepts and capabilities of the NAOMS, APMS, and PDARS will continue to evolve inde-
pendently, but information derived from each will complement the others in the process of continu-
ously monitoring, assessing, and projecting the health of the overall system when all the data sources 
can be accessed. Until then, the ASMM Project provided a comprehensive survey system for moni-
toring safety performance on a national scale, while helping air-services organizations build their 
intramural capability for safety monitoring and for establishing a potential database for the Aviation 
Safety Program. 
 
In addition to the data sources represented by APMS, PDARS, and NAOMS, the ASMM Project 
also drew on ancillary data sources such as meteorological records to further develop its understand-
ing of contextual factors contributing to safety events. An important product of this activity was the 
Aviation Data Integration System (ADIS), which provided the safety analyst easy access to weather 
information, Jeppeson charts, and air traffic relevant to a specific event. In particular, the ADIS 
team developed an archive of weather information (either the Airport Terminal Information  
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Service (ATIS) or the METAR)2 at all the major airports in the world. At the end of the ASMM 
Project, this capability was transferred to the FAA, which made it accessible to all air carriers with 
FOQA programs.  
 
Another database used as a resource for the ASMM Project was the ASRS which NASA has man-
aged on behalf of the FAA for nearly 30 years (see appendix C). The ASRS is a well-known reposi-
tory of experiential reports of incidents having safety implications gathered from the operators of the 
aviation system. Although the ASRS was not formally an activity of the Aviation Safety Program, 
the authors’ experience with ASRS and their access to its analysts stimulated and informed many 
ASMM research and development activities. The ASMM Project supported the development of 
another product called Incident Reporting Enhancement Tools under the Extramural Monitoring 
element. While these were designed to improve our accessibility to, and extraction of information 
from, the ASRS database, they have applicability to other similar textual databases such as the Avia-
tion Safety Action Program (ASAP). The ASMM Project benefited from a more convenient access 
to this unique repository of safety reports to test new capabilities that were needed for the Ames 
Safety Accountability Program (ASAP), NAOMS, and other sources of textual data. The ASRS 
benefited from upgrading its legacy systems to state-of-the-art capabilities for managing, processing, 
and accessing textual incident reports. The aviation community benefited from having ASRS data 
more accessible and better connected to other aviation-safety resources.  
 
The ASRS repository of over 150,000 reports offered a database for testing and evaluating some of 
the tools for processing and analyzing textual data that were developed under the Data Analysis 
Tools Development element of the ASMM Project. The ASRS database was used as a representative 
resource of textual reports to develop and evaluate new capabilities for their automated analyses. 
The first generation of an intramural text-processing capability applied to a database of ASAP  
reports was developed in collaboration with an air carrier under a SAA. 
 
Evaluating: 
The second step in the cycle of proactive management of risk is to evaluate the operational signifi-
cance of the event that was identified in the monitoring phase. The decision-makers must be able to 
quickly focus on those events with the highest potential severity and likelihood of reoccurring. This 
focus requires an understanding of the contextual factors and conditions that were conducive to the 
identified incident so that the domain expert can ascertain the likelihood of future occurrences and 
assess the severity of potential consequences. It also requires statistical analyses of the databases to 
estimate the frequencies of occurrence of the identified event or of the confluence of factors.  
 
Information must be extracted from qualitative data sources to help the domain expert understand 
the subjective aspects of “why” an incident occurred, and from quantitative data sources to under-
stand the objective aspects of “what” happened. Therefore, automated capabilities were developed to 
process both textual and numerical aviation data, and to recognize relevant information in diverse 
databases. The results of the searches of heterogeneous databases are presented in displays for visu-
alization of information to help the analysts achieve the insight needed to assess the operational 
significance, understand the circumstances, and formulate a mitigating action.  
                                                 
2 METAR is the international standard code format for hourly surface weather information. The acronym is French and 
translates, roughly, into Aviation Routine Weather Report. 
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Each of the ASMM tools contributes to such an insight into the picture of a safety event or trend, 
and can be used to support a complementary and synergistic process of hazard evaluation, causal 
analysis, and safety-risk assessment. The objective is to minimize the demands on the human expert 
to identify the operational events deserving of further attention. 
 
A demonstration of how the several ASMM products would be used in such an evaluation process 
preparatory to formulating an intervention was an application to a study of In-Close Approach 
Changes (ICACs) that is described in appendix B. 
 
Formulating: 
Having identified an operationally significant event and understood its contextual factors, the next 
step in the process of proactive management of risk is to formulate an intervention. For the most 
part, it is up to the experts in industry and the FAA to formulate and to implement the interventions. 
However, an objective of the element of ASMM called Modeling and Simulations is to aid the  
decision-makers in these two steps of the process.  
 
There can be many contextual factors important to an event that is identified to be a precursor of an 
anomalous condition and, therefore, there are many possible interventions to minimize the probabil-
ity of recurrence of those factors or of their confluence. Such an intervention can reside at any ele-
ment of the total system in its 
• Design (including man-machine interface and quality of information),  
• Procedures (including organization, requirements, and documentation), or  
• Training (including education and checking). 
 
The suggested interventions may be in any one of these but, usually, a change in one will necessitate 
a change in the others as well. Frequently, all three types of faults enter into the confluence of  
factors that result in an accident—but they do not necessarily all occur in the same element of the 
system. In order to decide on which of these many choices and combinations to implement and 
decide on a strategy for implementing the changes, the decision-maker needs to be able to forecast 
the systemwide effects of the proposed changes.  
 
The contribution of Modeling and Simulations to the goal of ASMM is to support reliable prediction 
of the systemwide effects of new technologies and procedures on operations and communications 
with emphasis on incorporating appropriate human behavioral models. This element provides for the 
development of tools for modeling the NATS at a level of detail sufficient to track key safety char-
acteristics to support prediction and decision-making. Techniques were developed for representing 
the interactions of multiple human and nonhuman agents in complex dynamic scenarios. Models 
were developed to explicitly incorporate human performance into existing NATS modeling tools and 
were validated with data obtained from Intramural and Extramural Monitoring.  
 
The elements of the NATS, including the contributions of individual multiple operators, individual 
elements of the system, the interactions among multiple (human and nonhuman) agents, technolo-
gies, and large-scale system flow and control issues, were modeled. This modeling served as a com-
putational testbed for simulating and analyzing system performance. Simulations of the system 
operations in non-real time (i.e., in contrast to realtime human-in-the loop simulations) enable the 
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analyst to efficiently explore NATS operations from various perspectives by exercising models of 
the system. Fast-time systemwide simulations developed in the ASMM Project can be used to  
answer questions such as, “Does the solution have any secondary, propagated, or side effects?” and 
“Does the solution provide for graceful degradation in unanticipated operation anomalies?” and 
“Does the proposed intervention address the right question and in the right way based on an under-
standing of the joint cognitive system?” Analytical tools were developed in parallel with the fast-
time simulations to assist the analysts in identifying the causal factors of an event and in assessing 
the safety risks. 
 
Implementing:  
Implementation of an intervention for an identified problem is accomplished via prototypes, their 
effectiveness is evaluated, refinements are implemented, and then full-scale deployments are facili-
tated. The decision on the appropriate intervention to mitigate the occurrence of some event entails 
considerations by the FAA and the industry of costs versus benefits in addition to the safety risks. 
Therefore, the products of the ASMM Project play only a supportive role to the decision-makers in 
this step of proactive management of safety risk. 
 
The step that is often missing from the full cycle of proactive management of risk as it is currently 
pursued in the aviation industry is that of having in place a system for monitoring in order to assess 
the effectiveness of the intervention measured against expectations. This step is comparable to the 
first step in the process (i.e., identifying) and closes the loop in the cycle. This step requires that 
metrics be established and those data that are needed to evaluate the intervention be appropriately 
collected, codified, and classified for retrospective search. The monitoring system should have been 
in place before the intervention to gather the baseline data for comparison of the before to the after. 
Once again, as described in the initial step, the sources of relevant information will be in large het-
erogeneous, distributed databases, and will need to be merged to gain a complete picture of the 
systemwide situation. Once again, all of the ASMM tools are applicable to facilitate efficient and 
insightful analyses of all relevant data.  
 
Figure 4.0.2 shows the relationships of the products of ASMM to the elements of the cycle of proac-
tive management of risk as discussed previously. NASA’s role is largely the development of tech-
nologies and methodologies to aid the decision-makers in identifying events and trends that could 
compromise safety, in evaluating their operational significance, and in identifying their causal fac-
tors, particularly those latent and proximate systemic features conducive to human error. Although 
our fast-time simulation capability aids in predicting the systemwide impact of interventions, the 
phases of formulation and implementation of these interventions are the responsibilities of the indus-
try and the FAA. Moreover, they entail other considerations, such as economics, besides the safety 
risk. 
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Figure 4.0.2. ASMM products vs. the proactive management cycle. 
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5.0  THE ASMM PROJECT: THE PRODUCTS 
 
In the following sections, each of the ASMM products mentioned briefly in the discussion of the 
approach will be described in detail within the element in which it was produced. 
 
5.1 Data Analysis Tools Development 
 
The recorded data of a single flight or the content of a single experiential report can entail values of 
hundreds or thousands of parameters. It is impossible for a human to perceive the relationships 
among flights or reports that are described in so many dimensions. Therefore, the objectives of the 
activities under Data Analysis Tools Development were to efficiently and reliably convert numerical 
and textual data into meaningful and actionable information. 
• Develop methods for automatically identifying the unexpected from numerical data, 
• develop new methods of automatic text understanding, and  
• create mechanisms to link information extracted from disparate textual and numerical data 
sources. 
 
5.1.1 Numerical Data Analysis 
For analyses of digital (numerical) data (such as flight-recorded data and radar-track data), the 
PROFILER was developed by Battelle’s Pacific Northwest Division as the underlying data-mining 
tool. The PROFILER is a tool to conduct atypicality analysis—to identify multivariate, statistically 
extreme flights. PROFILER extracts a “signature” for each parameter in each phase of flight, uses 
multivariate cluster analysis to group flights by similarity along flight signatures, searches for differ-
ences among clusters of flights, calculates an atypicality score for each flight, and provides a plain-
language description of what makes targeted flights atypical. The distribution of atypicality scores—
a function of the Mahalanobis distance from the population multivariate data centroid and multivari-
ate cluster results—is used to identify flights for examination. This calculation is illustrated in  
figure 5.1.1 in a two-dimensional representation. 
 
PROFILER 
• Automatically produces a list of atypical flights 
• Produces baseline operational envelope on each parameter 
• Identifies the specific parameters that are atypical 
• Provides summary information for each atypical flight  
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Figure 5.1.1. Calculation of atypicality score. 
 
 
PROFILER conducts the mathematical analyses transparent to the user. The results of these analyses 
were implemented into a user’s display called The Morning Report of Atypical Flights because the 
analyses of the previous day’s flights are performed overnight. The implementation and the use of 
The Morning Report tool is discussed in section 5.3, “Intramural Monitoring.” 
 
The Morning Report is a tool to search for the unexpected. It differs from and complements current 
FOQA tools that focus on exceedances, which are deviations from a predefinition of the appropriate 
performance envelope. No such predefinition is needed for The Morning Report. It automatically 
finds the typical operations and identifies statistically significant deviations from those typical  
operations. (See section 5.3 and Amidan and Ferryman (2005) for additional description of The 
Morning Report.)  
 
The Morning Report displays a summary page as soon as processing is completed. It shows when 
the report was completed, the number of flights analyzed, and the date range of those flights. It 
summarizes the number of atypical flights identified and their level of atypicality. It is similar in its 
presentation to the FOQA exceedance analysis in that it identifies individual flights worthy of atten-
tion. Clicking the flight list button of The Morning Report displays the most extreme 5% of flights 
(level 2 and 3 atypicalities with the option to display level 1 flights) in much the same way that the 
FOQA tools identify and display the levels of the exceedances. Atypical flights within normal  
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operations may, or may not, point to unsafe conditions lurking in the aviation system (Amidan, 
Cooley, et al. (2002); Amidan, Swickard, et al. (2002); Ferryman (2001)). The analyst’s access to 
displays of the specific parameters that were identified as atypical for a flight and of comparisons to 
the typical baseline for each helps the analyst determine the operational significance of the event. 
The results of the operational tests of the prototype of The Morning Report conducted with APMS 
and then adapted to PDARS are reported under “Intramural Monitoring” in section 5.3. 
 
The Morning Report of Atypical Flights was a recipient of the R&D 100 Award as one of the most 
innovative new products of 2005. 
 
Complementary to The Morning Report is the Pattern Search tool, an aid to retrospective search of 
flight-recorded or radar-track data that enables the user to define a pattern of multiple parameters, 
and search for that pattern in a large database (Chidester (2001)). When The Morning Report identi-
fies an atypical pattern in a subset of data, the Pattern Search tool is then used to search the entire 
database for that new pattern. The Pattern Search tool is discussed further in section 5.3. 
 
The focus of the data analysis that resulted in The Morning Report was on the performance of the 
aircraft and, therefore, on the continuous flight-data parameters such as altitude, airspeed, accelera-
tions, and rate of descent. In this process, it was useful to ignore the potential atypicalities in the 
sequences of the discrete data, except as they were used to define “snapshots” of a flight. However, 
the extraction of information from the flight-recorded data of the discrete parameters related to 
activities in the cockpit was always of interest. Therefore, during the final year of the program, a 
study was undertaken that focused on the discrete sensors, specifically, sensors recording pilot  
actions or switches. The purpose was to extract information about the sequences in which the values 
of these parameters change during the course of a flight and to find anomalies in the sequences and 
in the flight behavior based on this information. The conceptual approach was similar to that of The 
Morning Report in that this analysis entails two tasks as part of detecting atypical events in flights: 
first, the identification of atypical flights, and second, finding the events during the course of those 
flights that are anomalous or atypical. The underlying statistical processes that were developed to 
accomplish these tasks are described in Budalakoti et al. (2006). 
 
The first step in the process is to merge the data from all of the discrete sensors into a single  
sequence for each flight that records a sensor only when it makes a transition. The Longest Common 
Sequence (LCS) (see Budalakoti et al. (2006)) was used as the similarity measure for clustering 
flight data. New algorithms were developed that use Bayesian Networks to efficiently identify 
anomalous events during the flights within each cluster. These new algorithms ran up to five times 
faster than the current commonly used methods for clustering on LCS. The information that the 
process provides to the safety analyst is classified into: 
• A sequence of switching that was expected at a given stage did not occur. 
• A sequence of switching that was not expected did occur. 
• A sequence of switching occurred in an unexpected order. 
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The performance of these algorithms was demonstrated using operational data during the approach 
and landing phase of 6400 flights for which the base (typical) clusters were developed and anoma-
lous events in the flights were identified in the atypical clusters (Srivastava (2005)) and Srivastava 
et al. (2006)). There were about 700 individual parameters. The 6400 distinct data sequences varied 
in length from 600 to over 9000 switch changes, with the average sequence length of about 2500. A 
further preprocessing was performed that removed parameters believed to be secondary. These 
parameters are recordings of the reaction of the aircraft to the pilot’s command. For example, when 
the pilot changes the flap position, not only is the command action recorded, but also the reaction of 
a wing sensor that indicates that the position changed. After this reduction, the number of switch 
changes during the approach and landing phase of a single flight in these 6400 flights ranged from 
about 200 to over 1600. 
 
Figure 5.1.2 displays a histogram showing the distribution of sequence lengths. As is clear from the 
figure, around 4000 of the 6400 sequences have lengths less than 500 switches. Another 1500 have 
lengths around 1000, and around 500 sequences have lengths in the 1000 to 1600 range. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1.2. Histogram of sequence lengths in 6400 flights. 
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Current algorithms for calculating the LCS become very slow in practice as the sequence length 
increases. So a new algorithm was developed to calculate the LCS, which is much faster and scales 
better to long sequence lengths. Figure 5.1.3 shows the time taken by two current standard algo-
rithms for calculating the LCS compared with the time using the new hybrid algorithm that was 
developed. The two current algorithms to which the comparison was made are the dynamic pro-
gramming (DP) algorithm (Cormen et al. (1977)) and the Hunt-Szymanski (H-S) algorithm (Hunt 
and Szymanski (1977)). The horizontal axis gives the lengths of the sequences being compared, and 
the vertical axis gives the time taken. As is clear from the graph, the new hybrid algorithm is about a 
factor of five faster than the conventional DP and H-S algorithms currently used for clustering the 
sequences dataset. 
 
The process of clustering on the similarities of normalized (by length of sequence) LCS for the 6400 
flights produced a large cluster of about 3300 flights with an average similarity score of about 0.75. 
It was also found that about 75% of the switch changes occur in the same order for most flights. The 
smallest cluster contained 846 flights with an average similarity score of 0.55. The similarity score 
of a cluster is defined as the average normalized LCS between the elements of the cluster and the 
cluster centroid. The anomalous sequences were those in the clusters that were statistically dissimilar 
from those in the dominant cluster of 3300 flights. 
 
Not only were the anomalous sequences identified, but, unlike many anomaly-detection systems, the 
newly developed algorithms explained why these chosen sequences were considered to be anoma-
lous. There was only time to demonstrate a statistically viable concept before the AvSP ended, and 
there was not time to evaluate its uncertainty or the operational validity of the results of the process.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1.3. Performance comparison of current algorithms with the new hybrid algorithm. 
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Figure 5.1.4 represents how the algorithms present the results in an example based on the landing 
phase of an actual flight. The horizontal axis, read from left to right, represents the time remaining 
until the plane touches the runway. The vertical axis indicates the confidence with which the algo-
rithm predicts a switch should or should not have been activated to make the sequence closer to the 
norm. The positive direction of the vertical axis represents the suggested insertions (i.e., switches) 
the algorithm thinks the pilot should have pressed at that stage but did not. The negative direction 
represents the suggested deletions, (i.e., switches) the algorithm believes the pilot should not have 
pressed at that stage, but did. Thus, a graph with no bars would be representative of a normal flight. 
The colors of the bars indicate the altitude at the time. (Note: Actual altitude data were not used to 
generate this graph.) 
 
As an example, in one application of sequenceMiner, it was discovered that the landing gear had 
been activated in an unusual manner on flight 1147. The flight path of flight 1147 in terms of air-
speed and altitude versus time to touchdown is shown in figure 5.1.5. Upon viewing this figure, a 
domain expert’s comments were “Landing gear goes up and down more than once. This is probably 
a go-around. Unable to determine whether pilot or ATC-related. Low descent after bringing landing 
gear up. Needs to be investigated (with flap information).” This identification of a go-around was 
confirmed when viewed with the perspective shown in figure 5.1.6. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1.4. Switching anomalies during landing phase of 6400 flights. 
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Figure 5.1.5. Switching anomalies during landing phase of flight 1147. 
 
 
Figure 5.1.6. A 3-D view of the landing phase of flight 1147. 
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It is certainly true that a go-around such as this one would have been found by any analysis of the 
continuous flight data. However, it is significant that it was discovered solely from the data on the 
sequence of switches. The sequenceMiner tool opens the possibility of searching for unknown 
anomalous situations in the discrete data in conjunction with the continuous data. 
 
5.1.2 Textual Data Analysis 
Analyses of numerical data with tools like The Morning Report and Pattern Search provide informa-
tion about the characteristics of an event describing what happened, but the question remains: Why 
do professional, highly trained, motivated operators make mistakes? 
 
The formulation of the appropriate intervention in the process of proactive risk management  
requires: 
• Understanding why it happened. 
• What were the causal, contributing, and aggravating factors?  
• Which of these factors are systemic? 
 
Consequently, the next challenge was to automatically extract information from databases of experi-
ential reports to give the safety analyst insight into the why of incidents. This exploitation of incident 
reports requires sophisticated tools to analyze free text and to classify reports in a way that is mean-
ingful to experts. 
 
In order to extract useful information (whether quantitative or textual) from large databases, it is 
necessary to identify global patterns and relationships to aid decision-making. A model was needed 
with which to guide the automated analyses of textual data. The rationale for such a model is  
described in detail in Maille et al. (2006) and is summarized here. 
 
An aviation incident report is the story of the evolution of the reporter’s world from a safe state, 
through a sequence of events and states to a compromised or an anomalous "unsafe" state. Report 
narratives embody naturally occurring chains of events and the transitions between events as  
depicted in figure 5.1.7(a). The following three states can define the “world” of our aviation trans-
portation system: 
• Safe: All the aircraft and people (crews, traffic controllers…) and all the key systems (aircraft 
systems, instrument landing system (ILS)…) are in a state that approximates normalcy. 
• Compromised: An element of the aviation transportation system is in an undesirable state; a 
person is involved in a situation, an aircraft is experiencing compromised performance, or unde-
sirable environmental factors are impinging upon the aircraft. However, the required properties 
of all the involved aircraft are still nominal and the separation between aircraft complies with 
norms. 
• Anomalous: One or more of the required properties of an aircraft or an involved person is  
observably not in compliance with pertinent norms. 
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Figure 5.1.7(a). The experiential report. 
 
 
Further, what is referred to in this analysis of textual reports as an aviation incident will be charac-
terized as follows: 
• Incident: An incident is a finite sequence of states and transitions such that: 
− The first state is safe, 
− The last state is safe, 
− All the other states are either compromised or anomalous, and 
− At least one state is anomalous. 
 
If the state does not return to a safe one, the story is not related to an incident, but to an accident. If 
no anomalous state is reached, the story is not considered to be an incident.  
 
Figure 5.1.7(a) may well be the model of an incident report needed to achieve the objectives of this 
study. However, it is much too complex to be used as a basis for identifying similarities with auto-
mated clustering tools, at least for our initial attempt. Therefore, for the sake of simplification and 
justified on the basis of the experience with ASRS reports, it was decided to emphasize three parts of 
the generic incident model represented in figure 5.1.7(a) for the concept of Scenario represented in 
figure 5.1.7(b); namely, the first (safe) state (the beginning of the story); the sequence of states and 
transitions that lead the world to the anomalous state; and the anomalous state. Thus, the high-level 
definition of the scenario that was adopted for the present model was:  
 
Scenario = {Context + Behavior Î Outcome} 
 
With this simplified definition of scenario: 
• The Context fits the exact description of the situation in the last safe state. 
• The Behavior contains all the problematic events that occur during the transition from the last 
safe state to the anomalous state. 
• The Outcome describes why the anomalous state is considered anomalous. It does not necessar-
ily contain all the parameters used to describe the state. 
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Scenario = (Context + Behavior => Outcome) 
Figure 5.1 7(b). The scenario model of the experiential report. 
 
 
This simplified model may not apply to all systems or even for the aviation transportation system; 
other Scenarios could be stated and will, perhaps, have to be explored in future work. For example, 
another Scenario might highlight the recovery to the final safe state to study which parameters influ-
enced the recovery process (and so prevented an accident). Also, this model does not provide for the 
possible changes in context across the three states. The context of the last safe state is assumed to 
prevail throughout the incident. Nevertheless, there is merit in starting with the simplest possible 
model. 
 
The notion of the Scenario was useful to guiding the automated analysis and extraction of clusters of 
similar incident reports from large databases. Indeed, when the search is not based on a predefined 
specific issue or a preselected example report, a meaningful way to build clusters is to group reports 
with similar Scenarios. Identifying the main Scenarios in a database (i.e., their profiles) should help 
experts identify major safety issues and obtain clues for designing intervention strategies. 
 
The model that was established to guide automated analyses established, also, the capabilities 
needed to perform the analyses. The state-of-the-art of text-analysis tools that could meet these 
needs was reviewed. Figure 5.1.8 diagrams the state-of-the-art of Natural Language Processing 
(NLP) showing the stages of expression detection with examples of the expressions that would be 
identified with a particular concept (e.g., the concept of “familiarity”). 
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Figure 5.1.8. Stages of expression detection. 
 
 
Many techniques based on statistical correlation (commonly known as “bag of words” classification) 
cope very well with string matching and identification of similar expressions and have been used in 
a variety of successful search engines. However, capabilities for extracting meaning are extremely 
limited and even syntactic parsing or event extraction push the state-of-the-art of NLP. The Scenario 
model of the incident reports requires some of the capabilities of both bag of words and NLP for the 
desired analyses.  
 
The Scenario is defined by the subsets of parameters that describe the Context, the Behavior, and the 
Outcome of the incident model that are specific to the “story” of a particular incident report. These 
descriptors constitute the taxonomic structureTP3 PT for our world of aviation-safety-incident reports. 
Although a wide variety of taxonomic structures is used in the different accident/incident databases, 
the taxonomic structure of the ASRS database was chosen because this database was used to develop 
the ASMM’s text-analysis capabilities and because it is representative of reports of incidents in our 
world of aviation (Maille et al. (2006)). 
 
                                                 
TP
3
P By taxonomic structure, we mean a structured set of terms that describe some domain or topic. The taxonomic structure 
provides a skeletal structure for a knowledge base. 
Scenario Template
String Matching
Part-of-Speech/
Entity Extraction 
Syntactic Parsing
Event Extraction
Event Co 
reference 
Mature 
research 
“Unfamiliar”, “Unacquainted” 
 
 
“This setting was * new to me”  
(* = “somewhat”, “quite”, “entirely” 
   but  ≠ “not”, or “not quite”) 
 
 
“The regulations had * changed * 
since…. 
 
“I had not performed this procedure 
for years…..” 
 
“I (did something) … we went too 
high because on this plane the 
(tool) is more sensitive than on the 
737 “ (suggesting that the pilot is 
familiar with the B737, but not the 
plane he is flying right now)  
UExample: familiarity
N
LP
 D
ep
th
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A report to the ASRS comprises a set of attributes (the fixed fields) and the values of those attributes 
(entered by the reporter) plus the reporter’s narrative of the incident. A structured set of “descrip-
tors” is currently used to describe the incident and store it in the database.  
 
The study started with a prescribed subset of incident reports (aggregated by a selected phase of 
flight and aircraft type). Then, domain experts identified all the possible anomalous states (i.e., 
Outcomes) for the selected aircraft type and phase of flight. In fact, the set of anomalous states that 
were used were those that the ASRS had identified based on its nearly 30 years of experience. With 
the help of the ASRS analysts, the specific attributes in the fixed fields of the ASRS reports that 
describe each of the possible anomalous state were defined. Further, the domain experts identified 
the descriptive parameters (i.e., attributes in the fixed fields) of the Context important to the selected 
aircraft type and phase of flight. Then, in the first stage of automated filtering, clustering was per-
formed based on similarities among the objective parameters that define the Context of the Scenario 
combined with the objective parameters that define each possible Outcome of the Scenario in the 
subset of reports. Because all of these objective parameters were contained within the fixed fields of 
the ASRS reports, relatively conventional statistical techniques were adequate. Figure 5.1.9 may 
help in the understanding of this perspective on Context and Outcome. 
 
Identification of all the objective parameters of the Context and the Outcome that exist in a particu-
lar Scenario is an adequate definition of what happened, and available statistical techniques are 
adequate for analyzing the Contest and the Outcome from the fixed fields of an ASRS report. The 
Automatic Language Analysis Navigator (ALAN), a text comprehension tool developed by  
Battelle’s Pacific Northwest Division that clusters textual data, was used. ALAN uses well-defined 
objective factors in the fixed fields or in the narrative to identify aviation-safety reports that have 
similar topics, or to identify clusters of reports that are similar to a given exemplar (Willse, et al. 
(2002)). 
 
 
• Context  
− Aircraft make/model 
− Airport equipment 
− Weather (snow, ice, fog, …)  
− Light (dark, dawn/dusk) 
− Metrological conditions (IMC,  
borderline) 
− Phase of flight (takeoff, cruise,  
approach, landing…) 
− Etc. 
• Outcome 
− Altitude deviation 
− Conflict (airborne or ground) 
− Ground incursion 
− In-flight Wx encounter 
− Maintenance problem 
− Nonadherence 
− Airspace violation 
− Etc. 
Note: In ASRS reports, these are usually identifiable from the fixed fields. 
Figure 5.1.9. The parameters of Context and Outcome. 
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In fact, clustering on the what may prove to be pragmatically sufficient for an effective retrospective 
search for similar incidents, even though the explanation of why may be quite different for the clus-
ters of incidents. However, other incident report forms may not have all the information needed to 
define the Context and the Outcome and would require analysis of the free text to extract this infor-
mation. 
 
All this, so far, has been preparatory to pursuing the objective of automatically defining the why. 
The understanding of why the incident happened relies on exploitation of the free text and the  
extraction of subjective parameters.TP4 PT Natural language understanding is needed to extract informa-
tion about Behavior from free narratives.  
 
Experience with reading a great many ASRS reports has shown that reporters tend to tell why the 
incident occurred. Frequently, reporters provide “advice” in their reports to the ASRS, which implies 
the reporter’s perception of causal factors and potential interventions. The advice is often associated 
with the words “should” or “ought,” as in the following few exemplary excerpts taken from ASRS 
reports: 
 
I FEEL THAT THESE DEER SHOULD BE EITHER RELOCATED OR INSTALL A FENCE 
AROUND THE ARPT 
 
THIS APCH SHOULD BE OTS IF SUCH A RESTR IS REQUIRED, AND WINDS ALOFT ARE 
FROM THE N. 
 
I FEEL THAT THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN A HOLD SHORT LINE BEFORE RWY 1. 
 
A SE TXWY SHOULD BE INSTALLED. 
 
THE INCORRECT PAPERWORK SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED WELL BEFORE  
DEPARTING, BUT PRESSURE TO KEEP THINGS MOVING PUT US IN A 'GO' MODE 
 
I THINK THE SIGN SHOULD BE TO THE L (S) OF TXWY G AND PARALLEL TO RWY 35L/17R. 
 
I FREQUENTLY HAVE TO ASK FOR WIND INFO FOR TKOFS AND LNDGS WHICH SHOULD 
ALWAYS BE GIVEN. 
 
BECAUSE OF TIME PRESSURE TO GET FLT OUT, THE REQUIREMENT TO CHK OIL  
QUANTITY WAS OVERLOOKED AND NO ONE FROM MAINT SHOWED UP TO CHK. AN  
ENTRY SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE AND SIGNED OFF IN LOGBOOK BUT WAS NOT. 
 
PERHAPS A TAXI INSTRUCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE, IN REGARDS TO THE TXWY 
MERGER, OUGHT TO BE GIVEN SOME CONSIDERATION. 
 
                                                 
P
4
PT The experiential narratives of ASRS reports are a rich source of information regarding the behaviors of pilots, air-
traffic controllers, other persons, and automated agents during the course of the reported events. However, the unstruc-
tured nature of these data creates an analytical challenge. 
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IT OUGHT TO HAVE A WARNING HORN AT 300 FT FROM ALT 
 
TWR OUGHT NOT TO SEQUENCE RELATIVELY FAST ACFT SUCH AS MY M20R BEHIND 
TRAINERS 
 
WE OUGHT TO GO TO SCHOOL ON THIS TO PREVENT PROBS THAT COULD RESULT AT 
NIGHT OR IN THE WX. 
 
HE OUGHT TO FIND A NEW GATE FOR THAT INBOUND FLT 
 
Notice that in these examples and many others (though not all others), the causal factors and rec-
ommended interventions are linked to contextual factors rather than the identification of cognitive 
behavioral factors such as loss of situational awareness (which was, in fact, the first direction that 
this study of Behavior took).  
 
It was decided that this argument was valid, that it would be fruitless to try to separate contextual 
factors from behavior, and that the two are going to be closely connected in the experiential report. 
Consequently, the focus shifted to capturing fully from the free text the contextual factors that the 
experiential report says influenced the reporter’s behavior. To avoid confusion with the objective 
parameters of the Context (from the fixed fields) that were addressed previously, these factors  
derived from the narrative that influenced the behavior are referred to as “Shaping Factors.” Conse-
quently, the causal factors of an event as modeled by the Scenario consists of the factors that  
described the context of the initial safe state (i.e., the Contextual Factors) and the factors that influ-
enced the reporter’s behavior (i.e., the Shaping Factors).  
 
With the assistance of colleagues in human-factors research and operational personnel, and based on 
the experience of the ASRS reports, a set of 14 factors that influence human performance in aviation 
operations was formulated. Table 5.0 lists the set of 14 Shaping Factors with brief definitions and 
exemplary expressions taken from ASRS reports that were used to evaluate the ability to identify 
factors such as these automatically from the free narrative of a set of ASRS reports (Posse et al. 
(2004)). 
 
TABLE 5.0. SHAPING FACTORS – A SUBSET OF CONTEXT FACTORS DESCRIBING  
EXPERIENTIAL TEXTUAL DATA 
 
Factor Definition Example 
Attitude Any indication of unprofessional or antagonis-
tic attitude by a controller or flightcrew mem-
ber, complacency, or get-home-itis (being in a 
hurry to get home). 
“I believe a contributing 
factor was complacency 
flying a very familiar  
approach, also it was our 
last leg get-there-itis.” 
Communication 
environment 
Interferences with communications in the 
cockpit such as noise, auditory interference, 
radio frequency congestion, or language 
barrier. 
“We were unable to hear 
because traffic alert and 
collision avoidance system 
were very loud.” 
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TABLE 5.0. SHAPING FACTORS (Concluded) 
 
Factor Definition Example 
Duty cycle A strong indication of an unusual working 
period, including a long day, flying very late at 
night, exceeding duty-time regulations, and 
having short and inadequate rest periods. 
“Flight had previously been 
delayed and we had mini-
mum rest period coming up, 
less than 9 hours.” 
Familiarity Any indication of a lack of factual knowledge, 
such as new to or unfamiliar with the com-
pany, airport, or aircraft. 
“Both pilots were unfamiliar 
with the area.” 
Illusion Illusions include bright lights that cause 
something to blend in, a black hole, white-out 
confusion, or sloping terrain. 
“I was flying and was experi-
encing a black hole effect.” 
Physical  
environment 
Unusual physical conditions that could impair 
flying or make things more difficult, such as 
unusually hot or cold temperatures inside the 
cockpit, cluttered workspace, visual interfer-
ence, bad weather, or turbulence. 
“This occurred because of 
the intense glare of the sun.” 
Physical factors Pilot ailment that could impair flying or make 
things more difficult, such as being tired, 
fatigued, drugged, incapacitated, influenced 
by alcohol, suffering from vertigo, illness, 
dizziness, hypoxia, nausea, loss of sight, or 
loss of hearing. 
“I allowed fatigue and stress 
to cloud my judgment.” 
Preoccupation A preoccupation, distraction, or division of 
attention that creates a deficit in performance, 
such as being preoccupied, busy (doing 
something else), or distracted. 
“My attention was divided 
inappropriately.” 
Pressure Psychological pressure, such as feeling 
intimidated, pressured, pressed for time, or 
being low on fuel. 
“I felt rushed to complete the 
checklist in time.” 
Proficiency  A general deficit in capabilities such as inex-
perience, lack of training, not qualified, not 
current, or lack of proficiency. 
“The biggest safety factor 
here is the lack of adequate 
training in the newer auto-
pilot system.” 
Resource  
deficiency 
Absence, insufficient number, or poor quality 
of a resource, such as overworked or  
unavailable controller, insufficient or out-of-
date chart, equipment malfunction, or inop-
erative, deferred, or missing equipment. 
“Later I learned the minimum 
equipment list was wrong.” 
Task load Indicators of a heavy workload or many tasks 
at once, such as short-handed crew. 
“Due to high workload, I 
forgot to switch to tower.” 
Unexpected Something sudden and surprising that is not 
expected. 
“Had we known of him prior 
to takeoff we would have 
made adjustments.” 
Other Anything else that could be a shaper, such as 
shift change, passenger discomfort, or disori-
entation.  
“This happened during shift 
change.” “Ill passenger on 
board.” 
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These Shaping Factors are not mutually exclusive, and some may be more difficult to discriminate 
than others. Nor are these factors suggested as the “full and complete” set of contextual factors that 
can influence human performance. At this stage, they were selected simply to test the concept on 
their automated identification in a subset of ASRS reports.  
 
The next step was to test the ability to use these definitions and exemplary phrases to discriminate 
reliably the Shaping Factors from the free narratives of the ASRS reports that pertained to each 
Scenario. However, it is not sufficient to simply find such expressions in the narratives, because the 
context in which they are used must be accounted for. Most importantly, the narratives must be 
checked for the presence of negative modifiers in close proximity to a given expression that changes 
the meaning of the expression. For example, the expressions “I have not had an exhausting day,” “If 
I had felt I was tired I would...,” “…fatigue was not an issue,” indicate that fatigue was, in fact, not a 
significant factor. 
 
Consequently, it was recognized that the traditional keyword-based and bag-of-words classification 
approaches that worked so well on the fixed fields for analyzing the Context and the Outcome of 
each Scenario would be of limited value for analyzing the Shaping Factors of Behavior. More com-
plex pattern extraction methods were required, and an understanding of the nature of the narratives 
to be analyzed was needed in order to identify the most appropriate available methods.  
 
The narratives of incident reports are, generally, highly informal and replete with the acronyms, 
idioms, multiple spellings, misspellings, and ambiguous abbreviations that are specific to each  
domain, and even to tasks. The informal reporting setting tends to produce poor grammar, spelling 
variants, very domain- or task-specific expressions, as well as jargon. Stream of consciousness 
permeates the reports, which often exhibit feelings of anger, guilt, or defense. Styles and even lan-
guages vary dramatically, from telegraphic to very detailed, and they depend on the narrator, 
whether or not he/she is a pilot, an air-traffic controller, a flight attendant, a mechanic, or ground 
personnel. The following ASRS report is representative of incident reports and illustrates some of 
these characteristics:  
 
“I RETURNED FROM A LCL TRNING FLT. PER TWR, WE LANDED ON RWY 4R AT MDW. 
SHORTLY AFTER OUR T/D, THE ACFT EXPERIENCED SEVERE NOSE SHIMMY VIBRATION. 
WE SLOWED DOWN AND TURNED LEFT AS PER TWR INSTRUCTIONS OFF OF RWY 4R. WE 
SWITCHED TO GND AND THEY TOLD US TO TAXI TO THE N RAMP. WE PROCEEDED TO 
DO SO. FIVE SECS LATER, GND ASKED US HOW DO WE HEAR. WE TOLD THEM LOUD AND 
CLEAR. AFTER 15 SECS GND TOLD US TO CALL THE TWR. WE DID AND TWR TOLD US WE 
XED AN ACTIVE RWY (4L) W/O THEIR PERMISSION. TWR SAID AS WE WERE LNDG HE 
TOLD US TO TURN LEFT AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 4L AND REMAIN WITH HIM. WE  
OBVIOUSLY DID NOT HEAR HIM DUE TO THE EXTREME NOISE CAUSED BY THE NOSE 
SHIMMY. GND SHOULD NOT HAVE TOLD US TO TAXI TO THE N RAMP. TWR TOLD US ON 
THE PHONE THAT THERE WAS LNDG TFC ROLLING ON RWY 4L AT THE TIME WE XED 
RWY 4L. “ 
 
Consequently, the automation effort combined language normalization and knowledge infusion from 
domain experts. Normalization produces readable and correct English text, whereas knowledge 
infusion elicits the peculiar expressions used by personnel involved in aviation operations. A way 
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was needed to standardize the language of our world of flight operations before an automated analy-
sis of this sort of text could be expected. 
 
Under the ASMM Project, the Battelle’s Pacific Northwest Division developed a preprocessing tool 
called PLADS to standardize the language of unstructured text so as to facilitate its reliable auto-
mated analysis. PLADS uses a combination of standard dictionary English and domain-specific 
concepts to improve text-mining effectiveness. PLADS is composed of software (Java, Matlab, and 
Perl) and lexicons. The development of the lexicons when PLADS is adapted to a new domain for 
the first time requires an expert in PLADS working with an expert in the reporting language of that 
domain (Posse et al. (2005)). 
 
PLADS is an acronym of the names of the following five stages of filtering performed on each 
report prior to its automated analysis. 
• UPUhrases identified and concatenated. Identify phrases in the unstructured text by statistical 
means by identifying 2-, 3-, 4-, or 5-word strings that occur more often than one would expect 
based solely on the individual word frequency. Then concatenate the phrase together into 
what would be identified as a single word to subsequent software: e.g., ClassCAirspace,  
UnitedStatesOfAmerica. 
• ULUeave some words unprocessed. 
• UAUugment some words to make the meaning more useful for computer analysis by subsequent 
software. Some words have “too much” information; that is, they may be abbreviations for  
instruments and/or concepts with make/model/series, or numeric values of selected concepts. 
Examples include:  
− “B-757-300” might be augmented with the word “airplane.” 
− “FL28” (“FL26,” “FL30”) means “flight level at approximately 28,000 (26,000, 30,000) 
feet.” Augmenting with “FlightLevel” enables subsequent software to identify these 3 (and  
others) as related to a flight-level concept leaving the refinements of which specific flight 
level to finer grain analysis. 
− “24L,” “24R,” “25L,” and “25R” all relate to runways. Augmenting with the word “runway” 
enables the software to capture that concept. 
− Proper names are often augmented with the more general concept; e.g. “Dallas” augmented 
with “city.” 
− Airport abbreviations are often augmented with the word “airport”; e.g. “LAX,” “ORD,” and 
“DFW.” 
• UDUelete some words to simplify the analysis. These words are often called “stop” words. Exam-
ples include: “the,” “a,” and “an.” Some times numbers are deleted. 
• USUubstitute some words for others. Often there are many ways to express the same concept,  
including synonyms, abbreviations, jargon, and slang. For example, “pilot” might be substituted 
for these words: “pilot,” “pilots,” “co-pilot,” “captain,” “co-captain,” “left seater,” “PIC,” “Pilot-
in-Charge,” “plt,” and “plts.” Standard abbreviations can be checked and full meanings substi-
tuted. Numbers that are spelled out can be replaced by the numeral. 
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PLADS does not directly assess anything. It is used as a preprocessor in conjunction with other text-
analysis tools, whether they entail statistical (i.e.; bag-of-words classification) or NLP tools, to 
facilitate analysis of free text. 
 
Following is an example of an ASRS report shown previously after it has been processed through 
PLADS: 
 
I RETURNED FROM A LOCAL TURNINGTP5 PT FLIGHT. PER TOWER, WE LANDED ON RUNWAY 
4R AT MDW. SHORTLY AFTER OUR TOUCHDOWN, THE AIRCRAFT EXPERIENCED SEVERE 
NOSE SHIMMY VIBRATION. WE SLOWED DOWN AND TURNED LEFT AS PER TOWER  
INSTRUCTIONS OFF OF RUNWAY 4R. WE SWITCHED TO GROUND AND THEY TOLD US TO 
TAXI TO THE NORTH RAMP. WE PROCEEDED TO DO SO. FIVE SECONDS LATER, GROUND 
ASKED US HOW DO WE HEAR. WE TOLD THEM LOUD AND CLEAR. AFTER 15 SECONDS 
GROUND TOLD US TO CALL THE TOWER. WE DID AND TOWER TOLD US WE CROSSED AN 
ACTIVE RUNWAY WITHOUT THEIR PERMISSION. TOWER SAID AS WE WERE LANDING HE 
TOLD US TO TURN LEFT AND HOLD SHORT OF RUNWAY 4L AND REMAIN WITH HIM. WE 
OBVIOUSLY DID NOT HEAR HIM DUE TO THE EXTREME NOISE CAUSED BY THE NOSE 
SHIMMY. GROUND SHOULD NOT HAVE TOLD US TO TAXI TO THE NORTH RAMP. TOWER 
TOLD US ON THE PHONE THAT THERE WAS LANDING TRAFFIC ROLLING ON RUNWAY 4L 
AT THE TIME WE CROSSED RUNWAY 4L. 
 
The work described previously to capture the Context and Outcome of ASRS reports was based on 
the fixed-field (objective) data for which statistical (i.e., bag of words classification) tools worked 
very well. However, something more was needed to capture the significant information that the 
reporter conveys in the free text. The information in the free text does not lend itself to statistical 
classification because the requirement is to extract meaning about Shaping Factors that tends to be 
more subjective than objective (as is evidenced by the exemplary statements from ASRS reports 
used in table 5.0).  
 
After an investigation into available tools, the General Architecture for Text Engineering (GATE) 
tool was selected to capture NLP of the ASRS narratives after they had been processed through 
PLADS. GATE, a software tool created by University of Sheffield (Hhttp://nlp.shef.ac.uk/H), is one of 
the most widely used human-language processing systems in the world. GATE has had great success 
at TREC (Text Retrieval Conference series) cosponsored by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, the Information Technology Laboratory's Retrieval Group of the Information Access 
Division, and the Advanced R&D Activity of the Department of Defense (DOD) in competition with 
numerous other techniques.  
 
GATE comprises an architecture, framework, and graphical development environment to identify 
evidence of specific concepts contained in unstructured text. The concepts may be vaguely defined, 
and phrased in a way as to require subtle insight to identify their existence (Manning and Schültze 
(1999) and Cunningham et al. (2002)). GATE provides framework for applying customizable tools 
for data-mining. A GATE gazetteer is a list of expressions that map to a specific set of concepts. 
There may be many specific expressions enumerated that will be associated to one specific concept. 
                                                 
P
5
P Notice that “TRING” was incorrectly converted into “TURNING” rather than “TRAINING.” 
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Gazetteers may produce more false positives, but less false negatives because exact matches are 
determined out of context. Therefore, gazetteers are a good way to start encoding simple expressions 
of the Shaping Factors to control the false-negative rate. GATE includes, for example, a pattern 
specification language called Java Annotation Patterns Engine (JAPE), which describes patterns to 
match that will be associated with specific concepts. In the particular domain of this study, reports 
can be tagged with respect to the Shaping Factors, where the tags correspond to the patterns coded in 
JAPE for matching to the text. JAPE rules can be refined very rapidly without having to rewrite 
large pieces of code and can easily handle matching exceptions. The tools available within GATE 
enable identification of specific concepts using synonyms and Boolean expressions to identify natu-
ral language phrases that were not envisioned.  
 
Following is an example of the application of JAPE to Pilot Fatigue, which is one of the Physical 
Factors of the 14 Shaping Factors defined in table 5.0. The guidance was that a hint of the possibility 
of Pilot Fatigue being a factor would be when a pilot mentions that an incident occurred during a 
certain leg of a several-day/-leg trip. Mining the ASRS database revealed all of the following  
variants: 
 
LAST LEG OF A 2 DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF A TWO DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF A 3 DAY TRIP 
FINAL LEG OF A 3 DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF A 3-DAY TRIP 
FINAL LEG OF A 3-DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF A LONG 3-DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF A LONG 5-LEG DAY 
LAST LEG OF 3 DAY TRIP 
FINAL LEG OF 3 DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF 3-DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF A FOUR DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF A 4 DAY TRIP 
FINAL LEG OF A 4 DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF A 4-DAY TRIP 
FINAL LEG OF A 4-DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF 4 DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF AN ALL DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF OUR 3 DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF A SIX LEG WAY 
LAST LEG OF THE DAY 
FINAL LEG OF THE DAY 
LAST LEG OF THE TRIP 
LAST LEG OF A LONG TRIP 
FINAL LEG OF THE TRIP 
LAST LEG OF A 4 LEG 
LAST LEG OF 4 LEGS 
LAST LEG OF A LONG DAY 
LAST LEG OF A VERY LONG DAY 
LAST LEG OF THE NIGHT 
LAST FLIGHT OF THE DAY 
LAST FLIGHT OF A 2 DAY TRIP 
LAST FLIGHT OF THE TRIP 
LAST FLIGHT OF THAT DAY 
LAST FLIGHT OF THAT DAY 
LAST FLIGHT OF A FOUR DAY TRIP 
LAST FLIGHT OF A 5 LEG 
LAST FLIGHT OF A LONG BYT UNPROFITABLE DAY 
LAST SEGMENT OF A 3-DAY 
FINAL SEGMENT OF A LEG WAY 
NEXT TO LAST LEG OF TRIP 
DAY 2 ON A 4 DAY TRIP 
THIRD DAY OF A 3 DAY TRIP 
THIRD DAY OF A 4 DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF DAY #3 
3RD LEG OF A 4 LEG 
3RD DAY OF A 4-DAY TRIP 
THIRD LEG OF A 4 LEG, 1 DAY TRIP 
THIRD DAY OF A 3 DAY TRIP 
THIRD DAY ON A 4 DAY TRIP 
THIRD LEG OF A 2 DAY TRIP 
4TH AND LAST LEG OF THE TRIP 
4TH LEG OF A LONG DAY 
FIFTH LEG OF THE DAY 
SIXTH LEG OF A SEVEN LEG DAY 
10TH LEG OF AN 11 LEG DAY ON DAY 3 OF A 3 DAY TRIP 
11TH LEG OF THE DAY 
10 HRS INTO A 12 HR DUTY DAY 
NEARING THE END OF A LONG 3-DAY TRIP 
END OF A 2-DAY TRIP 
END OF A 3 DAY TRIP 
DAY THREE OF A THREE DAY TRIP 
DAY 3 OF A THREE DAY TRIP 
DAY 4 OF 4 DAYS 
DAY 4 OF A 4 DAY TRIP 
THIRD DAY OF A THREE DAY TRIP 
SECOND DAY OF A THREE DAY TRIP 
LAST NIGHT OF A 6 NIGHT TRIP 
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JAPE enables the provision of rules to cope with all such possible variations. 
 
Although there are numerous other methods of doing NLP, this study found NLP via GATE to be 
the most effective at identifying specific concepts in the free text of ASRS reports. GATE/JAPE 
was used to identify the Shaping Factors associated with a subset of 17,155 ASRS reports identified 
by a search of the ASRS database for 10 specific anomalous Outcomes (Ferryman et al. (2006)). 
Figure 5.1.10 is an example of some of the results of these analyses.  
 
This example is for the Scenario with the Outcome of Landing without a Clearance and it is associ-
ated with the Approach and Landing phase of flight. The green asterisks * are the probabilities of 
the occurrences of each of the 13 Shaping Factors (the Other category was omitted in this discus-
sion) during an Approach and Landing phase of flight. The red dots • are the probabilities of the 
occurrences of the Shaping Factors during the Scenario of Landing without a Clearance in this phase 
of flight. The hash marks on either side of the red dots are the 80% and 99% uncertainty intervals. A 
Shaping Factor is significantly associated with this Scenario when the ratio of the latter probability 
(i.e., the red dot) to the former (the green asterisk) is greater than 1.0, as in the cases of those indi-
cated by the blue arrows      for Communication Environment, Duty Cycle, Physical Environment, 
Physical Factors, Preoccupation, Proficiency, and Task Load. When both probabilities are small, the 
numerical stability of their ratio is questionable as in the cases of Attitude, Familiarity, Illusion, 
Pressure, and Resource Deficiency.  
 
 
Figure 5.1.10. An example of the probability of Shaping Factors. 
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In the results of this experiment shown in table 5.1, the significant Shaping Factors are identified and 
ranked (by odds ratio) for each of the 10 anomalous Outcomes in its associated phase of flight.  
 
Validation of results of the study was based solely on expert opinion. When the results of both the 
probably important (shown in table 5.1) and the probably unimportant Shaping Factors that had been 
identified in associations with anomalies were presented to a group of experts in aviation operations, 
they unanimously agreed that, in each of the 10 Scenarios, the results seemed entirely reasonable 
and plausible. This outcome demonstrated a capability to analyze the narratives of experiential 
reports for identification of the Shaping Factors of the human behavior in a group of reports of the 
same anomalous incident that is consistent with expert opinion. This validation was considered 
adequate for purposes of defining why the event occurred, considering the reliability of the incident 
reports. 
 
The experiments used the ASRS database as a resource for developing the analysis methodology. 
Nevertheless, the approach is expected to be applicable to any incident-reporting system because the 
ASRS is representative of all such databases. The methodology is sufficiently generic to be used 
with any database of textual reports of aviation incidents. This fact was demonstrated by applying 
the process to a set of ASAP reports that were in a format quite different from those in the ASRS 
database, showing that it was possible to reliably categorize the reports by their Context and Out-
comes into the anomalies that had been defined by the ASRS Office. The process could be adapted 
to any other set of anomalies or to new ones given their definitions and an exemplary report. A 
capability was demonstrated to extract information with adequate credibility on the Shaping Factors 
associated with each identified anomaly found in a large database of ASAP reports (that could have 
come from a single air carrier or de-identified from multiple air carriers).  
 
There remained one final objective to be achieved by the Data Analysis Tools Development team: to 
create mechanisms to link information extracted from disparate numerical and textual data sources, 
as, for example, FOQA and ASAP data. The systems for analyzing FOQA and ASAP databases 
were developed independently, they are heterogeneous databases, and they have different classifica-
tions. Nevertheless, there are potential synergies because the FOQA data describe what happened, 
whereas the ASAP data have information about why it happened. A solution was sought to link the 
complementary information extracted from each with concordance based on the same anomalous 
event within common constraints of flight phase, aircraft type, airport of origin or destination, and 
month(s) of the year, A process was developed for accomplishing this objective, and the capability 
was demonstrated by linking information about Shaping Factors from ASAP reports with informa-
tion about the other contextual features of the same anomalous incidents extracted from FOQA data. 
The underlying process by which the linkage is performed is diagramed in figure 5.1.11. The user’s 
interface for using this process is shown in figure 5.1.12. 
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TABLE 5.1. SHAPING FACTORS IDENTIFIED WITH SELECTED ANOMALIES 
 
Ground Flight Phase 
• Maintenance problem is associated with: 
− Pressure (Relative importance = 2.1) 
• Ground incursion is associated with: 
− Familiarity (Relative importance = 2.0) 
− Communication environment (Relative importance = 1.9) 
− Pre-occupation (Relative importance = 1.8) 
− Task load (Relative importance = 1.8) 
Take-off Flight Phase 
• Air conflict is associated with: 
− Task load (Relative Importance = 1.9) 
− Communication environment (Relative importance = 1.7) 
• Nonadherence is associated with: 
− Preoccupation (Relative importance = 1.6) 
Ascent Flight Phase 
• Altitude deviation is associated with: 
− Preoccupation (Relative importance = 2.7) 
− Proficiency (Relative importance = 2.1) 
− Physical factors (Relative importance = 2.1) 
− Duty cycle (Relative importance = 1.9) 
Cruise Flight Phase 
• Altitude deviation is associated with: 
− Preoccupation (Relative importance = 3.3) 
− Physical factors (Relative importance = 2.0) 
• Air conflict is associated with:  
− Communication environment (Relative importance = 1.6) 
Descent Flight Phase 
• In-flight Wx encounter is associated with: 
− Pressure (Relative importance = 3.1) 
• Altitude deviation is associated with: 
− Preoccupation (Relative importance = 1.8) 
− Proficiency (Relative importance = 1.6) 
− Familiarity (Relative importance = 1.5) 
Approach and Landing Flight Phase 
• Landing without clearance is associated with: 
− Preoccupation (Relative importance = 4.2) 
− Physical factors (Relative importance = 2.8) 
− Duty cycle (Relative importance = 2.7) 
− Proficiency (Relative importance = 2.4) 
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Figure 5.1.11. The Process for FOQA – ASAP linkage. 
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Figure 5.1.12. Parallax: The interface to FOQA-ASAP linkage. 
 
 
The user’s interface, called Parallax (shown in figure 5.1.12), allows the user to initiate a query 
starting from either the ASAP databases or the FOQA databases by specifying the constraints that 
define the data set (i.e., anomalous event, flight phase, aircraft type, airport, and time period). For 
example, to use Parallax, the user selects (from the drop-down menus shown at the top left of the 
figure) the phase of flight, the aircraft make/model, the time interval of the search, possibly the 
airport, and the event type. A single click initiates the search of the FOQA data.  
 
The criteria for the Pattern Search tool to search flight-recorded data for each of the anomalous 
events are predefined and stored. These criteria have been defined in terms of the flight-recorded 
parameters by domain experts who are knowledgeable about flight data and familiar with these 
anomalies.TP6 PT The Pattern Search tool is used on the FOQA database of a single air carrier or multiple 
air carriers to categorize flights with respect to each of the anomalous Outcomes (as depicted on the 
left side of the figure).  
                                                 
P
6
P Not all of the ASRS anomalies (for example, cabin events such as passenger misconduct or passenger illness) are 
identifiable from flight-recorded data. 
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The portion of the screen just below “FOQA Flights” automatically displays the number of flights in 
that subset with and without the selected event. Below that are displayed the number of flights in the 
selected subset and the total number of flights available in the database.  
 
When the user clicks on Storymeister under FOQA Flights, the Flight-Data Storymeister is dis-
played, as illustrated by figure 5.1.13. The Flight-Data Storymeister, developed by Battelle’s Pacific 
Northwest Division, identifies the Contextual Factors and describes the event in natural language. 
The Flight-Data Storymeister provides a high-level preliminary analysis of the search results in the 
format and language familiar to the user. It presents the discriminating features of the selected set of 
flight data. Discriminating features are parameter values with unexpectedly high or low frequencies 
or discrete parameters that show unexpected transition patterns. (In the example of figure 5.1.13, 
these discriminating features are the parameters shown at the left and ranked by frequency of occur-
rence.) In the application to flight data, the key discriminating features are the parameter averages. 
Storymeister contrasts flights having one or more of the selected anomalous events with flights that 
have none of the selected events within the constraints (i.e. flight phase, month(s), aircraft type, and 
airport) of the subset of reports being analyzed. An example of a display from the Flight-Data 
Storymeister is shown in figure 5.1.13. To the right are shown the location of the event and below 
that, the secondary combined events. 
 
 
Figure 5.1.13. An example of a display from the Flight-Data Storymeister. 
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A click on Link to ASAP on Parallax (figure 5.1.12) initiates the comparable analyses of the ASAP 
database. As indicated in figure 5.1.11, concordance of the incident-report data with the flight data is 
based on the same anomalous event under the common constraints of flight phase, aircraft type, 
airport, and time of year. From any single database of incident reports, such as a set of ASAP reports 
from a single air carrier or from multiple sources of incident reports (perhaps including ASRS) 
(depicted on the right side of figure 5.1.11), the reports are automatically categorized with respect to 
the anomalous Outcomes as defined by the ASRS (or any modification of those). For each anomaly, 
the subset of reports is analyzed for the Shaping Factors that are identified and the results are  
described to the user in natural language by the Incident-Report Storymeister developed by  
Battelle’s Pacific Northwest Division. An example of a display from the Incident-Report  
Storymeister is shown in figure 5.1.14. 
 
Just like the Flight-Data Storymeister, the Incident-Report Storymeister provides a high-level pre-
liminary analysis of the results in the format and language familiar to the user. It presents the dis-
criminating features of the selected set of reports. Discriminating features are values in the fixed 
fields of the reports and textual terms in the narrative with unexpectedly high or low frequencies. 
In the application to ASAP reports, the key discriminating factors are the Shaping Factors.  
Storymeister contrasts flights having one or more of the selected anomalous events with flights that 
 
 
Figure 5.1.14. An example of the display from the Incident-Report Storymeister. 
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have none of the selected events within the constraints (i.e., flight phase, month(s), aircraft type, and 
airport) of the subset of reports being analyzed. For each such anomalous event, Storymeister states 
the relative importance of the specified Shaping Factors. 
 
The information from the FOQA data about the Contextual Factors together with the information 
from the ASAP reports about Shaping Factors gives the safety analyst understanding and insight into 
the causal factors of an incident and enables decisions defining the most appropriate intervention.  
 
In summary, the Data Analysis Tools Development element of the ASMM Project produced the 
following capabilities: 
• The PROFILER – the statistical analysis of digital data that underlies the displays of The Morn-
ing Report of Atypical Flights. 
• The Pattern Search tool – a convenient way for safety experts to state the criteria for any pattern 
of numerical parameters and conduct a search of a large database. 
• PLADS – a preprocessing tool to standardize the language of unstructured text so as to facilitate 
its automated analysis.  
• ALAN – a text comprehension tool that clusters textual data.  
• Adaptation of GATE/JAPE – an NLP capability that analyzes free text and identifies the Shaping 
Factors of human behavior in an incident report. 
• Parallax, a process for FOQA-ASAP linkage – a way for a safety analyst to combine the infor-
mation from the FOQA data about the Contextual Factors with the information from the ASAP 
reports about Shaping Factors for insight into the causal factors of an incident. 
 
5.2 Extramural Monitoring 
 
The activities under the Extramural Monitoring element of the ASMM Project resulted in two prod-
ucts: Incident-Reporting Enhancement Tools and the NAOMS. 
 
5.2.1 Incident-Reporting Enhancements  
The Incident-Reporting Enhancements were designed to improve the accessibility to, and extraction 
of information from, the ASRS database. However, for the most part, these tools were general and 
are equally applicable to other similar textual databases such as the ASAP. The ASRS database was 
used as a representative resource of textual reports to develop and evaluate new capabilities for their 
automated analyses such as those described in the previous section. (See appendix C for a descrip-
tion of the ASRS.)  
 
The motivation for modernizing the ASRS processing was to make it more convenient to access this 
unique repository of safety reports in order to test new capabilities in text mining that were needed 
for the ASAP, NAOMS, and other sources of textual data. However, the ASRS benefited from 
upgrading its legacy systems to state-of-the-art capabilities to improve the efficiency of report  
processing and database search, increase the rate of volume-handling capability, and improve the 
quality of the processing and analyses. The specific aspects of the Incident-Reporting Enhancements 
included ASRS database migration, electronic report submission, the Analyst Workbench, and 
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improved ASRS search and analysis capability. The ASRS legacy database that had been housed on 
a VAX at the NASA contractor’s headquarters was migrated to a state-of-the-art Oracle 8 system. 
 
The capability for electronic report submission has as its goal to maximize access to digitized data 
for submitted reports through coordination with 1) airline ASAP programs, and 2) direct ASRS 
electronic submission from the Website with realization that some form of paper submissions will 
continue into the future. ASRS is currently receiving ASAP reports from 15 pilot groups, 3 mechan-
ics groups, 1 flight-attendant group, and 5 dispatch groups. ASRS supports 24 programs with 
15 airlines, and several more are awaiting coordination with ASRS. In 8 programs with 6 airlines, 
reports are being submitted through secure, electronic data transmission at various intervals (daily 
7 days per week, once per week, etc.). When it is completed, the electronic report submission will 
provide a secure end-to-end Web-based ASRS system that: 
• enables ASAP reporters to securely submit reports with a Web browser without leaving traces to 
protect confidentiality provisions of ASRS, 
• enables ASAP reporters to obtain an ASRS report receipt electronically without requiring an 
email address, and 
• enables ASAP reports to be automatically entered into the ASRS processing stream without 
human intervention and without threatening the integrity of the ASRS database. 
 
The Analyst Workbench is a customized, browser-based, cross-platform software application used 
for report processing. It tracks reports electronically through the report-production process, it auto-
mates analyst coding of over 1200 values in the current 12-page hardcopy coding form, and it  
enables 100% of those data needed to identify the type of event to be captured, thereby providing 
statistical indication of types of events being reported to ASRS. Following are the modules of the 
Analyst Workbench that have been implemented and are operational in the ASRS:  
• Online Resources 
• Preliminary Screening 
• Initial Screening 
• Secondary Screening 
• Decap ID Strip  
• Multiple Report Matching 
• Final Classification 
• Full Form Coding Prototype 
• Query Wizard as Basis for “Public Access” 
 
Improvements have also been realized in the capability of the ASRS for data search and analysis 
with new database query tools; namely, BRIO (a COTS query tool) and Query Wizard (a browser-
based tool). Database mining has benefited from the installation in the ASRS of Perilog (a tool 
developed at NASA Ames Research Center) that provides relative ranking of narrative text as well 
as keyword search, phrase search, phrase discovery, and exemplar matching. 
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5.2.2 National Aviation System Operational Monitoring Service 
The other product of the Extramural Monitoring element was the NAOMS, which enables a scien-
tifically designed survey of all the constituents of the aviation system to obtain the “front-line” 
operators’ experiences with system performance and a statistically sound basis for evaluating fre-
quencies of incidents and trends that might compromise safety (figure 5.2.1). This approach comple-
ments and enhances information gathered currently through voluntary reporting systems, such as the 
ASRS and the ASAP, that cannot be used for statistical analyses. NAOMS may provide the first 
indication of a developing new situation or trend deserving of further investigation. 
 
The value of receiving experiential reports on performance of the system from the perspectives of its 
operators has been well established in the 30 years of ASRS. It is important to have such systems 
that allow the communication of safety issues among the stakeholders in the aviation community. 
The ASAP programs that have been recently implemented internally by over 20 U.S. air carriers 
have recognized the value of voluntary experiential reporting. However, voluntary reports cannot be 
used as the basis for deriving frequencies of events or for any other statistical analyses of system 
performance because they do not necessarily represent the entire population. They can only provide 
information on an event important to the reporter that may or may not be operationally significant 
from a system perspective. The NAOMS addresses this limitation and enhances the value of front-
line reporting by the addition of statistical validity, allowing results to be broadly and reliably  
interpreted.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.1. The NAOMS concept. 
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The need for this kind of information has been documented. For example, the following appears on 
page 13 of the report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (1998): “The 
most effective way to identify incidents and problems in aviation is for the people who operate the 
system (pilots, mechanics, controllers, dispatchers, etc.) to self-disclose the information.” The  
General Accounting Office’s (GAO’s) Safer Skies Review (2000) emphasized the need for addi-
tional performance measures. The NTSB’s Safety Report on Transportation Safety Databases (2002) 
said that there was a “Need to address the problem of under-reporting in current aviation safety data 
systems.” Numerous databases attempt to capture safety-related information concerning the NATS; 
e.g.: 
• NTSB Accident/Incident Database  
• FAA National Airspace Incident Monitoring System (NAIMS)  
• FAA Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS)  
• Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) 
 
Numerous databases also attempt to capture safety-related information concerning specific parts of 
the NATS; e.g.: 
• FOQA 
• PDARS 
• ASAP 
 
However, prior to NAOMS, there had not been a database that addressed the performance and safety 
of the NATS as a whole in a quantitatively defensible fashion. Although the U.S. had many aviation 
safety-data collection efforts, no program gave decision-makers statistically defensible estimates of 
the frequencies with which unwanted events occurred in the national airspace. Nor was it known 
with acceptable levels of certainty whether the frequencies of such occurrences were trending  
upwards or downwards. Similarly, the national capacity to measure the effects of aviation-safety 
interventions and to uncover unwanted side effects from those interventions was limited. There was 
a need to acquire reliable, stable data on the performance of the NATS to provide rapid feedback on 
the efficacy of technological or procedural changes to the system and to facilitate a truly data-driven 
basis for proactive safety decisions. There was a need to escape from the accident du jour policy-
making syndrome. 
 
NAOMS was expressly designed to meet these needs by way of a comprehensive, statistically sound 
survey on which evaluations of frequencies of events and trends can be reliably based to overcome 
the limitations of voluntary reporting systems described previously. Information is solicited from the 
operators of the aviation system—pilots, controllers, mechanics, and others—about the things they 
have experienced. The information provided by these operator groups can be fused to develop a 
system-level picture of national aviation safety.  
 
There is no other way to get a top-down view of the system performance on a sound statistical basis 
until, perhaps, flight and radar data are available from all sources from which information is  
extracted and integrated routinely. NAOMS is primarily directed to acquiring event information 
(what happened), but, it can also shed some light on precursors to events (why it happened.) Further, 
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NAOMS provides information about frequencies of events and trends that may trigger further inves-
tigation using the other data sources. The “bottom-up” approach of FOQA/APMS and PDARS and 
the “top-down” approach of NAOMS supplement each other in some aspects, and complement each 
other in others. 
 
The objectives of NAOMS were to:  
• provide decision-makers in air carriers, air-traffic management, and other air services providers 
with regular, accurate, and insightful measures of the health, performance, and safety of the 
NATS;  
• provide decision-makers with reliable information to determine that changes of technology or 
procedures introduced into the system are producing expected improvements without producing 
unwanted side effects;  
• establish the baseline of operational performance against which to measure the systemwide 
impact of changes;  
• contribute to the information extracted from other data sources to support investigations of  
systemwide safety issues; and  
• provide a quick look or “snapshot” of an issue of interest to the aviation community at a particu-
lar time.  
 
NAOMS achieved scientific integrity by using well-crafted survey instruments and rigorous analytic 
methods based on established and proven methodologies. Surveys have been used to shape national 
policy for many decades, especially in areas such as public health policy and economics. Following 
are a few examples of Federal Government surveys and their sponsoring agencies: 
• Survey of Income and Program Participation (Census Bureau) 1984 – 
• Consumer Expenditure Surveys (Census Bureau) 1968 –  
• Annual Housing Surveys (Census Bureau) 1973 – 
• Survey of Consumer Attitudes National Science Foundation (NSF) 1953 – 
• Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys, National Center for Health Services (NCHS) 1959 –  
• National Health Interview Surveys (NCHS) 1970 –  
• American National Election Studies (NSF) 1948 – 
• Panel Study of Income Dynamics (NSF) 1968 – 
• National Longitudinal Surveys, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 1964 – 
• Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, Centers for Disease Control (CDC) 1984 – 
• Monitoring the Future, National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) 1975 – 
 
Survey methods are mature and well understood, and aviation safety is a natural topic for survey 
data collection. NAOMS was built on the best survey methodological practices with deliberate and 
thorough instrument development and robust statistical methods. Methodological decisions were 
made with regard to events to address, question structure, question grouping and order, length of 
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recall period, sample source and size, and data-collection mode. These decisions entailed briefings to 
aviation-safety decision-makers; consultations with industry and government safety groups; work-
shops; reviews of the aviation-safety databases; focus groups with active professional participants; 
trades among accuracy, completeness, quality, and cost; and field trials with active line pilots to 
determine how pilots organized memories of safety events and to select the optimum data-collection 
mode.  
 
During the late 1990s, a series of workshops and briefings to the FAA and industry were conducted 
to familiarize the aviation community with the concept of NAOMS and to engage their active par-
ticipation in the process by which the survey questionnaires were developed. The survey question-
naire design for each constituency is based on consultations with representative industry and 
government working groups and ASRS analysts. NAOMS needed “buy-in” from the community to 
achieve its goals. Further, the required approvals of the survey by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) entailed comprehensive and rigorous reviews.  
 
The structure of the survey instrument is shown in figure 5.2.2. Section A provides the fundamental 
information on the interviewee’s activity (that constitutes the denominator of the statistical analysis). 
Section B provides information to reveal trends (the numerator of the statistical analyses). Section C 
addresses special topics as, for example, information about effects of a change. Section D asks for an 
evaluation of the survey. 
 
Section A: Aviation-Activity Data 
• Hours and legs by make-model and by crew position 
• Previous 60 days and lifetime (total hours only) 
 
Section B: Safety-Related Events 
• Consistent data set over time 
• Airborne conflicts, spatial deviations, ground events, weather encounters, equipment problems, 
pilot-ATC interaction issues, turbulence, passenger issues, and aircraft handling 
 
Section C: Focus Questions 
• Topics driven by government and industry priorities 
 
Section D: Survey Feedback 
Figure 5.2.2. The structure of the NAOMS survey instrument. 
 
 
A field trial of NAOMS was conducted in 2000 followed by a successful program launch in 2001. 
The initial respondent group was air-carrier pilots who were chosen randomly from the FAA Air-
man’s Medical Database.TP7 PT The aviation community’s response to NAOMS was enthusiastic. During 
about 4 years of test and evaluation, almost 30,000 air-carrier-pilot interviews were completed  
                                                 
P
7 
PThe survey was later extended to General Aviation (GA) pilots and a brief experiment was conducted in which 4200 
interviews were completed. Sixty-nine percent of the GA pilots contacted completed the interview. Resource limita-
tions caused the suspension of the GA-survey effort about six months after it was begun. 
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before interviewing stopped in early FY05. NAOMS achieved exceptional response rates—83% of 
those contacted completed their interview, which is well above what is considered the “gold stan-
dard” for responses to surveys. This level of response was crucial to achieving statistical validity.  
 
Figures 5.2.3 through 5.2.9 are examples of a few of the results after 2 years of the survey of com-
mercial airline pilots and about 15,000 interviews. Figures 5.2.3 through 5.2.6 are examples of 
responses to the types of questions asked under section A: Demographics, the results of which are 
frequently used in calculating rates of reported events. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.3. Section A: Demographics – Flight experience. 
 
 
 56 
 
Figure 5.2.4. Section A: Demographics – Hours and legs by aircraft size. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.5. Section A: Demographics – Type of flight. 
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Figure 5.2.6 shows a comparison between the estimates of flight time per leg based on the NAOMS 
survey with the estimates reported at that time by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BST).  
 
Figure 5.2.7 is a sample of a result from section B queries and compares pre- to post-9/11. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.6. Flight-time-per-leg estimates – NAOMS compared with BTS data. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.7. Section B: Safety-related events – Evaluation of sample events. 
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Figure 5.2.8 shows some of the data obtained by NAOMS in support of the special study of In-Close 
Approach Changes (ICACs) that is reported in appendix B. 
 
Figure 5.2.9 is an example of the response to a question in section D in which the respondents 
showed they had a high degree of confidence in over 90% of their answers.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.8. Section C: Number of ICACs requested by ATC. 
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Figure 5.2.9. Section D: Confidence in accuracy of answers. 
 59
The results of the survey on air-carrier pilots demonstrated the potential value of NAOMS if imple-
mented as a permanent service. Although it remained work in progress, NAOMS had demonstrated 
the potential ability to develop statistically defensible estimates of a wide range of safety occur-
rences and to track their long-term trends. This potential was demonstrated, for example, by the 
contributions from NAOMS to the ASMM study of ICACs mentioned in section 4.0 and described 
in appendix B. However, public release (and, therefore, presentation in this report) of all the results 
of the surveys that clearly show this potential ability was limited because their interpretation and 
operational significance required domain expertise. NASA turned to the CAST for this help, and the 
results were offered to that body for use in their deliberations. 
 
The CAST has a critical need for safety metrics to validate that the industry’s safety investment in 
the interventions recommended by the CAST has been well spent and that the risk-reduction  
assumptions are valid. The NAOMS survey is one of the few indicators currently available to pro-
vide insight of whether they are on track or that adjustments are needed. The NAOMS team worked 
with the CAST in response to a request from the CAST’s Joint Implementation Data Analysis Team 
(JIMDAT), and showed that NAOMS can be used to assess the effectiveness of safety interventions. 
 
The CAST determined that section C of the NAOMS survey could be used to access information 
about several of the safety enhancements that were particularly related to the pilot community. The 
JIMDAT selected Procedures and Training as the desired focus for the initial use of NAOMS. A 
subteam of JIMDAT members worked in collaboration with the NAOMS team to construct a ques-
tionnaire for section C that would address the specific issues identified by the JIMDAT. NAOMS 
conducted interviews for 2.5 months of air-carrier pilots. The completion rate was a phenomenal 
92%, with 1150 completed interviews using 56 main questions covering a variety of issues, includ-
ing air-carrier reactions to go-arounds, unstabilized approaches, and ASAP reporting. The results 
were generally encouraging of the CAST’s interventions to improve safety.  
 
Figures 5.2.10 (a) and (b), showing the responses to some of the questions pertaining to go-arounds, 
are examples of the many results of the study that was conducted in collaboration with a team from 
the JIMDAT.  
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Figure 5.2.10(a). Example of responses to NAOMS survey in support of the JIMDAT. 
 
 
If No, Refused or Don't Know, Skip to JD27
100%1148Total 
0%0Don't know 
0%0Refused
83%955No 
17%193Yes
During the last 60 days did you perform a missed 
approach or go around?JD26
100%55Total 
0%0Don't know 
0%0Refused
25%14Neither
11%6Oppose
64%35Favor
Would you favor the institution of such a policy, 
oppose it, or neither favor nor oppose it?→»JD25a
If Yes, Refused or Don't Know, Skip to JD26
100%1148Total 
1%17Don't know 
0%0Refused
5%55No 
94%1076Yes
Does your airline have a no-fault missed approach or 
go-around policy?JD25
Response % Response ValueResponseQuestionQuestion Number
JIMDAT SECTION C RESULTS: Safety Reporting
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Figure 5.2.10(b). Continuation of example of responses to NAOMS survey in support of 
the JIMDAT. 
 
 
The pilot community is aware of and supportive of company procedures and policies, they are gen-
erally positive about the training they are receiving, and there is general acceptance of innovations 
such as the FOQA and ASAP. NAOMS was able to identify several specific areas where there was 
room for improvement, and indications were that pilots from airlines with large fleet sizes responded 
more positively than pilots from airlines with smaller fleet sizes. NAOMS has demonstrated its 
standalone capability to provide insight into the effectiveness of safety enhancements in a system-
wide and timely manner. As ASMM ended, the NAOMS team was working with CAST and with the 
ALPA to continue the NAOMS service for air-carrier pilots by transferring responsibility of the 
survey of Part 121 pilots to ALPA. 
 
The goal of NAOMS was to create a new national permanent service. The structure and methodolo-
gies developed have proven their potential as a basis for such a service to:  
• routinely measure the safety of the NATS in a quantitatively precise way,  
If No, Refused or Don't Know, Skip to JD28
100%1148Total 
5%60Don't know 
0%0Refused
9%96No 
86%992Yes
Does your airline participate in the safety reporting 
program called ASAP also known as the Aviation 
Safety Action Program?
JD27
100%8Total 
0%0Don't know 
0%0Refused
13%1Neither
0%0Negative
87%7Positive
Was that feedback positive, negative, or both positive 
and negative?→»JD26b
If No, Refused or Don't Know, Skip to JD27
100%193Total 
0%0Don't know 
0%0Refused
96%185No 
4%8Yes
Did you receive any feedback from your airline 
regarding this missed approach or go around?→»JD26a
Response % Response ValueResponseQuestionQuestion Number
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• assess trends in the performance of the NATS that may have implications of compromised safety 
and to identify the factors driving those trends, and  
• identify safety and efficiency effects of new technologies and/or procedures as they are inserted 
into the operating environment. 
 
NAOMS established and demonstrated a quantitative statistically defensible systemwide safety 
assessment tool that is the basis for such a national service. The statistical validity of the results 
obtained were ensured by the careful design of the methodology and demonstrated by comparison 
with the few other sources of similar data such as the one shown in figure 5.2.6. However, it was 
possible during the life of the ASMM Project to apply NAOMS only to the pilot community that 
was represented by results such as the examples shown in figures 5.2.3 through 5.2.10. The approach 
needs to be adapted to the other constituents, including, in particular, the air-traffic controllers as 
well as mechanics and cabin crews. Until these constituents have been included, NAOMS will not 
be able to present a full and unbiased perspective of the system performance. 
 
In summary, the Extramural Monitoring element of the ASMM Project produced the following 
capabilities: 
• The Incident-Reporting Enhancement tools – a suite of new capabilities designed primarily for 
the ASRS, but applicable to any incident-reporting database that includes: 
− ASRS database migration to ORACLE 8,  
− Electronic report submission,  
− The Analyst Workbench, and  
− Improved ASRS search and analysis capability. 
• NAOMS – a quantitative statistically defensible, systemwide safety assessment tool that is the 
basis for a permanent national service. 
 
5.3 Intramural Monitoring 
 
The Intramural Monitoring element of the ASMM Project entailed a “bottom-up” approach that was 
intended to provide air-service operators with the tools needed to monitor their performance con-
tinuously, effectively, and economically within their own organizations. The primary products of 
this activity were the APMS for processing aircraft flight-recorder data, and the PDARS for process-
ing ATC data. 
 
5.3.1 Aviation-Performance Measuring System 
APMS was a research and development program to support and enhance the industry’s program for 
analyzing aircraft flight data called the FOQA program (see appendix A). Advanced tools would 
reduce the labor necessary to extract information from the very large volume of data generated by 
these programs and increase the information that could be extracted relative to then-existing com-
mercially available software. NASA would also take on developmental risks of advanced capabili-
ties that, without a demonstrated market, had too much risk for commercial vendor development. 
Under these guidelines, government research focused on the development of advanced statistical 
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techniques, the limits of data storage, the limits of processing speed, and the limits of the level of 
data-quality filtering available for FOQA at the beginning of APMS. 
 
APMS was initiated in 1993 in response to a request from the FAA to provide capabilities that 
would minimize the costs of operating a FOQA program and, thereby, encourage U.S. air carriers to 
undertake the investment. The value of continuously monitoring and analyzing flight-recorded data 
had been demonstrated by several European air carriers. In 1997, the FAA withdrew its funding of 
the APMS, and NASA supported the continuing work until FY00, when it became part of the 
ASMM Project of the AvSP. Throughout the entire time, APMS was an activity to both develop 
advanced software tools and provide a toolbox of developed capabilities to minimize the time of 
human experts. The APMS team built tools responsive to user needs and pushed the limits of proc-
essing technology. The prototypical tools resulting from Data Analysis Tools Development were 
operationally tested and evaluated under Intramural Monitoring in collaboration with air carriers, 
the FAA, and vendors of current data-analysis software with whom NASA entered into SAAs. 
 
The tools developed by APMS fit two general categories, those developed early in the program that 
were pulled by stated airline-user needs and those that grew from a NASA push for advanced tech-
nology. Following are the tools in the first category, developed between 1994 and 2001, that have 
become industry standards.  
 
The Event Processing System (EPS) (figure 5.3.1) was designed to solve the workflow management 
problem inherent to FOQA data processing that had been identified during user-needs studies with 
air-carrier personnel. As flights are downloaded each day, commercial FOQA software searches for 
and identifies predefined exceedances. As APMS began, managing the review, validation, tracking, 
and reporting of exceedances, rates, locations, etc., was a significant, labor-intensive challenge, 
especially because the analyses were performed by a team of line pilots working individually as they 
had free time. The EPS assists the FOQA analyst in analysis, decision-making, decision-tracking, 
reporting, communicating, and recording for future reference information related to flight  
exceedances. The EPS gives the analysts an organized interactive to-do list of each flight and its 
exceedances and enables them to review each flight and validate, invalidate, defer, and/or comment 
upon the exceedance. It provides record-keeping tools for evaluations and recommended actions for 
each event, and enters the processed events into a database for subsequent reporting. 
 
The Graphics Viewer (figure 5.3.1) assists the FOQA analyst in interpreting and verifying  
exceedances or special events by displaying the data of a specific flight in great detail for any  
selected period of time surrounding the event, from a few minutes to the entire flight. Though any 
commercial FOQA software provides a viewer, APMS pioneered enhancements such as single-click 
links to flight animation and parameter baselines representing the population of flights operating in 
or out of the same airport, automatic display of parameter sets relevant to each exceedance, and 
automatic location of exceedances and detected patterns within a flight. As APMS evolved, this tool 
became the focal point for advances related to examining individual flights because, inevitably, 
understanding causal factors of any event entails examination of individual flights. Advanced tools 
link back to the viewer, and from the viewer an analyst can access weather information or display 
data in an air-traffic format. 
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Figure 5.3.1. APMS concepts that have become industry standards. 
 
 
The Routine Events tool (figure 5.3.1) presents the distribution of flight parameters around selected 
snapshots in time at “check points” that occur within each flight and are tied to standard operating 
procedures, giving the FOQA analyst an immediate and obvious point of comparison of performance 
observed in line operations to the standards specified in operator procedures. The analyst or team 
selects any set of standard events, for example 1000 feet above touchdown on approach or a flap 
setting during approach, and the tool displays the distribution of any selected set of parameters for 
any selected subset of flights at that selected “check point.” For example, the tool enables monitor-
ing for compliance with stabilized approach procedures by fleet or destination by displaying air-
speed (relative to Vref), vertical speed, engine power settings, flap and gear position, and localizer 
and glide-slope deviations at 10,000 feet above touchdown. Where compliance is good, the distribu-
tions would be tight and centered on reference speed plus additives, a descent rate of about 800 feet 
per minute, approach thrust setting, fully configured flaps, gear down, and on localizer and glide 
slope. Where compliance is poor, the variances would be greater, central tendencies skewed, and 
extreme values more populated. This tool has become a backbone for studies of specific issues, and 
has been generalized for new derived parameters, such as energy indexing. 
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The Pattern Search tool (figure 5.3.1) was developed as a way of reviewing any sample or popula-
tion of flight-recorded data for the occurrence of newly defined events. The user specifies the criteria 
defining an event, such as an unstable approach, and the search of the selected dataset provides a list 
of flights fitting the pattern. In a sense, this scenario is similar to finding exceedances, except for the 
ability to specify any pattern of any number of parameters or any sequence of parameter events. The 
tool displays all flights fitting the pattern, and makes them available to other tools, such as the 
viewer, routine events, animation, and airspace display. Pattern Search requires the storage of, and 
access to, all relevant data in order to provide the flexibility of searching throughout the dataset, 
whereas exceedance-based FOQA tools typically limit the data storage to about two minutes on 
either side of an exceedance. A key contribution of APMS was the push to retain all the downloaded 
data, not just scan for exceedances and discard all but a few minutes of data.  
 
The tools described in the following paragraphs were developed between 2001 and 2005 and grew 
from a NASA push for advanced technology, including the ADIS, The Morning Report of Atypical 
Flights, and the Aircraft Energy-State Indexing and Display tools. 
 
The ADIS (figure 5.3.2) was developed to allow access to other sources of information about a flight 
of interest without re-identifying the flight to an analyst. FOQA data are de-identified data by  
negotiated agreements among pilots and their representatives, airlines, and the FAA. Without a  
de-identified link to these other informational sources, they would be accessed very rarely, and only 
after a monitoring team agreed it was necessary. ADIS allows the linkage of a flight to the weather 
or air-traffic data at any time within the flight, while screening from the display the time and date 
information that would re-identify the flight to the analyst. 
 
ADIS enables the analyst to routinely access any information the airline and other entities are will-
ing to make available for analysis. Industry has already implemented easy access to flight animation 
and to approach charts, so NASA pursued the more difficult ones: weather and air-traffic radar data. 
A linkage of a de-identified flight to the related ASAP report has not been demonstrated but is  
viable.  
 
Integration of information has been pursued to facilitate causal analysis and risk assessment of a 
flight identified as atypical or having an exceedance by providing an analyst with the capability to 
examine conditions under which events occur, particularly the effects of weather and air traffic. For 
example, a deviation from glide slope in daylight visual conditions may be trivial (automated guid-
ance may or may not be in use while a pilot navigates by sight to the runway) or the deviation may 
be purposeful to avoid wake turbulence from a preceding aircraft. A similar deviation in instrument 
conditions, when runway and terrain features are not visible, may represent a significant risk. Appli-
cations of ADIS will facilitate understanding the consequences of weather and traffic situations on 
flight operations.  
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Figure 5.3.2. The concept of the Aviation Data Integration System. 
 
 
ADIS started an archive of weather information in the form of digital Air-Traffic Information Server 
(ATIS), Meteorological Terminal Aviation Routine Weather Report (METAR), Runway Visual 
Range (RVR), and light conditions for use in retrospective analyses. Figure 5.3.3 shows screenshots 
of the ADIS tool for accessing weather information to relate to flight-recorded (FOQA) data. The 
analyst makes selections on the left and receives the information on the right. ATIS is presented for 
those airports where digital ATIS is used and includes NOTAMS. METAR information is displayed 
for all other airports. At the conclusion of the ASMM Project, the weather-information archive was 
transferred to the FAA, which established a permanent archive service to all air carriers with FOQA 
programs. Also, the technology for linking to the weather information while maintaining the  
de-identification of the flight was demonstrated in operational evaluations and was licensed to one 
FOQA vendor.  
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Figure 5.3.3. Weather data (implemented). 
 
 
Automated linkage of flight-recorded data to air-traffic radar-track data generated by the PDARS 
program was demonstrated using ADIS and the Graphical Airspace Design Environment 
(GRADE) tool, under license from ATAC Corporation, the FAA’s primary contractor for PDARS. 
Figure 5.3.4 shows how flight data can be displayed along with associated traffic while maintaining 
de-identification of all data. The track in white is the flight of interest (in this case because of high 
energy state). The green tracks are of all other flights arriving at the airport in the same hour. The 
upper left display shows the track laterally, the lower right vertically, illustrating the high energy 
state of the flight relative to other arrivals. The use of this capability will be described with regard 
to a specific study on high-energy arrivals later in this section. 
 
The operational evaluation of air-traffic integration was more limited than the weather integration 
because access to and use of ATC data was more constrained. Unlike the weather information, this 
capability was not implemented as an ongoing service. 
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Figure 5.3.4. Example of display of air-traffic data in GRADE. 
 
 
The Morning Report of Atypical Flights discovers unenvisioned circumstances by searching for 
flights that are multivariate-statistically extreme within a flight phase, compared to other flights in 
similar circumstances. It is based on the PROFILER that was described in section 5.1, Data Analysis 
Tools Development. The PROFILER uses multivariate cluster analysis to group flights by similarity 
along flight signatures derived from parameter values, calculates an atypicality score (figure 5.1.1) 
for each flight, and provides a plain-language description of what makes targeted flights atypical; 
these data are then displayed in The Morning Report of Atypical Flights. Atypical flights are differ-
ent from exceedances where flights have violated limits that have been predefined by airlines based 
on standard operating procedure (SOP), and the supposition is that airlines know what to look for 
and have correctly identified all relevant parameters. The Morning Report is a tool for searching 
for unknown unknowns. The implementation of The Morning Report display is similar to that of  
exceedance-based FOQA analysis in that it identifies individual flights worthy of attention  
(Chidester (2003)). 
 
Analysis using The Morning Report tool starts with two simplifying provisions. First, below 
18,000 feet, flights are compared only to other flights (of the same make/model aircraft) departing 
from or arriving at the same airport. Above 18,000 feet, flights are compared to all other flights 
Horizontal 
Vertical 
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(actually the most recent 1000 flights of the same make/model aircraft). Second, any and all  
recorded parameters can be used in the multivariate analysis and in calculating an atypicality score. 
However, only those parameters that are likely to be operationally significant are selected for analy-
sis so as to minimize the possibility of discovering trivial problems. For example, use of anti-ice is 
so rare in summer months that its operation will make a flight highly atypical, but not worth examin-
ing, so this entry would be dropped from the parameter list for that time of year.  
 
The Morning Report calculates the flight signature for each phase of every flight being analyzed. 
The phases of flight are takeoff, low-speed climb, high-speed climb, cruise, high-speed descent,  
low-speed descent, final approach, and landing. Flight signatures for each phase are defined by 
compressing the data for each parameter into 18 variables, including initial and final values of the 
parameter at the start and at the end of the phase, the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and 
maximum of the value of the parameter, its slope, its acceleration, and the (residual) noise calculated 
over the entire phase.  
 
The flight signature is a characterization of each phase of flight that satisfies the needs of the analy-
sis for The Morning Report and reduces the computational time and complexity greatly because of 
the high degree of data compression. However, the temporal relationships among the parameters are 
lost in this characterization. That information is retained in the APMS in its full-flight data (.ffd) file 
for use in analysis in which those temporal aspects are significant.  
 
The flight signatures in each phase (18 values per selected parameter) are submitted to a principal 
component analysis to derive a reduced number of uncorrelated dimensions. The flights are clustered 
to find similar flights. Each flight is compared to the available similarly situated population (of up to 
the most recent 1000 flights). The atypicality score is then calculated using the Mahalanobis distance 
of each flight from the multivariate data centroid, and a weighting using a cluster analysis of the 
reduced principal components. The larger the Mahalanobis distance from the global centroid and the 
fewer the number of flights in a cluster the greater the atypicality.  
 
As currently implemented, The Morning Report contrasts the most extreme 20% of flights (defined 
as atypical) to the least extreme 80% (defined as typical). The “typical” 80% is used for a display of 
a typical performance envelope for each parameter. Atypical flights are divided into three levels; the 
most extreme 1% is called level 3, the next most extreme 4% is called level 2, and the next most 
extreme 15% is called level 1.TP8 PT The Morning Report display identifies the most extreme 5% of 
flights to the safety analyst, who judges their operational significance. The selection of these bounds 
is arbitrary. They were chosen as a starting point because they correspond to the current definitions 
of the levels of significance that are typically assigned to exceedances.  
 
As new flights are uploaded into the APMS each day, The Morning Report display automatically 
alerts the monitoring team to those flights that had level-2 or -3 events. Plain-language text describes 
the parameters and aspects of those parameters that caused each of those flights to be identified as 
atypical. It is important to recognize that by searching for multivariate-statistical extremity, The 
Morning Report will not detect unsafe states that occur often and, therefore, are not atypical. 
 
                                                 
P
8
P These definitions of the levels are expected to evolve with experience to minimize uninteresting alerts. 
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The APMS team began testing the first version of The Morning Report in 2003 with three airlines 
under SAAs. By the end of the ASMM Project in 2005, these airlines had used The Morning Report 
in processing over 16,000 flights. The APMS team reviewed those flights identified by The Morning 
Report as having at least one phase in level 3, i.e., the most extreme 1%. The key question was 
whether The Morning Report alerts were useful and interesting, whether they were redundant to the 
exceedance-based analysis, or whether they were unique but of no consequence. Interesting results 
were those flights that the domain experts thought could be operationally significant and deserved 
further investigation. Uninteresting flights were those that the domain experts could explain easily 
and were deemed not operationally significant or were the result of bad data. Initially, about half of 
the alerted flights were found to be interesting by the first two airlines. 
 
Improvements in data-quality filtering were introduced and parameters that were frequently causing 
trivial alerts were eliminated from analysis. One example of such a trivial alert was caused by engine 
parameters, each of which might be only slightly atypical but would outweigh all the other parame-
ters by their sheer number in the multivariate statistical analysis. By the time the evaluation was 
conducted with the third airline with all these changes implemented, 74% of The Morning Report 
alerts were deemed to be operationally interesting by the airline representatives and deserving of 
further study.  
 
The Morning Report displays the page shown in figure 5.3.5 when processing is completed. It shows 
when the report was completed, the number of flights analyzed, and the date range of those flights. It 
summarizes the number of atypical flights identified and their levels of atypicality. A click on the 
Go To Flight List button displays the most extreme 5% of flights (level 2 and 3 atypicalities). 
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Figure 5.3.5. The opening (executive-level) screen of The Morning Report. 
 
 
The page that displays the list of flights that had level 2 and 3 atypicalities is shown in figure 5.3.6. 
It includes information for finding the flight in the database for further analysis, along with the 
(encrypted) aircraft tail number to assist the analyst in determining whether the atypicality of any 
aircraft is in performance or in the data recording of that particular aircraft. By selecting a single 
flight on this screen and clicking on the “Explore Flight” button, a screen like figure 5.3.7 appears 
that shows the trace of the atypical flight parameter for the atypical phase and compares it to a typi-
cal performance envelope of that parameter. There is an option to display level 1 atypicalities.  
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Figure 5.3.6. The Morning Report display of flights with level 2 or 3 atypicalities. 
 
 
Of the 16,000 flights analyzed by The Morning Report, 3.1% fell within the criterion of having at 
least one phase in level 3, the most extreme 1% of atypicallity. A few of these level-3 atypical flights 
were truly unique (i.e., singletons). However, many of the flights that met this criterion could be 
grouped into similar patterns.  
 
The frequent similar patterns fell into one of the following categories: 
• High-energy state during the arrival phase  
• Go-arounds  
• Landing rollout anomalies (such as unusual braking or use of reverse thrust)  
• Atypical climbs (such as leveling off at low altitude following departure)  
• Turbulence and accommodation (the former appearing as noise in spatial and motion-related 
parameters, the latter in reduced airspeed for the flight phase)  
• Unusual arrival paths (such as very short downwind, base, or final approach segments)  
• Traffic Collision Alert System (TCAS) resolution advisories accompanied by escape maneuvers 
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Figure 5.3.7. The Morning Report display of atypical vs. typical parameters. 
 
 
Truly unique events included a speed-recovery maneuver observed in the arrival terminal area (slow 
speed in clean configuration followed by decreased pitch and increased thrust but no stall warning) 
and a firm landing. Neither the maneuver nor landing events was discovered by the current FOQA  
exceedance analysis. Importantly, none of these events that were empirically discovered by The 
Morning Report had been identified by any previous analyses.  
 
Figure 5.3.7 shows a comparison of the parameters of a selected atypical flight to those of typical 
flights or to those of all flights during the same phase. On the left side is a listing of five specific 
parameters that caused the flight to be identified as atypical by The Morning Report. To the right of 
each of these are thumbnails of comparisons of each parameter to "Typical" and "All" performance 
envelopes. The thumbnails under the heading “Typical” are the comparisons to the same parameters 
in the 80% most typical flights in the same phase. Those under the heading “All” adds the remaining 
20% atypical flights. The comparison with the “Typical” envelope focuses on how the selected flight 
is atypical. The comparison with the “All” envelope shows whether this flight is truly alone in its 
atypicality. In the lower right corner "Rationale List" displays the explanation for having decided 
that this flight was identified as atypical by The Morning Report.  
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The flight in this example is atypical because it went around after encountering a high-energy state 
during the arrival phase. The x-axis is the percentage of the time through the flight phase; in this 
case “low-speed descent.” At the origin (0%) is the first time the aircraft descends through 
10,000 feet above mean sea level. At the right end (100%) is the last time the aircraft descends 
through 2500 feet above field elevation (afe). Flights vary in the length of time to complete each 
phase, hence the use of percentage of time through the phase is used to normalize and enable com-
parisons. This flight took much longer than typical to complete the phase because the flight went 
around; it includes two approach descents.  
 
The y-axis in the example shown in figure 5.3.7 is selected to be altitude in feet above mean sea 
level. It can be seen that the aircraft descended to a low altitude, then climbed and descended again 
to join the approach. This “shape” is always the signature of a go-around detected by this tool, vali-
dated by the view of this flight presented in figure 5.3.10.  
 
From this page, the analyst can click on the “Flight Validation” button to validate, invalidate, or 
make notes on the event, or click on the “Flight Information” button to make use of ADIS for 
weather, or click on the “APMS Viewer” button to explore the flight in detail, as shown in  
figure 5.3.8. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.8. The APMS Viewer of flight parameters. 
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The APMS Viewer for this flight as shown in figure 5.3.8 clearly indicates that the flaps and gear 
were fully extended and then they were retracted, confirming that a go-around occurred.  
 
In figure 5.3.8, the cursor (i.e., the vertical line at about 2.08 hours) has been placed just before the 
go-around, at which point in time the values of the approach parameters are automatically displayed 
in the data box at the left of the screen. The aircraft was at 2488 feet above the runway (Height_abv_ 
Rwy), at 153.5 knots (Airspeed_Computed_Corr), an appropriate airspeed for this point and configu-
ration. However, it was more than 3 dots above the glide slope (Glide_Slope_Dev_Dots), not estab-
lished on the localizer (Loc_Dev_dots_corr), and descending at 1516 feet per minute (Vrt_Spd_Inert). 
The aircraft has high potential energy (i.e., it is high above glide slope), and somewhat elevated  
kinetic energy (due to the descent rate) at this point, both of which would have to be dissipated before 
landing. With the aircraft in landing configuration (and therefore, maximum available drag) at a low 
altitude close to the runway, the pilots had no options available to dissipate that energy in the time 
and distance remaining, and wisely elected to go around. 
 
On the Menu line of the screen shown in figure 5.3.8 is an option called Graphical Airspace Design 
Environment (GRADE). By selecting that option, this flight or just this phase of the flight can be 
exported to an airspace visualization and animation tool, as shown in figure 5.3.9. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.9. Horizontal view of the flight in figures 5.3.7 and 5.3.8 in GRADE. 
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Figure 5.3.9 is a horizontal view of the flight in GRADE (where the x- and y-axes are longitude and 
latitude) showing the aircraft arrived from the northwest and completed a downwind and dogleg 
base to final approach. The first final approach includes “s-turns” indicating the pilots’ attempt to 
become established on the desired glide path. The aircraft then completes upwind, crosswind, 
downwind, base, and final legs to a parallel runway. This view further confirms the go-around. 
 
Figure 5.3.10 shows a vertical view of the same flight. Notice first that the x-axis (horizontal dis-
tance from touchdown) is compressed relative to the y-axis (altitude) (in this case 6:1). This display 
is conventional among such visualization displays of air traffic because, although an aircraft may 
traverse the world laterally, commercial aircraft rarely exceed 8 miles in altitude.  
 
With this view from the west, the path of the first, abandoned approach can be compared to the 
second approach, from which the landing was completed. This view confirms the aircraft was well 
above the desired path, in a high-energy state.  
 
When the ADIS tool was accessed by clicking on “Flight Information” on the screen shown in  
figure 5.3.7, this flight was found to have been conducted in visual meteorological conditions as 
shown in figure 5.3.11. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.10. Vertical view of the flight in figures 5.3.7 and 5.3.8 in GRADE. 
High energy state
Go around 
 
Landing 
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Figure 5.3.11. The ADIS display of weather information for the flight of figure 5.3.7. 
 
 
As described previously, the most frequent reason for a flight to be atypical (within the sample data 
set from three air carriers) was a high-energy state between 10,000 and 2500 feet afe. This finding 
was of great interest to the three airlines participating in the research and to their FOQA vendor as 
well. The APMS team, the vendor, and the airlines perceived a need to develop a tool to allow  
routine examination of arrivals, approaches, and airports for high-energy states. NASA entered into 
collaboration with the vendor and the airlines to develop an energy-state analysis tool.  
 
High-energy arrivals have several common characteristics, including the aircraft were at high speed 
(200 to 250 knots) as they approached 2500 feet afe, they were above the desired glide path during 
low-speed descent and final approach, and they were descending onto the glide slope rather than 
capturing it from below. Analyses of these flights (discussed further later in this section) revealed 
that descending onto the glide slope was a frequent precursor to unstable approaches. A typical 
search for exceedances alerts to an unstable approach, but it does not identify the descent onto the 
glide slope above 2500 feet if the aircraft is stabilized before 1000 feet afe. 
 
Aircraft energy-state indexing and display tools were developed that provide a simple format for 
understanding the energy state of an aircraft arriving into a terminal area and airport. For any single 
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flight, the index enables an analyst to assess quickly and accurately whether the aircraft was on a 
proper profile and at an appropriate speed throughout the arrival and approach, by reference to a 
single index value at any point in flight. Figures 5.3.12 (a) and (b) show examples of displays of the 
energy-state indexing tools for arrivals at Seattle-Tacoma Airport (SEA-TAC) and Los Angeles 
International Airport (LAX), respectively.  
 
Three charts are useful to the analyst. The top charts in figures 5.3.12 (a) and (b) depict the statistical 
distribution of the energy-state Index for the user-selected group of flights operating into the selected 
airport (in this case SEA-TAC and LAX). An Index value of 100 (the gold line) is considered to be 
ideal and is called the Gold Standard. Shown on these top charts are the distributions of energy-state 
Index values (in shades of blue) for these flights from 30 miles to near the point of landing measured 
at 5-mile increments to 10 miles from landing, then at 2-mile intervals. The shading of the blue 
blocks indicates the density of flights; the darker the shade of blue, the higher the number of flights. 
The blocks containing 80% of the flights (what the APMS program considered to be the typical 
range) at these snapshots are connected with the green band. The dark green line is the median value 
of the energy-state Index. The superposition of a flight on this Gold Standard Energy Index chart 
allows the analyst to visualize the relative state of compliance with normal operations in regard to 
aircraft energy state during approach at the selected airport.  
 
The two charts at the bottom of figures 5.3.12 (a) and (b) provide supporting information that aid the 
analyst in interpreting the Gold Standard Energy Index chart. Aerodynamic drag and engine power 
effect changes to the energy state of the aircraft. The Flap Position chart indicates the level of pro-
gressive flap configuration (and thus level of drag) that occurs during the approach. The N1  
Engine-1 chart indicates the level of engine power being used during the course of the approach. The 
information provided in these two charts helps analysts understand contributions from these two 
primary factors to variations that occur in the Gold Standard Energy Index chart. An experienced 
flight-data analyst understands the relative variations in these two charts and their associated effect 
on total aircraft energy state. The distributions (the green bands) for these two charts are displayed in 
operational values relative to their respective function. Engine power is displayed in percent of N1 
RPM (100% = Takeoff power) and Flap Position is displayed in degrees of flap travel from zero 
(Zero = No flaps extended).  
 
Such an aircraft energy-state indexing display tool also provides a simple format for understanding 
the energy state of groups of aircraft arriving into any terminal area or airport and for comparing 
operations among those facilities. Corresponding drag and power index values displayed in conjunc-
tion with energy state allow analysts to explore how an out-of-desired energy state developed and 
progressed.  
 
Energy-state displays can be used to provide graphical depiction of the distribution of energy, 
power, and drag indices along the descent path for any selected group of flights, along with underly-
ing descriptive statistics, enabling airline-safety analysts to compare flights by airport or runway of 
arrival to any other airport or group of airports, thereby facilitating the identification of potentially 
problematic arrivals or approaches.  
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Figure 5.3.12 (a). Energy-state display and indexing tool (SEA-TAC arrival). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3.12 (b). Energy-state display and indexing tool (LAX arrival). 
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The APMS team pursued further studies of high-energy approaches to gain understanding of these 
events because of the high interest expressed by the air carriers in the discovery of The Morning 
Report. Less than one-half of 1% of all flights submitted to atypicality analysis were deemed atypi-
cal because of high-energy state. Among these flights, about half were brought under control by 
500-foot afe, complying with airline stabilized approach criteria. About one-fifth of these high-
energy arrivals ended in a go-around. But, about one-third continued to landing, representing an 
unstable approach. Based upon these observations, a high-energy arrival state was postulated to be a 
potential precursor of an unstable approach. 
 
Stabilized approach criteria have been applied by the industry to deal with findings from approach 
and landing accidents, implying that less-stable approaches present a greater risk. Typically, a stabi-
lized approach is defined as being established on localizer and glide path (typically within 1 dot off 
the localizer and ½ dot off the glide slope), at a stable and appropriate airspeed (typically 120 to 
150 knots, varying by landing weight and configuration) and rate of descent (typically 600 to 
900 feet per minute, varying by approach speed and approach slope), at a stable power setting 
(measured by compressor speeds or exhaust pressure ratio, depending upon aircraft and engine 
type), and in landing configuration. Pilots are normally required to be stabilized on approach by 
1000 feet above the runway in instrument conditions and 500 feet in visual conditions.  
 
The Pattern Search tool was used to identify all instances of high energy during the arrival phase to 
demonstrate to the airlines how the APMS tools could be used to assess whether high-energy arri-
vals are a precursor of unstable approaches. The Pattern Search on the flight dataset from one of the 
airlines revealed that high-energy arrivals were three to four times more frequent than had been 
discovered in that data set by the analysis for atypicality using The Morning Report. The frequency 
difference is not entirely unexpected because atypicality analysis searches with no prescribed guid-
ance for flights that are statistically extreme, whereas Pattern Search looks for highly specific  
criteria.  
 
Surprisingly, however, the consequences of the high-energy arrivals identified by the atypical analy-
sis were found to be different from those of the full population of high-energy arrivals found with 
the Pattern Search. Those detected by atypicality were brought under control within stabilized  
approach criteria (SAC) about half the time and resulted in a go-around about a third of the time. 
Among the full population of high-energy arrivals, only a quarter were brought under control within 
SAC, and only 4% went around. Over 70% of the high-energy arrivals were continued through an 
unstable approach to landing. 
 
An explanation of the difference in outcomes was that the search for atypicality among the 16,000 
flights examined found something doubly rare: high-energy arrivals that were either brought under 
control within stable approach criteria or resulted in a go-around. A high-energy arrival that was 
followed by an unstable approach or a go-around was typical and, therefore, was not identified as an 
atypical flight by The Morning Report. In contrast, the Pattern Search with criteria that focused on 
high-energy arrival found all of those flights, whether they were stabilized at 1000-foot afe or not. 
 
Importantly, however, these results should not be generalized because the findings were based on the 
analysis of the 16,000 flights that were available for the study, and these were a nonrandom sample 
of flights from a nonrandom sample of airlines. This analysis was a demonstration, showing how 
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airlines could use atypicality analysis, and that airlines must apply all the APMS tools to get defini-
tive statistics. 
 
The demonstration was carried a bit further for a few flights to show how ADIS could be used to 
understand the context of high-energy arrivals. Four selected flights were examined at LAX, an 
airport with an average rate of high-energy arrivals in the dataset. Two of these flights were brought 
under control within SAC (and, therefore, had no exceedances identified by the FOQA program), 
and two were not brought under control within the SAC, continued to landing, and had multiple 
unstable-approach-related exceedances identified by FOQA. 
 
The GRADE tool was used to depict their lateral and vertical paths in the terminal airspace, and 
ADIS was used to examine the weather and air-traffic conditions to which these four flights were 
exposed. The air-traffic data were obtained through the ASMM Project’s relationship with the FAA 
Office of Performance Analysis in the collaboration on the PDARS. PDARS provided one-hour of 
data for each flight, when the participating airlines gave permission to disclose the date and hour in 
which the selected flights arrived. 
 
There was nothing statistically or operationally significant about the following weather data shown 
for these four flights except that the two flights exhibiting exceedances occurred in moderate wind 
conditions. All four flights arrived in visual meteorological conditions. 
• Nonexceedance flights 
− Exemplar 1 – Night VMC 
Visibility: 8 (mi) Temperature: 12 (c) Dew Point: 11 (c) Wind Direction: 160 (deg) Variable 
Wind Direction: (deg) Wind Speed: 03 (kts) Wind Gust: (kts) Altimeter: 3021 (in) Sky Con-
dition: FEW013 BKN180 SUN Position: Night Darkness  
− Exemplar 2 – Day VMC 
Visibility: 10 (mi) Temperature: 21 (c) Dew Point: 17 (c) Wind Direction: VRB (deg) Vari-
able Wind Direction: (deg) Wind Speed: 05 (kts) Wind Gust: (kts) Altimeter: 2996 (in) Sky 
Condition: FEW018 FEW034 SCT080 BKN120 BKN180 SUN Position: Day Light  
• Exceedance flights 
− Exemplar 3 – Day VMC (moderate wind) 
Visibility: 10 (mi) Temperature: 16 (c) Dew Point: 08 (c) Wind Direction: 250 (deg) Vari-
able Wind Direction: 240V350 (deg) Wind Speed: 16 (kts) Wind Gust: (kts) Altimeter: 
2988 (in) Sky Condition: FEW100 SCT200 SUN Position: Day Light 
− Exemplar 4 – Day VMC(moderate wind) 
Visibility: 10 (mi) Temperature: 18 (c) Dew Point: 12 (c) Wind Direction: 230 (deg) Vari-
able Wind Direction: (deg) Wind Speed: 12 (kts) Wind Gust: 19 (kts) Altimeter: 2998 (in) 
Sky Condition: FEW008 SUN Position: Day Light 
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The GRADE graphical displays in figure 5.3.13, with the perspective of the profile view, portray the 
vertical paths of the four exemplar flights in white and the vertical paths of all other flights landing 
in the same hour in green. The concentrated green band can be interpreted as aircraft on the glide 
slope, both for straight-in arrivals and flights turning from downwind to final (the case for the four 
exemplar flights). The two graphics at the top of figure 5.3.13 (high energy to touchdown and to 
1 mile) are the flights that had exceedances. The two graphics at the bottom of figure 5.3.13 are the 
nonexceedance flights. (These graphics are screen dumps taken from the GRADE displays with no 
absolute scales. The relative scales of the flights are correct and are the only feature of significance 
to this visualization of the events.) 
 
Examination of the air-traffic data revealed that three of the four flights were operating at a higher 
airspeed over the very-high-frequency (VHF) omnidirectional range (VOR) navigational-system fix 
point at Santa Monica than would be expected had the charted “expect” speed been applied. The 
VOR at Santa Monica is called SMO. The charted "expect” speed is the required speed that is pub-
lished on the arrival chart for the segment crossing over SMO VOR. These aircraft crossed SMO at 
250 knots indicated airspeed. The charted “expect” arrival speed is 230 knots, well before SMO.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.3.13. GRADE display of air traffic for four exemplar flights. 
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All four flights crossed SMO within 700 feet of the published altitude for either the associated  
instrument approach or charted visual approach. Altitude at this point was not a factor, but the 
graphics of figure 5.3.13 show that all four flights were higher than similarly situated flights at 
various points during the arrival and approach. All four flights joined the final approach well short 
of the charted visual approach path, indicating that they had either been vectored to the final  
approach course or had been cleared for a visual approach other than the charted visual. Of the two 
nonexceedance flights (at the bottom of figure 5.3.13), the night exemplar (on the right) was the only 
flight at the “expect” arrival speed of 230 knots as it crossed SMO, and the day exemplar (on the 
left) completed the longest of the four flight paths. 
 
Only one of the flights had an observable air-traffic constraint, a B-747 five miles ahead of one 
exceedance flight. This information is informative because, in the absence of air-traffic information, 
the participating airline assumed that ATC had vectored its aircraft into high-energy states because 
of constraints of other departing or arriving aircraft. These exemplars suggest high energy may have 
resulted solely from difficulties in determining where a visual approach could be initiated from 
downwind to ensure an appropriate energy state. There is no guidance in real time to assist these 
decisions, and pilots must make them in varying conditions of wind, lighting, and visibility. 
 
The APMS tools contributed importantly to two demonstrations of the value of integrating informa-
tion from diverse sources to gain a full picture of an event. One was the study of ICAC (described in 
appendix B). The other was the study of metering of air traffic (described later in this report), in 
which APMS was used to assess the impact on flight operations. 
 
The approach to developing the APMS tools was to respond to user needs, and then implement each 
as a prototype for testing at collaborating airlines. Maturing the tools to allow transfer to industry 
was accomplished by demonstrating their use, evolving them during evaluation tests with air carri-
ers, disclosing tools as new inventions, patenting inventions where appropriate, and licensing pat-
ented tools to commercial FOQA software vendors. Table 5.3.1 is a list of the APMS tools that have 
been disclosed and their disposition at the time of the completion of the ASMM Project.  
 
APMS generated a set of capabilities as a standalone system. Using data in any of the vendors’ 
formats as inputs, APMS provides a suite of tools for conducting the following variety of basic and 
advanced functions:  
• Exceedance analysis, management, and reporting, 
• Identification, analysis, and management of statistically atypical flights, 
• Operational studies using Pattern Search and Routine Event statistics, 
• Depiction of flights of interest in airspace visualizations using GRADE under license from 
ATAC, and 
• Examination of weather data for flights of interest. 
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TABLE 5.3.1. DISCLOSING, PATENTING, AND LICENSING INVENTIONS 
 
 
 
 
These functions will be converted for use in the Distributed National FOQA Archive (DNFA) under 
the Information Sharing Initiative (ISI) in FY05 and FY06 (the ISI project is discussed in section 
7.0, “Toward the Future Vision”). The ISI opens the door for expanded use of the capabilities devel-
oped under both the APMS and the PDARS activities of Intramural Monitoring. 
 
In the near term (perhaps with enhancements of the National Archives started under ISI), APMS can 
provide to an air carrier capabilities to provide: 
• Daily alert to atypicalities and exceedances, 
• Automated access to weather and air-traffic conditions without reidentifying flights, 
• Ability to search for prior and monitor for subsequent similar events, documenting frequency 
and location, and 
• Basis for directing its resources toward well-documented and researched problems. 
 
In the midterm, as the interest grows for information integration across distributed diverse data 
sources, use of the APMS tools is envisioned as a prime capability in an operational concept in 
which: 
• Automated issue-level data integration frees safety analysts from specific data sources, 
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• Review issues across diverse types of data (such as FOQA and ASAP) are available to the  
airlines, 
• Integrated data allow understanding of systemic issues identified in any given event or data 
source. 
 
In the long term, this concept would evolve to a national operation in which:  
• Information is integrated across organizations, 
• Airlines compare their operations to de-identified industry aggregates to understand context of 
operations, 
• Each airline becomes a node on a system that can establish industry norms, and 
• Each airline can readily determine whether identified issues are unique to their operation or 
common across airlines, allowing airlines and industry to act at the appropriate level. 
 
When the ASMM Project ended, the following barriers to realizing the long-term objective remained 
unresolved: 
• Gaining access to other sources of data for routine analysis 
− Air-traffic radar data belongs to the FAA. Permission for limited access was gained for dem-
onstrations, but no permission was granted, nor was a system developed for accessing air-
traffic data routinely. 
− Similar problems exist even within organizations. For example, air carriers have no permis-
sion to link their ASAP reports with FOQA data.  
− There is a broad future challenge to being granted access routinely to extract and integrate  
information from diverse, distributed data sources for systemic analysis.  
• Each new data source is likely to pose a new technological challenge to extracting and using its 
information.  
− Conceptually, many APMS tools generalize to other digital sources, but, except for a very 
limited experiment with radar data described later in this section, this generalization has yet 
to be demonstrated.  
− Automated analyses of textual data are a special concern because of the large number and 
great variety of such sources of valuable safety information. 
 
Implementation of APMS to overcome some of these barriers proceeded on two paths. The path to 
intramural implementation was through commercial vendors of software. As shown in table 5.3.1, 
APMS tools have been transferred through concept adoption or licensing to vendors. 
 
The path to extramural implementation of the capabilities developed as APMS tools that will over-
come some of the barriers identified previously is the ISI, which is discussed later in this report. ISI 
was initiated in the final year of the ASMM Project. ISI will focus on designing hardware, software, 
and networking to enable information sharing among air carriers and the FAA by transferring an 
operational system, instead of commercializing individual tools. Although the initial demonstration 
will have limited analysis capabilities, including Pattern Search, Routine Events, and Energy  
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Analysis, eventually The Morning Report will follow in subsequent years and be retailored to focus 
on atypical groups of flights rather than individual flights. 
 
5.3.2 Performance Data Analysis and Reporting System 
The other primary product developed under the Intramural Monitoring element of the ASMM Pro-
ject was the PDARS. From its outset, PDARS was a close collaboration among NASA, FAA  
ATO-PA, and the FAA’s contractor, the ATAC Corporation. It was the amalgamation of the FAA's 
interest in measuring system performance and safety and NASA's interest in developing technolo-
gies for monitoring and enhancing system safety. The NASA Ames Research Center and the FAA 
Office of Performance Analysis developed PDARS in response to two motivational factors—the 
accident-reduction goals of NASA’s Aviation Safety Program and the Government Performance and 
Results Act (GPRA), which required government agencies to measure performance and demonstrate 
proof of improvement. A good marriage of those motives, PDARS is the counterpart to the APMS 
that enables the FAA to measure the capacity, performance, and safety of its air-traffic services.  
 
FAA ATC facilities record large volumes of daily data, but, prior to PDARS, there was little ability 
to generate facility-specific metrics for improving safety and efficiency. PDARS provides ATC 
decision-makers at the facility level with a comprehensive set of tools and methods for monitoring 
the performance and safety of the day-to-day operations of their facility. In addition, the PDARS 
data and toolset can be used on a more macroscopic level by regional or national managers to moni-
tor the performance and safety of the NATS as a whole (den Braven and Schade (2003)). 
 
An activity of PDARS was to test and evaluate advanced concepts, methodologies, and software 
tools for analyses of ATC radar-track data. The objective is to provide technologies to identify, 
analyze, and manage conditions and events that could compromise safety, while meeting the pro-
jected requirements of increasing air traffic. Tools such as PDARS can be used to facilitate a proac-
tive reaction within the ATC facilities to mitigate the circumstances surrounding such events. It is 
necessary to be able to merge information produced by PDARS (for the perspective of air-traffic 
control) with information developed by APMS/FOQA (for the perspective of the aircraft) to under-
stand all the factors that may have been involved in an incident or unwanted trend that had been 
identified by either one.  
 
The FAA already uses many systems with which to monitor particular operational aspects of its air-
traffic-management system. PDARS is a unified capability for monitoring many aspects of a facil-
ity’s performance. It provides the capability to:  
• Collect, extract, and process ATC operational data,  
• Compute quantitative operational performance measures on a regular basis relating to safety, 
delay, flexibility, predictability, and user accessibility,  
• Conduct causal analyses and operational problem identification and analyses,  
• Access design and simulation tools for "what-if" analyses and for identification and emulation of 
system improvement options, and 
• Archive performance statistics and basic operational data for use in research development and 
planning studies.  
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PDARS incorporates innovative technology for rapidly processing large volumes of complex air-
traffic data, for extracting and visualizing information from these data, and for a secure network that 
enables facilities across the continental United States to share and discuss this information. Data are 
accessed daily from each of the sites participating in the test and evaluation of PDARS, the data are 
processed overnight, and customized reports are routinely delivered to each of the participating 
facilities each morning. Figure 5.3.14 shows how PDARS automatically and continuously collects, 
processes, and analyzes ATC information. PDARS provides to each ATC facility the capabilities to: 
• Routinely collect, process, and analyze air-traffic-management operational data, 
• Generate daily reports, 
• Share data and reports among facilities, 
• Provide software tools to support exploratory and causal analysis studies, and  
• Archive basic operational data and measurement. 
 
The core processing modules are integrated directly with a data-management system that allows for 
easy retrieval and reporting on the collected information. Data are stored locally at each FAA ATC 
facility as well as at a central location for archiving and additional reporting. A secure wide-area 
network (WAN) allows for data transfer between the central and remote sites. Reports are available 
in the form of Microsoft Excel workbooks or as interactive Web pages. The ability to monitor  
continuously, convert the collected data into reliable information, and share that information for 
collaborative decision-making is the basis for a proactive approach to identifying and alleviating 
life-threatening aviation conditions and events. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3.14. PDARS: A system for automatic data collection, analysis, and reporting. 
 
Live Radar Data 
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The front-end user tools of PDARS allow for easy access to information with a focus on short turn-
around times and professional style publishing as depicted in figure 5.3.15. Here the reporting  
system serves as a conduit through which access to additional analysis capabilities can be obtained. 
These additional capabilities include other office tools, commercially available statistics packages, 
and the custom GRADE visualization software. 
 
As indicated in figure 5.3.16, the typical setup of PDARS equipment at each FAA ATC facility 
includes one data-acquisition PC that connects to the data source through a gateway. In addition, at 
least one PC designated for data analysis allows users at the facility to access the processed informa-
tion using the PDARS software tools. 
 
PDARS provided an important contribution to the ICAC study described in appendix B that demon-
strated the value of integrating information from various sources to give a complete picture of an 
event. In the case of ICAC, that air-traffic information was particularly significant. Table 5.3.2 
shows the results of the PDARS analysis for San Francisco (SFO) and Los Angeles (LAX). One of 
the interesting results was that no conclusive evidence was found to show that go-arounds were 
more likely to result during an approach with an ICAC. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3.15. A system for user-driven analysis and publishing. 
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Figure 5.3.16. The PDARS network. 
 
 
TABLE 5.3.2. COMPARISON OF ICAC ANALYSIS FOR SFO AND LAX 
 
 LAX SFO 
Average number of ICACs per day 21.9 11.3 
Std. dev. number of ICACs per day 7.6 12.2 
ICAC rate per 1000 arrivals 35.6 26.5 
Average ICAC time to end of track 74 sec 76 sec 
Average threshold distance at ICAC 2.7 nm 3.1 nm 
Number of go-arounds 34 34 
Average go-arounds per day 1.1 1.1 
Std. dev. number of go-arounds per day 0.94 1.27 
 
 
The clustering and visualization technology from The Morning Report of Atypical Flights (described 
under APMS previously) was adapted to radar-track data as shown in figure 5.3.17. This adaptation 
required a system integration of PDARS data management, APMS-style clustering component, The 
Morning Report Display, and GRADE visualization. The top half of the slide shows a top-down 
view of aircraft arriving at LAX. The bottom half of the slide shows the same aircraft in a profile 
view. Each cluster of similar tracks is given a separate color. 
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Figure 5.3.17. Cluster visualization with GRADE. 
 
 
The Morning Report displays for the PDARS version are an Executive Summary screen and a List 
of Atypical Flights that are very similar to the displays for the APMS version that were shown in 
figures 5.3.5 and 5.3.6. Just as with APMS, upon entering the flight-list page of The Morning Report 
for PDARS, the user/analyst can examine atypical flights. Each flight on the flight list can be com-
pared to its contemporaries using numerous density plots called performance envelopes. The indi-
vidual flight can be plotted against its “cluster mates,” versus the 80% most typical flights, or against 
the entire population for numerous parameters. The example of figure 5.3.18 is a plot of heading in 
degrees relative to the direction of the runway versus the percentage of time to touchdown. 
Vertical view, looking North 
North 
East 
LAX 
Horizontal view 
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Figure 5.3.18. The Morning Report display from PDARS data. 
 
 
The particular performance envelope example of figure 5.3.19 shows altitude versus percentage of 
time to touchdown of an atypical flight (black line) compared to the distribution of “typical” flights 
(blue shading). This flight was probably atypical because of low altitude during this phase.  
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Figure 5.3.19. Performance envelopes. 
 
 
Continuing on with the analysis, The Morning Report for PDARS allows for flights of interest to be 
displayed in GRADE and shown colorized by different criteria, as shown in figure 5.3.20. In this 
example, the flight of interest is shown along with the other flights that are in the same cluster. 
However, only their associated parameters during the “colored” section of their tracks were used for 
clustering analysis. In this example, the grey portions of the flight tracks are considered to be outside 
the clustering “phase” and not considered during the clustering computations.  
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Figure 5.3.20. Clustering of flights shown in GRADE. 
 
 
PDARS has been used by the FAA ATC facilities to: 
• Measure, explain, and improve facility operation, 
• Communicate with the airlines, military, public, and other stakeholders, 
• Analyze staffing requirements, 
• Create and validate training scenarios, 
• Support airspace redesign, and 
• Find lost aircraft. 
 
PDARS has also demonstrated value to 
• Airlines: 
− Provide quick, clear, and decisive response to questions and complaints. 
− Measure, explain, and improve airline operation.  
− Provide detailed analysis that has led to schedule improvements. 
Flight of Interest 
Other flights in the 
Same cluster 
Flight portions outside the
Phase of interest 
North 
East 
LAX 
5 nmi 
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• Military/Security: 
− Provide quick, clear, and decisive response to questions. 
− Support setup of Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), Temporary Flight Restriction 
(TFR), and Special Use Airspace (SUA) volumes. 
• Public: 
− Provide clear information about traffic operations. 
− Provide better response to noise complaints. 
 
PDARS merges many data sources to achieve complete tracks for terminal-to-terminal coverage and 
provides increased accuracy over traditional flight-track-data sources. PDARS enables safety and 
performance measurements on the inter-facility, regional, and national levels. In the following para-
graphs and figures are some examples of how PDARS can and has been used. 
 
PDARS enables trending analysis, as exemplified by figure 5.3.21, which shows the trend over a 
period of two years of the flight time spent in Oakland center airspace for SFO to LAX flights. 
 
 
Date 
Figure 5.3.21. Trending analysis with PDARS. 
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PDARS tools allow users to quickly go from summary tables to query tables to charts to three-
dimensional (3-D) visualization to animation playback, as indicated in figure 5.3.22. All these capa-
bilities support exploratory and causal analysis using the underlying dataset. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.22. PDARS enables exploratory analysis. 
 
 
BWRS Report Query Table GRADE Animator  
GRADE
Statistics Packages/
Presentation Tools
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Figure 5.3.23 highlights some of the visualization capabilities of GRADE. In this figure, GRADE 
shows flights arriving and departing SFO. Green lines represent the horizontal trajectories of arriv-
ing flights, and red lines show departures. The 3-line data blocks show the positions of arriving and 
departing traffic (in green and red, respectively), at a particular point in time. Grade capabilities 
include 3-D visualization, custom colorization, and animation playback. Users have found these 
visualization features highly effective in communicating complex ATC concepts to other aviation 
stakeholders.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.3.23. Visualization of PDARS information using GRADE. 
 
 
Colorization 
Visualization 
Animation 
SFO 
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PDARS enables analysis of daily operation of the National Airspace System on local and inter-
facility levels in response to a great variety of queries. PDARS allows facilities to identify situations 
that can be changed or improved and to quantify the consequences of changes from safety and effi-
ciency perspectives. For example, figure 5.3.24 shows an arrival stream to LAX runway 25R. 
PDARS has computed “aircraft state” events at predetermined intervals (2000-, 1000-, and 300-feet 
afe for use in analysis of unstable, high-energy, or high-rate-of-descent approaches. The “snapshots” 
taken of each aircraft at the specified altitudes (called the “EV_STATE” in figure 5.3.24) is the point 
at which aircraft conditions (such as airspeed, heading, and glide slope) can be measured for subse-
quent analyses. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3.24. PDARS supports above ground level (AGL) analysis. 
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PDARS enables analysis of sector density both numerically and visually, as indicated in figure 
5.3.25, which is a horizontal view of a snapshot of the distribution of aircraft relative to sector 
boundaries. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3.25. PDARS supports sector-density analysis. 
 
 
 99
Figure 5.3.26 shows a graph from a PDARS report that depicts instantaneous traffic count through-
out the day for one en-route sector of an ARTCC. Also plotted is the Monitor and Alert Parameter 
(MAP) value for that sector, which is used loosely as a measure of sector capacity.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3.26. PDARS supports sector capacity analysis. 
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Figure 5.3.27 demonstrates analysis of a track compared with its corresponding flight plan route 
using PDARS. The white line shows the actual track of a flight; the blue dashed line shows its flight-
plan route. PDARS maintains information about all the filed, amended, and updated flight plans of 
en-route transiting aircraft that can be used to compute a variety of track vs. flight-plan metrics. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3.27. PDARS supports track vs. flight-plan analysis. 
 
Actual Track 
Flightplan 
route
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PDARS supports proximity analysis and can numerically and visually show horizontal and vertical 
distance between aircraft, as shown in figure 5.3.28. The horizontal separation distance (hsep)  
between the two aircraft is 6.99 nautical miles and the vertical separation distance (vsep) is 6.3 FL. 
(An FL, or Flight Level, is 100-feet pressure altitude in standard atmosphere.) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3.28. PDARS supports proximity analysis. 
 
Aircraft 2
Aircraft 1
Horizontal and 
vertical distance
hsep 6.99 nmi; vsep 6.3 FL 
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A proximity analysis applied to a large number of flights, and arrivals at SFO over a 24-hour time 
period, is shown in figure 5.3.29. The tracks are color-coded by distance to the closest flight. A light 
blue color signifies more that 5 nautical miles 3-dimensional separation distance, whereas red indi-
cates less than 3 nautical miles. The pattern illustrates the typical reduction in separation of flights 
arriving to closely spaced parallel runways. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3.29. An example of proximity analysis with PDARS. 
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Figure 5.3.30 displays how PDARS data can be used to illustrate and analyze locations with a higher 
than usual number of TCAS Resolution Advisories (RAs), as reported by TCAS-equipped flights. 
Such RAs tell pilots to take evasive action to avoid collision with other aircraft. The figure shows 
the area where the RAs occur (the white rectangle) with the trajectories of the aircraft involved 
(shown as colored lines) and the boundaries of the local Class B airspace (in yellow). This profile 
view shows that the Class B airspace, which is supposed to separate arriving and departing commer-
cial aircraft from general aviation traffic, does not extend far enough to the east to protect this arrival 
traffic flow. 
 
When PDARS was turned over fully to the FAA at the end of the ASMM Project: 
• It had been in operation for six years.  
• Nineteen users’ meetings had been convened. 
• It had 33 FAA data feeds (20 ARTCCs, and 13 terminal radar approach control facilities  
(TRACONs)). 
• There were 39 FAA facilities connected (20 ARTCCs, 13 TRACONs, 5 Regional Offices, and 
the Air Traffic Control System Control Center (ATCSCC)). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3.30. PDARS supports TCAS RA analysis. 
Profile view, looking North 
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• There were over 200 FAA users. 
• More than 400 reports were being generated daily (192 on site; 239 centrally). 
• More than 23,000 facility days of data had been archived. 
 
The approach taken in the development and usage of PDARS was a reason for its success: 
• Engaged the “user” from the outset of the concept and continuously in its evolution, 
• Designed the applications to respond to the users’ perceived needs first, 
• Provided support, training, and “hand-holding” continuously, 
• Responded quickly to users’ concerns and recommendations, 
• Identified a “champion” able to deal with the “political” issues in the user community, and 
• Exploited NASA’s reputation, objectivity, and expertise. 
 
The PDARS team had to overcome many political and technical challenges, including:  
• Ensuring an acceptable, secure WAN, 
• Reconstructing a flight from diverse data sources of segments (analogous to “unshredding” 
paper), 
• Automatic processing for next-day, high-quality, reliable reporting, 
• Quickly accessing reports and processed data, 
• Using low-cost infrastructure (i.e., standard PC technology), 
• Advancing visualization and exploration capabilities to produce meaningful displays, 
• Building an evolving system to grow and adapt as technologies advance, as informational needs 
change, and as users learn more about their needs and the capabilities available in PDARS. 
 
In addition to expanding to all the major TRACONs in the continental United States (from the 13 at 
the time of transfer), future plans for PDARS at the time that NASA transferred full responsibility to 
the FAA, included:  
• Expanded use of The Morning Report for PDARS, 
• Further data integration, 
− Geographic information system (GIS), weather,  
− Facility logs, 
− Scheduling and demand information, 
− Voice communication, and 
− Airline data (if made available), 
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• Enhanced data mining tools, 
− More efficient algorithms and automation for specific-use cases (“issues”), such as ICAC, 
and 
• Baselining and trend detection. 
 
Moreover, when FAA took the "hand off" of total responsibility for PDARS at the end of FY05, 
their plans included: 
• Continuation of the expansion of PDARS applications, 
− Further expansion of PDARS installations, 
• Plans to cover the 35 destinations included in the Operations Evaluation (OEP), 
• Plans to add oceanic coverage,  
− Further development of metrics, 
• Safety, Capacity, Efficiency, and Cost, 
• Runway, Airport, TRACON, Center, and National Airspace System (NAS), 
• Traffic, terrain, weather, airspace, and obstacles, and 
• Trend Analysis. 
 
At the time of the transfer, the FAA expected that PDARS would continue as a key application for 
performance and safety measurement and enhancement. In the near term, PDARS was expected to 
provide the capability for interconnected ATC facilities to collect, extract, process, and merge ATC 
data routinely; compute quantitative performance measures; disseminate performance measurement 
reports; access system design and simulation tools for what-if studies; and archive basic operational 
data and performance statistics. In the longer term, PDARS was expected to be nationalized as an 
operational capability in the FAA. Radar data from all ATC facilities would then become sources for 
identifying operational issues and would provide a key element for understanding issues that are 
identified in other data sources or by human analysts. PDARS would also provide the archive of data 
on which to base airspace redesign studies and will be the source of the measures of performance to 
meet the requirements of the GPRA. 
 
At the termination of the ASMM Project, NASA and the FAA were in negotiations exploring ways 
in which NASA could be permitted to access PDARS data for NASA’s future activities. The vision 
of the future is that PDARS would potentially become a node of a source of information that could 
be integrated with information from other data sources (such as FOQA/APMS). The ASIST Concept 
Paper provided in appendix D is a clear statement of the need for such information, not only by the 
FAA for measuring their ATC performance as stated previously, but also for sharing and integrating 
with other data sources to identify and gain insight into systemic issues. 
 
In summary, the Intramural Monitoring element of the ASMM Project tested, evaluated, and 
brought to operational capabilities advanced concepts for processing numerical data in the suite of 
APMS tools for flight-recorded data and PDARS for ATC radar-track data. 
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5.4 Modeling and Simulations 
 
5.4.1 Fast-Time Simulations 
The Modeling and Simulations element of the ASMM Project had as its objective the reliable and 
validated identification of operational hazards, their causal factors, and their risks by simulating the 
interactions of the multiple human and nonhuman agents operating the aviation system. Successful 
computational modeling approaches were combined to provide a suite of interactive investigative, 
evaluation, and assessment tools for system-risk assessment. These developments were motivated by 
the requirements of the ASMM objectives for a human-centered system model of the interactions 
and mutual expectations among multiple human and nonhuman agents to enable risk-precursor 
identification based on human-system capabilities and limitations. This approach provided an essen-
tial capability for proactive management of safety risk using a predictive analysis of the systemwide 
impacts of interventions or local changes in the system. During the Identification step of proactive 
risk management, safety incidents are identified by APMS, FOQA, PDARS, NAOMS, ASRS, 
ASAP, or other sources. Fast-time simulations provide guidance in conducting additional investiga-
tion of each identified incident and a preliminary risk assessment based on approximate likelihood 
and probable consequence. During the Evaluation step, fast-time simulations assist in acquiring 
insight into the operational significance of an identified event or trend, explore for the important 
contextual factors of that event conducive to failure and human error, and assess the probability of 
its risk. During the Formulation step, these tools assist in predicting the systemwide impacts of 
proposed interventions to support the selection of the most appropriate intervention. 
 
One of the most interesting methods of predicting the future behavior of a system is simulation. 
Simulation has become an important tool to engineers during conceptual and preliminary design for 
investigating and predicting behavior of complex systems. Its value has been demonstrated when, 
for whatever reason, it is impractical to exercise the actual system in its true environment, and when 
absolute fidelity is not essential to studying the system behavior. Simulations entail analogues, 
replicas, mathematical representations, or combinations of these factors that have been validated and 
verified at, perhaps, an individual component level.  
 
Investigations of various fatal aviation accidents over many recent years have frequently resulted in 
their attribution to “human error.” Two of the questions that must be answered in order to formulate 
the appropriate intervention are “Why do highly trained professionals make mistakes?” and “What 
features of the system operations are conducive to human error?” Identifying when equipment and 
procedures do not fully support the operational needs of the human operators of the system is key to 
a proactive approach to reducing error and improving flight safety. Consequently, analyses to iden-
tify causal factors and to understand why the accident occurred must account for human perform-
ance. Serious human errors that result in aviation accidents are rare events, and the low probability 
of their occurrence makes the study of these errors difficult to investigate in the field and in human-
in-the-loop tests. Human errors characteristically result from a complex interaction of unusual cir-
cumstances, subtle "latent" flaws in system design, procedures, training, organizational cultures, and 
limitations and biases in human performance. Such systemic problems can lead to the fielding of 
equipment or the implementation of procedures that put the system safety at risk, particularly when 
they are used in a manner or under circumstances that were not envisioned or tested. Currently, 
analysis of the causal factors of systemic issues is based on third-party observations, experiential 
reporting, and, less frequently, human-in-the-loop tests. These tests are not only difficult, labor 
107 
intensive, and expensive, but they seldom shed satisfactory insight into why the human performed as 
(s)he did, particularly when it entails some low-probability confluence of conditions and contexts.  
 
Computational models of human performance in large-scale and complex systems have served 
engineers in predicting system performance for over 20 years, and have been used to predict  
requirements for aiding systems to augment human performance and ensure safe system operation. 
Human-performance models have also served the Human-Factors and Cognitive-Sciences communi-
ties by establishing a platform for the embodiment of architectural and functional representations of 
key human operator characteristics. In order to define safe and effective processes and procedures 
for an evolving system concept, the human operators’ performances must be appropriately and 
consistently included in the design of the new operation and of any automated aiding that is pro-
posed to help the distributed human operators in their activities. In this model paradigm, the  
response of the humans in the system is a function of the demands of environmental stimuli medi-
ated through the current state of the humans.  
 
The models of human performance in systems then look to two basic interactions to answer that 
question. First, there are models of the basic information-processing elements, functions, and  
resources that the human operator uses during an activity (Card, Moran, and Newell (1986) and 
Wickens’ Multiple Resource Theory, Wickens (1984)). In these models, limitations (perceptual, 
memorial, cognitive, or motor) are provided in order to anticipate how humans might be overloaded 
by task demands. Humans do not have infinite bandwidth and, in fact, have some unique attributes 
that determine what types of tasks they can and cannot do simultaneously. Second, there are models 
describing how the functions of a human operator change in response to environmental stressors 
(either internal or external to the operator). These models have played a large role in human-
reliability analyses as “performance-shaping functions” (Swain and Guttmann (1983)).  
 
The human operator’s function in the distributed air/ground air-traffic management (ATM) system 
includes visual monitoring, perception, spatial reasoning, planning, decision-making, communica-
tion, procedure selection, and execution. The level of detail to which each of these functions needs 
to be modeled depends upon the purpose of the prediction of the simulation model. Human operators 
sharing control and information with automated aiding systems and with other operators in the 
control of complex dynamic systems will, by the nature of those systems, need to perform several 
tasks within the same time frame or within closely spaced time frames. Multiple operators perform-
ing multiple tasks are a challenge to the state-of-the-art in human-performance representation. What 
makes it absolutely essential to model multi-tasking and task management stems from the fact that 
there are limits to human bandwidth, information storage/retrieval capacity, and the ability to focus 
attentional resources that clearly affect performance. This effect can lead directly to safety-critical 
performance by the operators. In other words, when humans are asked to do too many things at once, 
they change what they do and how they do it. To accurately predict human performance, it is impor-
tant to understand when the multiple task demands exceed human bandwidth and how humans 
respond under such circumstances. The number of activities, the complexity of the tasks, and the 
diversity in human capability all contribute to the complexity of the analysis and are the foundation 
for research into the understanding and modeling of human multitasking behavior.  
 
Fast-time simulations incorporating models of human-system performance are useful in understand-
ing and predicting the sensitivities of human performance to changes in design, procedures, and 
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training. These simulations examine the effects of parameter variation on human-system perform-
ance by small perturbations of each parameter from a nominal value. It is now possible to perform 
on the order of a million simulations using a modern computer and rapidly generate extensive prob-
ability distributions describing the human-system response. Statistical analysis indicates that the 
uncertainty in the probability distribution decreases as more simulations are performed with suffi-
cient numbers of iterations of the situation being simulated and its variations based in human-system 
interactions to allow for the distribution of performance to be developed. From these distributions, 
the probability of the highly infrequent “erroneous” performance can be estimated, and the causal 
structure of those rare errors can be examined in detail. Potential interventions can also be explored 
by examining the attributes of the causal structure, making preventative adjustments in selected 
parameters, and then performing additional simulations to assess the human-system response.  
 
Fast-time simulations have been shown to provide reliable data-driven assistance with prediction to 
support formulation of the most appropriate interventions to prevent incidents. (See, for example, 
Aldrich et al. (1989), Blom et al. (1998), Cacciabue (1998), and Blom et al. (2003).) Fast-time simu-
lation is a powerful technique to uncover a design or procedural or training flaw that may  
induce human error under some low-probability confluence of conditions and contextual factors and, 
thereby, compromise the safety of operations of the national aviation system. When combined with 
human-in-the-loop testing in nominal and off-nominal scenarios, fast-time simulations provide a 
complementary technique to develop systems and procedures that are tailored to the humans’ tasks, 
capabilities, and limitations. Fast-time simulations enable the more expensive and less efficient 
human-in-the-loop simulations to focus on those situations most likely to be of high safety risk. At 
the same time, the human-in-the-loop simulations provide bases for validating and/or modifying the 
models used in the fast-time simulations.  
 
The Modeling and Simulations element of the ASMM Project focused on simulations to reveal the 
systemic causal factors behind human performance when controller, pilot, and automated systems 
interact in specific flight scenarios. While several effective simulations exist for exploring questions 
related to capacity of the aviation system, this activity was uniquely designed to explore its vulner-
ability to events or trends that could compromise its safety. Human-performance models were inte-
grated with existing models of other elements of the aviation system to simulate the interactions 
among the multiple human and nonhuman agents that operate the NATS and to examine the per-
formance of the system and reveal potential hazards. Specifically, this activity addressed identifica-
tion of the intended and the unintended consequences of changing the information control balance 
and demands among human and automated operators in the system.  
 
The Modeling and Simulations activity used as the starting point for its objectives the significant 
investment within NASA and in other agencies in complex human-system-performance representa-
tion. Specifically, an activity of another AvSP project called Systemwide Accident Prevention 
(SWAP) developed the models of human performance used in the Fast-Time Simulations. (A  
description of these models is provided in section 5.4.3 and appendix E.) 
 
The incorporation of human-performance models is necessary when examining the performance 
limitations and boundaries of a complex system involving many human-machine interactions.  
Human performance must be considered to assess potential incidents, determine if a hazard exists, 
and forecast the potential of a failure in the interest of proactive management of safety risk.  
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Proactive management of safety risk has the following needs, some of which can be met only with 
simulation:  
• Determine human and machine requirements for successful task performance (perceptual, cogni-
tive, motor, and informational), 
• Describe possible mechanisms for that performance, 
− Define causal relationships between the human operators and the context in which they  
operate, 
• Predict performance of human-system model involving multiple interacting humans and  
machines under nominal operating environments, 
• Identify hazards and their causal factors in new operating environments for which there are no 
data or experience, and 
• Determine risks of identified and unexpected hazards. 
 
There are several sources of “safety risk” that can be assessed using a computational model, includ-
ing emergent behavior from interaction between the human operators and the requirements of the 
system within which they operate. Analyses of these sources entail imposing a stress-induced risk by 
running the human-system model in simulations at, or slightly beyond, the performance boundaries 
that would normally be considered safe. A different sort of emergent behavior occurs in the tails of 
the probability density functions of performance corresponding to rare events in operations. These 
events are typically the outlier incidents that entail the confluence of numerous unusual system states 
and human responses to those states. There is also the emergent behavior of the “novel” response to 
a hazardous situation that occurs as a result of unique operator behavior (or unique operator-system 
interaction). All of these sources of risk were modeled in the analyses that were conducted as case 
studies under the Modeling and Simulations element of the ASMM Project.  
 
Several different perspectives and approaches have evolved in developing simulation models of 
human performance because human performance is complex. The diagram shown in figure 5.4.1 
illustrates this diversity, ranging from general theoretical models at the top of the figure to objective-
oriented pragmatic models at the bottom, and from biological physical models at the left to process 
task models on the right.  
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Figure 5.4.1. Perspectives and approaches to modeling human activity. 
 
 
The state-of-the-art of human performance modeling is described in section 5.4.3, in appendix E, 
and in Foyle et al. (2003, 2005). (See also the bibliography in appendix E.) The human-performance 
model selected for the experiments conducted under the Modeling and Simulations element of the 
ASMM Project was the Air MIDAS (Air Man-Machine Integration Design and Analysis System) 
model developed at San Jose State University, San Jose, California. Of the five predictive models 
described in appendix E, each with its own unique characteristics, Air MIDAS was found to fit best 
to the scenarios of these experiments and to the integration with the simulation of the rest of the 
system required in each scenario. Air MIDAS is described in appendix E as an integrative multi-
component cognitive model designed to examine workload, memory interference, and misperception 
and is most closely related to the “Workload Prediction Models” of figure 5.4.1. Air MIDAS is 
driven by a set of user inputs specifying operator goals, procedures for achieving those goals, and 
declarative knowledge appropriate to a given simulation. These asserted knowledge structures inter-
act with, and are moderated by, embedded models of cognition for managing resources, memory, 
and action.  
 
The diagram shown in figure 5.4.2 represents the primary model components in an integrated, 
closed-loop simulation of the aviation transportation system and human operator. On the left side of 
figure 5.4.2 are the “domain” models that represent the portion of the aviation transportation system, 
the equipment, and the characteristics of the portion of the real world with which the operator inter-
acts. The use of the term “World” in the figure and in the subsequent discussion is meant to imply 
this domain, which is the full extent of the world within which the human model operates in a given 
simulation. It is the representation of everything external to the human operator(s) essential to the 
scenario of the simulation. 
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Figure 5.4.2. Representation of the models simulating the aviation transportation system and 
human operator (Air MIDAS). 
 
 
On the right side of figure 5.4.2 are models describing components of human-operator performance. 
The human-operator model functions as a closed-loop control model with inputs coming from the 
world of the model, i.e., from the representation of the aviation transportation system, and with 
outputs representing action taken in this world.  
 
The Air MIDAS software is performance-prediction software that uses models of human perform-
ance within an integrated computational framework to generate workload and activity timelines in 
response to operational environments. As shown in figure 5.4.2, the main components of the model 
are the simulated operator’s world representation and the symbolic operator model (SOM) represent-
ing perceptual and cognitive activities of an agent. Within the SOM, the Updateable World Repre-
sentation (UWR in figure 5.4.2) contains information about the environment, cockpit, vehicle, 
physical constraints, and terrain. Updates of the states of these elements are provided through the 
perceptual and attention processes of the SOM.TP9 PT The world representation serves to trigger activities 
in the SOM to serve mission goals or respond to anomalies. The UWR also contains the Working 
Memory (WM) of the simulated operator, the domain knowledge, and a goal-based procedural 
activity structure. In Air MIDAS, the internal UWR provides a structure whereby simulated opera-
tors access their own tailored or personalized information about the world in which this model oper-
ates. The structure and use of the UWR is akin to human long-term memory and is one of the aspects 
of Air MIDAS unique among most human-system modeling tools. In order to capture the central 
                                                 
TPT
9
TPT Like a human’s, the model’s representation of its world may not be consistent with reality. 
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role of schema and internal representation, the Air MIDAS model has an elaborate representation of 
both declarative and procedural information. 
 
Activities to be performed are managed through a queuing process and scheduled according to 
priority and resource availability. Four resource pools (Visual, Auditory, Cognitive, and Psycho-
motor) are checked for availability in response to the demands by the required tasks. Depending on 
the resources available and the task requirements, an activity may be working, pending, or  
postponed. 
 
Tasks or activities available to an operator are contained in that operator’s UWR and generate most 
of the simulation behavior. Within Air MIDAS, a hierarchical goal representation is used. Each 
activity contains slots for attribute values describing, e.g., preconditions, temporal or logical execu-
tion constraints, satisfaction conditions, estimated duration, priority, and resource requirements. The 
durations of activities are defined by distributions of performance times and, at any given perform-
ance, a stochastic mechanism selects the performance time to be used in that schedule cycle.  
 
To support adaptation and response to unanticipated stimuli in the mission, a continuum of contin-
gent or decision-making behavior is also represented in Air MIDAS, following the skill, rule, 
knowledge-based distinction reported by Rasmussen (1983).  
 
Consequently, within the Air MIDAS model are stochastic representations of human limitations in 
capacity resources (visual, auditory, cognitive, and motor), in storage (working memory and proce-
dural queue), in look-ahead capability (decision horizon), and in interruption and resumption man-
agement. Air MIDAS also models the inherent stochastic variability in activity performance and in 
context mode variability in activity selection. Further, it represents the stochastic nature of the adap-
tation in response as a function of context and of the adaptation of workload and priority levels 
based on the operator’s state. For a detailed discussion of the implementation of the contextual 
model of Air MIDAS, see Verma and Corker, 2001. 
 
The Air MIDAS model provides psychological plausibility in the cognitive constructs of long-term, 
working memories (with articulation into spatial and verbal components of these models), with 
sensory/perceptual and attentional components that focus, identify, and filter information from the 
simulated world for the operator’s action and control. The cognitive function is provided by the 
interaction of context and action. The human and task environments are considered to be interactive 
and inter-responsive rather than linear components in an information-processing system. The human 
operator modifies the process of task performance as active adaptations to his/her perceptions of 
his/her own capabilities and the task environment demands. These adaptations include an under-
standing of context and a requirement to include context and its potential impact explicitly in the 
system-performance model. The explicit inclusion of context-responsive behavior in human-
performance models of the Air MIDAS has been demonstrated by Corker and his colleagues (Verma 
and Corker (2001), Corker et al. (2000)). The Air MIDAS model takes the construct of context to 
guide the selection of activities to be performed to reach the operator’s goals in simulation. In order 
to have these activities play out in the simulation world, the Air MIDAS model has a scheduler that 
accounts for the resource constraints of the human operator; i.e., the human-performance model is 
limited in the cognitive, perceptual, and motor tasks that can be performed simultaneously. Activity 
in this model is assumed to be concurrent unless constrained by resource or information. 
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The recorded output of the Air MIDAS version of the Operator model generally takes two forms: the 
output associated with measurement of the performance of the model in the task domain, and that 
associated with measurement of the modeled (internal) human-performance characteristics, i.e., the 
psychological functions that are responsible for the activities of the model. Psychological perform-
ance is recorded by “biographers” that keep track of the perceptual demands, operator’s attention 
demands, cognitive loading, context-control switching, and memory representations. 
 
System performance is also recorded as the modeled operator performs functions to meet mission 
goals in the domain of the simulation. These external measurements of task-related performance are 
scheduling, degradation, and shedding of tasks; time to complete a task; and timeline information on 
tasks performed. This information includes such things as the flight tracks of aircraft, the aircraft 
pilot’s and the air-traffic controller’s commands, the number of incidents, etc. 
 
The Air MIDAS model of human performance was used in three missions, or case studies, to iden-
tify hazards and assess risks. Each of these different studies was also used to develop and explore the 
capabilities of the fast-time simulations. Each study had unique characteristics to demonstrate the 
applicability of the Air MIDAS model and to evolve its capabilities. The three studies to be dis-
cussed here addressed:  
• Clear Air Turbulence Predictions (CAT), 
• Miles-in-Trail and Time-Based Metering, 
• Surface Movement Operations.  
 
In the first two studies, Air MIDAS was linked to the Reconfigurable Flight Simulator (RFS) devel-
oped by the Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech) to identify the hazards and their causal 
factors in each scenario. (See Shah et al. (2005) for a description of RFS). The RFS was used to 
represent the left side of figure 5.4.2, which is called the “World Representation” in the figure. As 
stated previously, this term is simply meant to imply everything external to the human operator(s) 
with which the operator models are required to interact in the scenario of the simulation. For the last 
study, entailing a risk-assessment study of surface-movement operations, Air MIDAS simulations 
provided inputs to the Traffic Organization Perturbation Analyzer (TOPAZ) produced by the Dutch 
National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR) (Blom et al. (1998) and Blom et al. (2003)). 
 
The CAT study analyzed the impact on the aviation transportation system of a modified commercial 
aircraft cockpit that had a display of CAT sensors. Three scenarios were studied: one in which there 
was no advance warning of CAT (the current state), one in which the CAT system provided an alert 
1 minute in advance of entering turbulence, and one in which the CAT system alerted 5 minutes in 
advance of an encounter. The simulation examined the impact of these sensors on ATC in a sector 
with 12 to 16 aircraft. It was assumed that all the sensors worked reliably (i.e., no misses and no 
false alarms) and that all the aircraft were equipped with these sensors. New procedures describing 
the flightcrew response to CAT alerts were provided in the simulations as required.  
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In the CAT study, models of the controller and the pilots (all of whom were represented by Air 
MIDAS models) were linked to Georgia Tech’s RFS (Pritchett (2002)). The RFS was used to repre-
sent the portion of the external world with which the human-operator models had to interact, as 
shown in figure 5.4.2. RFS was linked to Air MIDAS via a run-time interface through the DOD-
developed High Level Architecture (HLA) to establish real-time integration between the models, 
and synchronize their operations through coordination of their independent internal clocks. The 
human-operator model representing ATC “looks” at the airspace provided by RFS, makes decisions 
on what actions need to be taken to manage the traffic in that airspace, and then communicates those 
decisions to the human-operator models who pilot the aircraft according to the ATC commands.  
 
Figure 5.4.3 shows the number of “monitoring” processes that the air-traffic controller model was 
able to complete as a function of the prediction time of the CAT alert. The monitoring process is the 
method used by the controller model to gain information about the state of his/her world. The model 
is programmed to move its point of visual regard in a pattern based on the scan pattern used by 
controllers to ensure that information is not missed as they scan their radar screen Display System 
Replacement (DSR). The model simulates the movement by interrogating the equipment model 
(radar) for information at an x,y point on the surface of the radar display. (In three-dimensional 
equipment, as, for instance, cockpit instrumentation, the model also has a z-plane dimension that 
refers to whether the information displayed is in the focal plane.) At the point of inquiry, the equip-
ment model provides information about its state (radar signature) at that time. If the model dwells on 
the position for a sufficient amount of time (which varies as a function of the type of equipment 
being scanned, see Landy (2002), then full information about that point on the equipment display is 
provided. If the model does not achieve a full dwell time, then a reduced set of information is passed 
to the UWR of the model. A controller’s scan pattern of the radar display starts with the periphery of 
his/her sector boundary, then to any crossing points for reroutes at co-altitude, and then to each 
quadrant of his/her sector in a clockwise process. It is important that this process be as continuous 
as possible. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.3. ATC frequency of interruptions. 
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Figure 5.4.3 shows that the 1-minute look-ahead sensor resulted in a reduction in the number of 
monitors completed. The 1-minute look-ahead was the most disruptive of the controller’s monitoring 
process because of the link of the model to flight-crew behavior. If there was no alerting system, the 
flight crew penetrated the turbulence in sequence of their route of flight. They would call to the ATC 
to request a new altitude, but only after some (modeled) work to call to the cabin, reduce speed, and 
assure continued stable flight. The performances of these tasks are distributed in time because of 
variability in both the performance time and flightcrew scheduling of each task and, furthermore, 
distributed as a function of the flightpath of each aircraft relative to the area of turbulence. Similarly, 
in the case of the 5-minute look-ahead, the flightcrew model would schedule a call to ATC to change 
altitude as a lower-priority task than any other activity that was being performed. Consequently, in 
both the no-alert and the 5-minute-alert cases, although each aircraft would still ask for an altitude 
change, the requests would occur in a temporally distributed manner. However, when the CAT alert 
is received on the flight deck at 1 minute to penetration, each flightcrew model scheduled a call to 
ATC as a priority task as soon as they received the alert. Since many aircraft approached the turbu-
lence field along different routes at about the same time, many near-simultaneous calls to the con-
troller resulted, all of which had high priority and, therefore, they produced a period of interruption 
for the ATC. The introduction of these simultaneous high-priority tasks caused the reduction in the 
number of monitors completed. 
 
The graph in figure 5.4.4 illustrates the time spent monitoring other traffic as a function of the sensor 
look-ahead characteristics. Again the 1-minute look-ahead provides the least time available to moni-
tor because of the nearly simultaneous multiple priority calls for altitude changes described previ-
ously, whereas the controller’s performance with 5-minute CAT alerts was about the same as with 
no alerts.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.4. ATC monitoring time. 
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The graph in figure 5.4.5 illustrates the cumulative load on the air-traffic controller model as a func-
tion of the look-ahead time of the sensor. The condition of no sensor has the least impact on the 
controller’s cumulative load. The 1- and 5-minute look-aheads have about the same impact on the 
workload of the controller model. The cumulative workloads presented here do not reflect the inter-
ruptions due to the massed calls at 1 minute to penetration nor the impact on the available monitor-
ing time discussed previously. The workload calculation process of the Air MIDAS model does not 
have a function that accounts for the rate at which tasks are introduced (although, perhaps, this 
function should be developed). As each task is performed, the load associated with it is added to the 
cumulative workload. If there are too many tasks to be performed at given time, the lower-priority 
tasks are interrupted (as is the case of the controllers interrupting their scans in the 1-minute-alert 
scenario). However, if the deferred tasks are performed eventually, then their loads are added to the 
cumulative load in the model. It is the dynamics of when the calls for changes come that affects the 
interruptive behavior. A time line of second-to-second model load would show the spike associated 
with the management of the calls associated with 1-minute alerts. 
 
The experiment indicated that onboard CAT sensing affected the simulated controller. This effect 
was observable because the Air MIDAS model integrated with the RFS enabled a full closed-loop-
system representation that included representations of both air-traffic and flight-deck operations. The 
procedures that were implemented in the simulations were those anticipated by the designers of the 
CAT equipment. As described previously, the sequence of response on the flight deck differed as a 
function of when the alert was received relative to the penetration of the turbulence. The combina-
tion of those procedures and the look-ahead time in the system resulted in an interruption pattern that 
had its highest impact on controller performance at 1-minute look-ahead time. The model imposes 
limits on tasks to be performed based on load limits for scheduling of tasks by the operator. In the  
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.5. Workload across Scenarios. 
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experiment performed, the monitoring task of the controller for the 1-minute look-ahead design had 
to be interrupted more frequently than in the other scenarios to maintain the acceptable load level for 
the controller model. It is worth noting that 1-minute look-ahead was the design specification for the 
CAT system that was most likely to be implemented. 
 
A second study was conducted to further develop and explore the capabilities of the Air MIDAS-
RFS linkage to analyze statistically the systemic operational impact of a procedural change. This 
study was performed to explore the differences in workload resulting from time-based-metering 
(TBM) and miles-in-trail (MIT) metering of high-density traffic on approach to LAX through the 
Southern California TRACON and the Los Angeles ARTCC (ZLA).  
 
In agent-based simulation, models of the agents relevant to the operational concept are created and 
executed at the same time in one large collective simulation environment, as diagrammed in figure 
5.4.6. In the specific study of metering traffic flow, this representation included the environment of 
the arrival streams, and the agents of interest included the controllers of each of the center and 
TRACON sectors; communication channels for controllers emulating their VHF voice communica-
tion frequencies; surveillance technologies mimicking their radar systems; and the pilots and air-
craft. The controllers were critical contributors to the overall system behavior in the scenarios 
relevant to this study, and thus were modeled using Air MIDAS. Multiple copies are made of each 
model type within the simulation run, each representing a single actor within the system. For exam-
ple, if the arrival stream currently contains 50 aircraft, then the simulation has 50 aircraft models and 
50 pilot models.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.6. Agent-based simulations of managing arrival streams.  
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For MIT metering, the TRACON establishes distances to be maintained between aircraft during 
approach for landing. In TBM, Center establishes the times at which each aircraft is to arrive over a 
fix.TP10 PT Procedures for both types of approach control were developed for two Center sectors and one 
TRACON sector. The air traffic recorded by PDARS for four days under each traffic control condi-
tion served as the validation traffic base. The simulation of controller performance was run using 
one hour of selected traffic with 54 aircraft in both approach and over-flight regimes. A nominal 
flightpath generated by using averaged flight parameters (i.e., latitude, longitude, altitude, and 
speed) at fixes and entry/exit points of the sectors was used as a reference.  
 
The PDARS data in figure 5.4.7 illustrate the over-flight and arrival traffic patterns into LAX. The 
sector boundaries are sketched in purple. The over-flight traffic is in yellow, blue, and pink, and the 
arrival traffic is shown in green. The simulation included Air MIDAS models of the controllers of 
Center sectors 19, 20, and the lowered feeder sector (LFDR) and the air traffic flow was simulated 
in RFS. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.7. Example of PDARS data on flights through sectors 19, 20, and lower feeder sector 
(LFDR) into LAX. 
 
 
 
                                                 
TPT
10
TPT A fix is an intersection of two navigational (VOR) radials or the intersection of a navigational radial and distance 
measuring equipment (DME) used by ATC. 
N
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Figure 5.4.8 is an example of the correspondence of the modeled controller performance (white) to 
the human controller (green—from PDARS) in managing descent into LAX. (The y-axis represents 
the vertical flightpath of the descent in thousands of feet. The x-axis is the longitudinal distance on 
the approach.) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.8. TBM Scenario: Actual compared with simulated tracks. 
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Figure 5.4.9 shows a plan view of one simulation in the TBM scenario. Note that the human control-
ler (green track) takes an aircraft on a vector to satisfy time restrictions at the fix point (a merge 
waypoint on the ZLA approach indicated by the circle in figure 5.4.9.) The modeled controller (red) 
takes the aircraft to an empty slot on the other approach route to manage the same time restriction. 
The blue line is a nominal flightpath that was generated by averaging the aircraft tracks for 1000 
flights. It is used to show the variation of an individual controller’s performance as well as that of 
the model with respect to the averaged human performance. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.9. TBM Scenario: Nominal vs. actual vs. simulated tracks in plan view. 
 
 
121 
Figure 5.4.10 indicates the accuracy with which the modeled controller in a single simulation run 
managed to meet the required time at the fix compared with the actual controller. For individual 
aircraft (shown along the x-axis) the abscissa shows the simulated time over fix relative to the actual 
time over fix (shown as the zero axis). The ordinate is the simulated time either early (up) or late 
(down) relative to the actual time.  
 
As shown in figures 5.4.11(a), (b), and (c), there was no statistically significant difference in work-
load of the modeled controllers operating TBM or MIT metering, even though more aircraft maneu-
vers were undertaken in the Center sectors under TBM control than under MIT metering control. 
Although the overall workload was the same for both TBM and MIT metering, it will be shown that 
the source and timing of the workload was redistributed as a consequence of different actions  
performed.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.10. TBM: Mean values of time differences between simulated and actual tracks at 
sector exit points. 
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(a). Sector 20 controller. 
 
(b). TRACON controller. 
 
(c). Sector 19 controller 
Figure 5.4.11. Controller workload – TBM compared with MIT. 
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The procedural sequences for both TBM and MIT metering were developed through interviews with 
controllers from the Los Angeles Center. Figure 5.4.12 illustrates the action sequences that produced 
the cumulative workload graphs in figure 5.4.11. Each of the boxes in figure 5.4.12 represents an 
activity in the controller procedure. Each of these actions has a load associated with its performance. 
The actions on the left of the figure are the TBM sequence and the actions on the right are the MIT 
sequence. The action sequences are programmed into the model to accomplish the tasks needed to 
achieve the goals for TBM or MIT metering. 
 
The TBM sequence shows a high workload in the controller’s initial interaction with the delay list 
and in planning the subsequent maneuvers. After that, a relatively low workload is experienced 
because of the conflict-free trajectories associated with the TBM. In the MIT sequence on the right, 
the controller has a moderate spike in workload at the hand-off, but also has a continuous load asso-
ciated with monitoring separation conformance. In the TBM process, the controller is presented with 
a time to manage for an aircraft to cross a specific point in the airspace. The controller develops a 
plan to have that point reached at a specific time and provides that clearance to the flight deck. The 
flightcrew then enters that plan into its Flight Management System (FMS). From that point the 
controller monitors the conformance of the aircraft with the plan. Assuming relatively accurate 
conformance, the controller does not have that much to do in the rest of the trajectory to the merge 
point. In the MIT case, the controller has to monitor separation and issue clearances to the aircraft in 
the descent to ensure the required separation at the merge point, providing a set of tasks, each of 
which has an associated load. As in the case of the CAT experiment, the average loads across these 
tasks are roughly equal but differently distributed in time.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.12. Action sequences for TBM and MIT metering for workload source analysis. 
 
 
TBM MIT 
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An analysis was performed on the full datasets to support a comparison between the actual traffic 
(sampled over four days), a “nominal” set of traffic, and the traffic produced by the Air MIDAS-
RFS simulation. In summary, there were no statistically significant differences between the model-
generated flight tracks and the actual flight tracks in terms of distance flown and time-in-sector for 
any scenario. For example, the F-test on the difference among the sources of the data tracks in time-
in-sector and distance flown as dependent variables provided an F = 0.113B (2,42) B (i.e., no significant 
difference).TP11 PT Further analysis of the differences between MIT and TBM on those same variables 
showed a two-tailed F = 1.648B (1,42)B (no significant difference). A Pearson Product Moment statistic 
in the analysis of all model factors (both source and type) found RP2P = 0.8.TP12 PT An R P2P = 0.960 was 
found in the analysis of the sources of the data (i.e., actual vs. simulated). An RP2P = 0.004 was found 
in the analysis of the differences of variances among the actual and simulated flight tracks. Examina-
tion of the other recorded performance metrics showed similar close correspondence between model 
and actual human performance. For instance, with respect to the metric of miles flown in each sec-
tor, the simulated and actual controller performances were 99.6% in agreement. This study provided 
one of the unique opportunities to validate models of air-traffic-management performance against 
actual operational data. 
 
In the first two studies described previously, the linkage of the Air MIDAS model of the human 
operator(s) with the RFS was used primarily to explore for possible hazardous situations and for 
their causal factors, although both studies also enabled further development and exploration of the 
Air MIDAS-RFS simulation capabilities. It was only in a later portion of the study of the TBM-MIT 
metering scenarios (described in section 5.4.2) that the fast-time simulation with Air MIDAS and the 
RFS linked dynamically was used to assess the safety risks of the identified hazards. Even then, the 
assessment was based on the predicted frequency of occurrence of the hazard, whereas the severity 
of its consequences was based on expert opinion. However, having identified the hazard, employing 
the many hundreds of thousands of simulation runs needed to obtain the probability of such rare 
events with adequate reliability is only one possible (and not always the most economical) approach 
to safety-risk assessment. 
 
The third experiment (illustrated in figure 5.4.13) was intended to explore the value of another  
approach to safety-risk assessment by taking advantage of an existing well-developed tool. The 
capability of Air MIDAS to model human performance was used to enhance the human representa-
tion in the TOPAZ (Blom et al. (1998) and Blom et al. (2003)) developed by the Dutch NLR to 
assess the safety risk of specified aviation hazards. TOPAZ includes a simulation of a specified 
hazardous scenario using the formalism of a dynamically colored Petri net, the outputs of which are 
the variables of algorithms that compute the relative safety risk for each scenario. Independently, Air 
MIDAS was run in simulations of the same scenarios, and the outputs of the probability distributions 
of the model-generated human behavior were used to supply input parameters for performance of 
human operators in the simulations of TOPAZ. Although the representation of the human operator 
used in TOPAZ was improved by using the outputs of the simulations with Air MIDAS, this repre-
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TPT The F-test is a statistical test to evaluate the equivalence of the two datasets. The validity of the F-test requires the 
underlying data to follow a normal (i.e., Gaussian) distribution. 
TPT
12
TPT The statistic R P2 P, often referred to as the “coefficient of determination,” measures the portion of the variability in a 
dataset that can be accounted for by a statistical model such as a regression equation. An R P2 P value of 1.0 indicates that 
the fitted model explains all the variability in the data. 
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sentation did not entail the dynamic linkage like the simulations using Air MIDAS with the RFS. 
(In figure 5.4.13, Air MIDAS is represented in the process by the two blue octagons depicting the  
human brain and hands.) 
 
The objective was to combine the significant advances in modeling of individual human perform-
ance and in understanding of human-performance factors (human factors in general and human 
cognitive behavior in particular) with an established risk-assessment tool to perform large-scale 
simulations for aviation-safety-risk assessment. The hypothesis was that the provision of the repre-
sentations of individual human operators would improve the reliability and validity of aviation 
safety-risk assessment using TOPAZ. It was further hypothesized that such an integrated aviation 
safety-risk simulation model would illuminate the Air MIDAS model entities (either specific opera-
tors, functions within an operator, or interaction among operators) that are most critical in managing 
the aviation safety-risk level. Because the consequence of an identified hazard was assumed severe 
if left unattended, the focus of this risk analysis was on determining the likelihood of its occurrence.  
 
Figure 5.4.13 depicts the process of development for the TOPAZ hazard model, and illustrates 
where data and model structure from the Air MIDAS model were incorporated into that model. The 
figure illustrates the entire process of TOPAZ model development and analysis. Beginning in the 
lower left corner, task decomposition for the specified scenario is undertaken (illustrated by the 
connected box graphic). In that step of the process, the Air MIDAS model is used to support the task 
decomposition for definition of the activities to be modeled in Air MIDAS. Moving up on the left, 
the task decomposition is presented to domain experts, who refine it. In the center top of the figure, a  
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.13. Air MIDAS-TOPAZ interlink.  
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list of possible hazards encountered in the specified scenario is developed, and these hazards are 
then implemented as procedures in the Air MIDAS model (shown in the upper right corner). The Air 
MIDAS model is then run, and distributions of performance times for specific parameters that are 
shared between MIDAS and TOPAZ are generated. These parameter distributions are then coded 
into TOPAZ as part of the dynamically colored Petri net process (in the lower right corner). The 
TOPAZ algorithms are then run and conditionally probabilistic likelihoods of hazard outcome are 
generated. 
 
For effective simulation, the complementary modeling approaches of Air MIDAS and TOPAZ were 
integrated at all of the following three levels: 
• Context level: This approach ensures that similar application contexts are being considered. 
Common understanding about issues such as boundaries, operations, and task analysis are  
required. In this level of integration, the assumptions about the operational context are coordi-
nated. For example, in a study of runway operations, specification of the physical layout of the 
runways, operational procedures, and roles and responsibilities would be among the context-
level coordination parameters.  
• Model level: This approach ensures that the model integration is done appropriately; there was 
need for understanding and agreement about how Air MIDAS and TOPAZ models complement 
each other. Integration at the model level ensures that the simulation scenario is jointly repre-
sented in the two modeling systems, allowing identification of values for specific parameters of 
human performance in the TOPAZ simulation model to be supplied by the Air MIDAS simula-
tion. These parameter values are generated in Monte Carlo runs of the Air MIDAS model and 
the results are subsequently supplied as input to the TOPAZ simulations. If the modeling para-
digms allow similar representations, this parameter exchange is straightforward. For example, 
simulation of pilot reaction time to recognition of an incursion by the taxiing aircraft is repre-
sented in both models; hence exchange of reaction-time values is straightforward.  
• Parameter level: This approach ensures that similar parameter values are being used; there was a 
need to be able to use detailed outputs of Air-MIDAS at the parameter level as inputs to TOPAZ 
simulations. Upon examination of the similarities and differences of the models used for the sur-
face operation considered by Air MIDAS and by the TOPAZ in a similar study using a toolset 
called TOPAZ-TAXIR, TP13 PT a list of model parameters to be affected by the joint runs was identi-
fied. These parameters can be grouped and provided as follows: 
− braking initiation times of pilots flying, 
− inter-monitoring time of pilot flying of taxiing aircraft, and 
− duration of visual observation of pilots flying. 
 
Integration at the model level ensured that the simulation scenario under examination was consis-
tently defined in the Air-MIDAS and TOPAZ models. Parameter values that were generated in 
Monte Carlo simulations of the human-performance model were subsequently supplied as input to 
the TOPAZ simulations. For example, the first parameter group listed included the braking initiation 
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TPT AXIR (TAXI Risk) is the name of the TOPAZ simulation toolset designed specifically for assessing accident risks of 
runway operations. 
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times of pilots flying or taking-off or taxiing aircraft in either tactical or opportunistic mode, when 
they have become aware of a conflict with the other aircraft. 
 
In an earlier study, known as TOPAZ-TAXIR, TOPAZ was used to evaluate a new operational 
concept for managing aircraft crossing an active runway with aircraft takeoffs. Figure 5.4.14 shows 
the simplified representation of the runway configuration used, where the taxiway crosses the run-
way at a distance of 
by3  from the runway start threshold, the taxiway has remotely controlled stop 
bars on both sides of the runway at a distance of 
xx3 from the runway centerline, and the taxiway 
entrance is at a distance of 
1
3x from the runway centerline. Aircraft are crossing over the runway as 
they move from the apron to a second runway.  
 
The involved human operators include the startup controller, the ground controller, a runway con-
troller for each runway, the departure controller, and a pilot flying (PF) and a pilot not flying (PNF) 
for each aircraft. Two aircraft are shown in figure 5.4.14, one (a/c i) is in position to take off from 
the runway start and the other (a/c j) is in position to taxi and cross that runway. 
 
Communication between controllers and pilots was by standard VHF receive/transmit (R/T) and 
communication between controllers was by telephone lines. Aircraft monitoring by the controllers 
was by direct visual observation with support from radar-track displays. Aircraft monitoring by the 
pilots was by visual observation with support by the VHF R/T party-line effect. 
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Figure 5.4.14. Configuration of active runway crossing operation considered.  
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In the runway-crossing operational concept, control over the crossing aircraft is transferred from the 
ground controller to the controller of the runway to be crossed. If the runway controller is aware that 
its runway is not used for a takeoff, the crew of an aircraft intending to cross is cleared to do so. The 
pilot not flying the crossing aircraft acknowledges the clearance and then the pilot flying initiates the 
runway crossing. After the crossing aircraft has vacated the runway, the pilot not flying reports this 
fact to the controller of that runway. Then control of the aircraft is transferred from this runway 
controller to either another runway controller or to the ground controller. 
 
This scenario was used to evaluate the effects of modifying certain human-performance parameters 
used in the original TOPAZ-TAXIR model to correspond to those parameters as they are generated 
using Air MIDAS. The first issue was to find a common parameter shared by TOPAZ and Air  
MIDAS. In this example, "braking time" was that common parameter. The times at which braking is 
initiated by the pilot flying the aircraft that is taking off and the pilot of the taxiing aircraft (when 
they have become aware of the conflict with the other aircraft) is the parameter called “braking 
time.” Both Air MIDAS and TOPAZ-TAXIR use braking time as a parameter that impacts the safety 
risk. 
 
Both the Air MIDAS model and the TOPAZ-TAXIR model of the pilots have states or operating 
modes in which the pilots' actions are different (in terms of the parameter values used) depending on 
their operating modes. The operating modes modeled in Air MIDAS are strategic, tactical, and 
opportunistic (Blom, Corker, and Stoeve, (2005)). The models may change operating modes depend-
ing on many factors, of which one of the most important is situation awareness. The impact of situa-
tion awareness occurs in the following manner:  
• If the pilot model is aware that its aircraft is on a taxiway that will cross an active runway or on 
an active runway, then the model remains in a strategic mode, the activities associated with  
potential surface conflict are assigned high priority, and the activities of detecting aircraft depart-
ing can be performed quickly without interruption.  
• If the pilot model is not aware that its aircraft is on an active runway or on a taxiway that crosses 
an active runway, then the scheduling process of the model does not assign priority to those  
actions that are associated with possible conflict with another aircraft. It may take the model 
longer to schedule these activities because they do not have high priority and the model is per-
forming other activities it considers to be of like or higher priority. In this case, when the model 
becomes aware of the situation, it changes to the tactical or opportunistic operating mode,  
depending on the contextual parameters. 
 
In this scenario, response speed to a possible conflict is the variable that changes as a function of the 
operating mode for the human model.  
 
Air MIDAS and the TOPAZ models use somewhat different mechanisms to switch between modes 
of operation, but fundamentally they both look at the current and near-term actions that need to be 
performed and the capacities available to perform them and exercise algorithmic transforms to pick 
set points that represent a level associated with that operating mode.  
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As stated previously, both Air MIDAS and TOPAZ-TAXIR use braking time as a parameter that 
impacts the safety risk. In TOPAZ, braking time is defined by a prescribed, empirically based Prob-
ability Density Function (PDF) that assigns a probability of occurrence to each value of the braking 
time. In Air MIDAS, braking time is considered composed of perceptual recognition of the need to 
break, a decision to brake, and the actual application of brakes to the aircraft dynamic model. A PDF 
is calculated for each of these components to arrive at the PDF for braking time. 
 
In figure 5.4.15, an overview is provided of the PDF and related parameter values for Air MIDAS 
and the original and the modified TOPAZ-TAXIR models. In all three models, equal PDF types and 
parameter values for the braking initiation times are chosen for the pilots flying the taking-off and 
taxiing aircraft, regardless of their cognitive control modes. Figure 5.4.15 shows that, in comparison 
to Air-MIDAS, the original TOPAZ-TAXIR model has a smaller mean braking initiation time and a 
larger tail (i.e., probability of more than 5 seconds initiation time). In order to improve on these 
aspects, the Rayleigh PDF has been selected for the modified TOPAZ-TAXIR model. The improve-
ments are:  
• its shape better fits to the Air-MIDAS data,  
• it supports positive values only, and 
• it has a more realistic tail than Gaussian PDF. 
 
The parameter value of the Rayleigh PDF has been chosen such that its standard deviation equals the 
standard deviation of the PDF chosen in Air-MIDAS. 
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Figure 5.4.15. PDFs for braking initiation time; linear scale (left figure); logarithmic scale 
(right figure). 
 
 
Air-MIDAS (continuous line): Gaussian PDF with µ=2, σ=0.8.  
Original TOPAZ-TAXIR (dotted line): exponential PDF with µ=0.67, σ=0.67.  
Modified TOPAZ-TAXIR (dashed line): Rayleigh PDF with µ=1.53, σ=0.8.] 
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Table 5.4.1 provides the information about the parameter values integrated in the original TOPAZ 
model, Air MIDAS, and the modified TOPAZ simulation for braking initiation times. 
 
It is assumed in TOPAZ-TAXIR that the inter-monitoring time of the pilot flying the taxiing aircraft 
is independent of the cognitive control mode of the pilot. In the original TOPAZ model, this time 
was represented by an exponential PDF. Simulations of Air MIDAS resulted in a dataset of 536 
inter-monitoring times of the taxiing pilot flying. A histogram of this dataset is shown in  
figure 5.4.16, which shows that this histogram can be well represented by an exponential PDF. 
Therefore, in the modified model the inter-monitoring times of the pilot flying the taxiing aircraft are 
also chosen from an exponential PDF with a mean equal to the estimated mean of the Air-MIDAS 
data.  
 
 
TABLE 5.4.1. PARAMETER VALUES FOR RUNWAY INCURSION SIMULATIONS 
 
Source PDF Mean, µ Std Dev, σ 
4. Braking initiation time after detection of a conflict by taking-off PF in tactical mode 
Original TOPAZ-TAXIR Exponential 0.67 s 0.67 s 
Air MIDAS Normal 2.0 s 0.8 s 
Modified TOPAZ-TAXIR Rayleigh 1.53 s 0.8 s 
5. Braking initiation time after detection of a conflict by taxiing PF in tactical mode 
Original TOPAZ-TAXIR Exponential 0.67 s 0.67 s 
Air MIDAS Normal 2.0 s 0.8 s 
Modified TOPAZ-TAXIR Rayleigh 1.53 s 0.8 s 
6. Braking initiation time after detection of a conflict by taking-off PF in opportunistic mode 
Original TOPAZ-TAXIR Exponential 0.67 s 0.67 s 
Air MIDAS Normal 2.0 s 0.8 s 
Modified TOPAZ-TAXIR Rayleigh 1.53 s 0.8 s 
7. Braking initiation time after detection of a conflict by taxiing PF in opportunistic mode 
Original TOPAZ-TAXIR Exponential 0.67 s 0.67 s 
Air MIDAS Normal 2.0 s 0.8 s 
Modified TOPAZ-TAXIR Rayleigh 1.53 s 0.8 s 
 
 
 
131 
0 5 10 150
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
time [s]  
 
 
Figure 5.4.16. Data of inter-monitoring times of the PF of taxiing aircraft. 
 
 
The third parameter group includes the visual observation times of pilots flying the taking-off or 
taxiing aircraft in either tactical or opportunistic mode. The PDFs of these times in the original 
TOPAZ model are exponential PDFs with a mean that is smaller in the opportunistic mode than in 
the tactical mode. Air-MIDAS simulations provided data on the duration of the tasks: 
• “Monitor Out The Window” for the PF of the taking-off aircraft, and 
• “Decide Action – Decide Take-off Spotted” for the PF of the taxiing aircraft. 
 
These tasks were found to be in good agreement with the visual observation tasks of the pilots flying 
the taking-off and taxiing aircraft, respectively. These data were provided for the three control 
modes used in Air-MIDAS. 
 
Figure 5.4.17 shows that the histograms of the visual observation time of the pilot flying the  
taking-off aircraft (figure 5.4.17 A, B, and C) and the pilot flying the taxiing aircraft (figure 5.4.17 
D, E, and F).  
 
 
Air-MIDAS (bars): normalized histogram of data (µ=2.1, σ=1.8).  
Original TOPAZ-TAXIR (dotted line): exponential PDF with µ=3.0, σ=3.0.  
Modified TOPAZ-TAXIR (dashed line): exponential PDF with µ=2.1, σ=2.1. 
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Figure 5.4.17. Visual observation times of the pilot flying taking-off aircraft (upper figures A, B, 
and C) and taxiing aircraft (bottom figures D, E, and F). 
 
 
It can be seen in figures 5.4.17 A, B, and C that the normalized histograms of the visual observation 
time of the pilot flying the taking-off aircraft can be reasonably approximated by uniform PDFs with 
a lower bound of 0.5 and an upper bound of 1.5 (Blom, Corker, and Stoeve, (2005)). Therefore, this 
simple representation was chosen in the modified TOPAZ-TAXIR model. The Air MIDAS data 
presented in figure 5.4.17 indicate that the variance of the visual observation duration for the pilot 
flying the taking-off aircraft is smaller than that for the pilot flying the taxiing aircraft (see figure 
5.4.17 D, E, and F), whereas their means are about the same. Nevertheless, the PDF for the taxiing-
aircraft pilot was chosen to be equal to the PDF for the taking-off-aircraft pilot so as to minimize the 
complication of the modified TOPAZ-TAXIR model and since there are no manifest reasons why 
the PDF of the visual observation duration should be different for pilots flying the taking-off and 
taxiing aircraft. 
 
Figure 5.4.18 is an example of the results of calculating the probability of collision in the scenario of 
runway incursions using the original TOPAZ-TAXIR model and using the modified TOPAZ-
TAXIR model with inputs from Air MIDAS. The Air MIDAS-based adaptation of TOPAZ-TAXIR 
showed as much as a factor two reduction in assessed likelihood of a collision. 
  
Air-MIDAS cognitive control mode is similar to strategic (left), tactical (center) or unplanned (right).  
Air-MIDAS data (bars): normalized histograms of data and one uniform density fit (dashed lines). 
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Figure 5.4.18. Comparison of collision risk as a function of crossing distance using TOPAZ with 
and without Air MIDAS inputs. 
 
 
Table 5.4.2 provides the differences in the likelihood of a collision between the original and the 
modified TOPAZ models. There is no uncertainty in the conditional risk. The uncertainties in this 
mode are associated with the parameters of performance that are used to calculate the risk. Blom, 
Corker, and Stoeve (2001) discuss these details and the data that establish confidence in the calcu-
lated probabilities. 
 
The results summarized here and presented in detail in Blom, Corker, and Stoeve (2001) demon-
strated not only the feasibility, but also the value of coupling Air MIDAS and TOPAZ. More impor-
tantly, this experiment provided the unique opportunity to compare the model of human performance 
as it had been implemented in the original TOPAZ-TAXIR model with the representation from Air-
MIDAS incorporated into TOPAZ-TAXIR model for the same scenario. This experiment also  
enabled further comparisons to be made between the two simulation approaches. 
 
 
TABLE 5.4.2. LIKELIHOOD COMPARISON USING ORIGINAL AND MODIFIED TOPAZ 
 
Crossing distance Original collision likelihood 
(occurrence per takeoff) 
Modified collision likelihood 
(occurrence per takeoff) 
500 m 1.3 10P–8 P 1.2 10P–8 P 
1000 m 1.1 10P–8 P 7.1 10P–9 P 
2000 m 8.0 10P–9 P 4.4 10P–9 P 
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The probability of collision that resulted from the TOPAZ-TAXIR simulations is composed of 
contributions from many combinatorial event sequences. Stroeve et al. (2003) give further details on 
this study, the results of the analyses, and confidence levels. In particular, the event sequence classes 
include the status of technical systems, such as alerting systems, communication systems, aircraft 
types, and human-operator situation awareness. Since all the adaptations of TOPAZ-TAXIR inter-
linked with Air-MIDAS incorporate assumptions describing the behavior of pilots flying, it is inter-
esting to compare the decomposition of the probability of collision for a pilot flying in the original 
and modified models.  
 
In particular, in figure 5.4.19, the probability of collision is shown for the situations in which (a) the 
pilot flying the taxiing aircraft believes he/she is on a regular taxiway with no runway crossing 
(Proceed taxiway) and (b) the pilot flying the taxiing aircraft believes he/she is on a regular taxiway 
and that runway crossing is allowed (Cross runway). In the first case, the pilot is lost. In the second 
case, the pilot’s situation awareness corresponds well with the actual position of the aircraft. It can 
be seen in figure 5.4.19 that, in both the original TOPAZ-TAXIR model and the modified TOPAZ-
TAXIR model using inputs from Air MIDAS, the contribution to the probability of collision for the 
situation in which the pilot believes he/she is on a regular taxiway exceeds the probability of colli-
sion for the situation in which the pilot believes a runway crossing is allowed. However, the differ-
ence between those probabilities is smaller in the modified model, in which the components of the 
braking time have been considered, than in the original model, in which the PDF for overall braking 
time was used. 
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Figure 5.4.19. TOPAZ-Air MIDAS interlinked operation. 
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In the final experiment before the AvSP ended, another approach to risk assessment was explored. 
This approach was an extension of the study described previously of the workloads associated with 
TBM and MIT metering of high-density traffic on approach to LAX through the Southern California 
TRACON and the Los Angeles ARTCC (ZLA). As stated previously, the study of risk assessment 
was based on the predicted frequency of occurrence of the hazard, whereas the severity of its conse-
quences was based on well-known existing analysis of potential consequences of loss of separation. 
This study entailed two phases. In phase 1, indicated in figure 5.4.20, the full high-fidelity human-
performance model representing the controller behavior used in the studies described previously was 
used to perform a sufficient number (typically, hundreds) of simulations to obtain stable probability 
distributions of human behavior across the range of human activities associated with control. Each 
activity (for example, conflict detection, speed error detection, and flightpath deviations) has an 
associated probability distribution around the time of performance and the accuracy of performance. 
During these simulations, the model was subjected to parameter variations of “stressors,” e.g., 
changes in the direction and speed of the wind or in the density of traffic or the visibility. The results 
of the full-model performance were then examined to identify the functions in the model that were 
critical in their contributions to potential hazardous performance (as measured, for example, by 
points of closest approach). Those critical functions were then made efficient in the code of a lower-
fidelity human-performance model, integrated into the RFS, and embedded in a high-speed parallel 
simulation cluster. This process was necessary to make it practical to conduct the very large number 
of simulation runs needed for estimates of the occurrences of the very low-probability event of less-
than-minimum separation in ATC. In phase 2, indicated in figure 5.4.20, a very large number of 
simulations (representing over 175,000 flight hours) were then performed in the cluster to look for 
the “rare event” in the system model and the system environmental “stress” contexts of those rare 
events. The phase 2 experiment on likelihood of occurrence is described in section 5.4.2 
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Figure 5.4.20. The process for assessing frequency of occurrence of hazards. 
 
 
Phase 1 of the process of generating the hazards, the human-performance parameters critical to the 
occurrence of those hazards, and the probability of the occurrence of the hazards was applied to two 
metering concepts for high-density air traffic (figure 5.4.20). This experiment was an extension of 
the second experiment described previously in which the differences in workload were explored that 
resulted from MIT metering and TBM of high-density traffic on approach to LAX through the 
Southern California TRACON and the Los Angeles ARTCC (ZLA). In this part of the study, proce-
dures for both types of approach control were developed for four Center sectors and one TRACON 
sector. These sectors were sectors 29 and 30 in ZLA transition sectors and sectors 19 and 20 in ZLA 
approach sectors managing descent from 310 FL through 110 FL to the LFDR, as shown in  
figure 5.4.21. 
 
Phase 1: Critical 
Parameter  
Generation 
Phase 2: Probability of 
Occurrence Generation 
Run parameterized  
reduced HPM model 
integrated into RFS 
(>100,000 runs)  
Establish Hazard 
Frequency Levels 
Based on Rare Event 
Identification  
Run full HPM in 5 parallel scenarios to  
generate critical performance parameters 
(>100 runs) 
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Figure 5.4.21. LAX Center and feeder sector.  
 
 
Air traffic was recorded by PDARS under both MIT and TBM metering, and these data served as the 
validation traffic base. Human-performance models (Air MIDAS) and air-traffic models (RFS) were 
operated in integrated simulations to represent the performance of air-traffic controllers managing 
that traffic. The traffic-management performance of these models was compared with the perform-
ance of the human operators managing the same traffic. The metrics of comparison for each flight 
were: 
• Time flown in sector, 
• Distance flown in sector, 
• Minimum indicated airspeed in sector, 
• Maximum indicated airspeed in sector, 
• Delta indicated airspeed (entry-exit) through sector, 
• Average airspeed in sector, 
• Number of altitude change commands in sector, 
• Number of airspeed change commands in sector, and 
• Total number of commands in sector. 
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Traffic samples were collected over a period of approximately one hour for each metering condition 
and for each wind (east/west direction and speed) condition, providing six one-hour validation sam-
ples for each condition. Verification of the human-performance model was based on statistical com-
parisons with the human performance of each of these metrics. Following are a few representative 
results. 
 
Figure 5.4.22 shows the total distance flown by an aircraft to transit each of the five sectors under 
MIT metering. The four sets of data points in each sector represent the four different conditions 
under which data were collected with PDARS and the four conditions under which the simulations 
were performed. There were two conditions of wind direction (east or west), and two visibility 
conditions, or acceptance-rate conditions at the airport (high or low). In this figure, the approach to 
landing is from right to left (east to west) with the four Center sectors decreasing in size and  
accommodating merging traffic that moves into the TRACON in the LFDR sector. The total  
number of actual flights transiting each sector during the period (approximately one hour) of  
recorded PDARS data varies by sector and by day; however, all flights being sequenced to arrival at 
LAX eventually transition through the LFDR. The total number of arriving flights transiting the 
sectors varies between 20 and 25 in approximately one hour. The total number in any sector at any 
time is a subset of that total. The simulated data are generated by taking these same flights (the 20 to 
25 transiting and being sequenced to the LAX arrival) and performing 20 simulations in each of the 
four scenarios of differing wind direction and visibility. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.22. Comparison of distance in sector for MIT. 
 
 
Error bars represent +/- 1 Standard Deviation
LFDR
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The distance flown in a sector is one aggregate measure of a controller’s strategy in managing the 
traffic. Commands for heading changes and airspeed modifications will increase or decrease the time 
and distance flown in a sector. This comparison is one representative example of the nine metrics of 
performance of the human controller (as determined from the PDARS radar-track data) and the 
performance of the modeled controller (as determined from the simulations). The simulation data 
exhibit a slightly larger variability than the human performance in several of the scenarios. However, 
the close overlap of the means and standard errors provide a visual representation of their statistical 
equivalence. 
 
The data of figure 5.4.23 represent the same distribution of distance flown for four scenarios and the 
five sectors with TBM rather than MIT metering. It shows a reduction in variability of both the 
actual data and the modeled data compared to the MIT metering data in figure 5.4.22. As in figure 
5.4.22, there is an overlap of the standard-deviation bars and a close proximity of the means, indicat-
ing statistical identity between the simulated and actual performance. (The Pearson product moment 
correlation between the controller and the behavior of the model was R= 0.897.) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.23. Comparison of distance in sector for TBM. 
 
 
Error bars represent +/- 1 Standard Deviation 
LFDR 
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Figure 5.4.24 illustrates the performance of the model with respect to the aircraft meeting the time at 
which it is required to be over the fix as specified by the TBM. Each pair of bars represents the 
performance of one aircraft as measured by the delta between the actual and scheduled time over the 
fix. The zero axis represents the condition when the aircraft is over the fix at precisely the time 
specified by the TBM. A bar in the upward direction indicates that acceleration is needed by that 
aircraft to catch up on the time required to meet the specified time over the fix; a bar in the down-
ward direction indicates that deceleration is required. The blue bar represents the delta from the 
simulation, and the purple bar represents the target delta, i.e., the required deceleration or accelera-
tion needed to achieve the time specified by TBM. The simulated delta is a measure of the modeled 
controller’s performance in achieving those times in the simulation by commanding the appropriate 
increase or decrease in speed. The difference in height between these two bars is the mean error in 
the model’s making the required time. It was not possible to compare this measure directly to the 
human operator’s performance because there were no comparable data on the human controller’s 
actual achieved time over the fix. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.24. Mean delta relative to specified time over fix. 
 
 
Error bars represent +/- 1 Standard Deviation 
      Simulated Delta 
      Target Delta 
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Figure 5.4.25 illustrates the mean and one-standard-deviation values of the three-dimensional sepa-
ration distance between aircraft for the four scenarios across the five sectors under TBM. Virtually 
identical performance between the actual and simulated controller occurs in sector LFDR, and may 
be due, in part, to the limited airspace available as well as to the convergence of the human’s and 
model’s strategies of management. It is significant to note that the variation of the average separa-
tion distance at one standard error increment is over 20 miles in the outer sectors and decreases to 
approximately 10 miles in the inner sectors. Separation violations defined at 5 lateral miles and 
1000 feet in altitude in the Center sectors represent a significant excursion from the norm and are 
appropriately rare events. This result of the phase 1 study is relevant to a result of phase 2 simula-
tions discussed in the next section.  
 
These representative results of the agreements that were found for all of the nine metrics shown 
previously provided confidence in the representation of the Air MIDAS model of the human control-
ler’s performance.  
 
The human-performance characteristics that contribute to the potential for failing to meet minimum 
separation requirements were identified and were used to define an abbreviated, very efficient model 
that was incorporated into RFS for the phase 2 assessment study of probability of occurrences  
described in the next section. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.25. Minimum separation distance for TBM. 
 
 
 
Error bars represent +/- 1 Standard Deviation 
LFDR
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5.4.2 Systemwide Risk Assessment 
Figure 2.0.1 presented a concept of proactive management of safety risk—an iterative cycle of iden-
tifying contributors to risk, evaluating their impact and causal relationships, and formulating  
methods of reducing risk that are intimately joined in with implementation. Another version of 
figure 2.0.1 is shown in figure 5.4.26 to show where risk assessment fits in this cycle. The functions 
of identification, evaluation, and formulation are all part of the process of safety-risk assessment. 
Although the implementation of an intervention to mitigate the possibility of the event or trend is the 
responsibility of the operators and the regulatory agencies, the systemic safety-risk assessment has 
strong linkages with the mechanisms used for implementation. Specifically, (1) the “identify” func-
tion should be a natural part of the implementation process that can be conducted both during and 
after implementation in order to monitor and assess effectiveness, and (2) the “evaluate” and “for-
mulate” functions should provide directly applicable insights about the hazards and their causal 
factors to the implementation process in a language and form that are immediately understandable 
by the operators.  
 
Table 5.4.3 addresses two perspectives on risk assessment: retrospective and predictive. Retrospec-
tive risk assessment entails analyses of data on past or current performances of an existing system, 
whereas predictive risk assessment is the evaluation of the unknown hazards that might be encoun-
tered in the operations of a new concept of system design, procedures, or personnel selection and 
training. 
 
Retrospective risk assessment entails effective integration of information developed from multiple 
perspectives and data sources to identify existing hazards in the aviation transportation system and 
their causal factors, and, thereby, help formulate risk mitigations.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.26. Risk assessment in the cycle of proactive management. 
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TABLE 5.4.3. PERSPECTIVES OF RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
Retrospective 
(Diagnostic) 
Predictive 
(Prognostic) 
• Data exist on past safety incidents. 
• Expertise and experience exist. 
• Effective analysis tools have proven to: 
− identify hazards, 
− define their causal factors, 
− establish frequencies, and 
− provide learning. 
• Validation of modeling and simulation 
have been proven by comparison to actual 
data. 
• Implementation effectiveness is monitored. 
• No data exist on future safety incidents. 
• Expertise and experience may not exist. 
• Modeling and simulations are required to: 
− predict likely hazards, 
− identify probable causal factors, 
− determine probable frequencies, and 
− provide bases for focused studies using 
real-time, human-in-the loop  
simulations. 
• Implementation effectiveness may be  
difficult to monitor. 
 
 
A process for predicting unknown hazards and assessing risks in the operations of proposed future 
systems builds upon a validated capability for assessing risks of the known hazards in the current 
system. Many tools are available to support retrospective risk assessment using existing operational 
data and expert knowledge. However, only fast-time simulations are available for identifying haz-
ards, analyzing their causal factors, and providing consistent and reliable risk assessment of the 
operations of future aviation technologies and systems for which there are neither data nor experts. 
Although no predictive method is perfect, simulation can build on what is known, look at emergent 
behaviors, enable analysis of possible causal factors, and provide detailed assessments of safety risks.  
 
A study discussed in section 5.4.1 and diagrammed in figure 5.4.17 showcased the predictive meth-
ods developed within ASMM, using fast-time simulation and human-performance models. Specifi-
cally, it was a study of the operational impact of different methods of metering traffic flow during 
high-density operations at that same facility. This study demonstrated the use of fast-time simulation 
to analyze current and new types of operations in a two-phase approach. 
 
In the first phase, detailed, high-fidelity human-performance models were used in simulations to 
identify potentially hazardous scenarios and to provide insight into the behaviors relevant to the 
occurrence of these hazards. These results were used to identify the key human-performance charac-
teristics critical to the scenarios of interest and the identified hazards that guided the development of 
the less complex, efficient human-performance models needed for sufficient computational effi-
ciency to perform the high number of simulation runs needed in the second phase. A very large 
number of runs is required to identify the probability of occurrences of rare events with adequate 
degrees of confidence. In the second phase, hundreds of thousands of fast-time simulation runs were 
performed to determine the probability of occurrence of the rare hazardous events identified in the 
first phase. In each case, sufficient runs were performed until the probabilities of occurrences were 
determined to an acceptable level of reliability. This process was automated as is described later in 
figure 5.4.29 and its associated text. 
144 
Insight into rare hazardous events and their primary causal factors requires a model with a sufficient 
level of detail that reasonably accurate assessments are made of the interactions and dependencies of 
the primary variables, leading to the question of “What is the appropriate scope and decomposition 
of the model?” (See figure 5.4.27.) Historically, models that covered a broad scope had to use very 
aggregate models, suitable for looking at broad economic and policy issues, but not suitable for 
investigating the impact of new operational concepts. Likewise, many of these aggregate models 
were parameterized by retrospective analysis of current operations, further limiting their predictive 
ability. When it comes to identifying the rare hazard events of new operational concepts in which 
methods of interactions and the dynamics of traffic flows may be substantially different from current 
operations with which there has been experience or for which there are operational data, predictive 
simulations must be built directly on what is known: the “physics and cognition” aspects of techno-
logical and human performance acting within a specified future operational concept. By starting with 
these basic building blocks, it may be possible in the future to develop detailed models that can also 
span the scope of regions and nations. With increasing computational power this modeling will 
become possible, but will require the development of new models and simulation architectures 
beyond anything done before.  
 
The NATS has multiple human and nonhuman agents acting both independently and interactively 
among themselves and with the environment. “Hazards” emerge out of their collective behavior in a 
manner that, for two reasons, cannot be predicted by examining agents in isolation. First, some of 
the causal factors of the hazardous situation arise because the agents are placed in a dynamic envi-
ronment that promotes or induces risky behaviors. At one extreme an environment may overload the 
capabilities of an agent, such as occurred in the CAT simulations described previously in which the 
modeled controller simply did not perform certain tasks when the available time became too short.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.27. Decomposition and relationship between level of model detail and scope  
of simulation. 
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At the other extreme an environment may not provide the agent with sufficiently accurate and timely 
information to function in an effective manner, such as when a pilot encounters CAT with no  
advance warning. Second, additional contributors to the hazard arise that cannot be isolated to single 
agents, but instead are more accurately described as arising out of their collective behavior, such as 
multiple “upstream” sectors creating an overly dense traffic-flow condition downstream. Conse-
quently, development of a hazardous situation and its risk is an emergent behavior.TP14 PT Such behavior 
can be predicted with reasonable accuracy and confidence only by simulating these human and 
nonhuman agents all acting together and all interacting with their environment.  
 
A related benefit of simulating all the agents acting together is that it enables “structure-preserving” 
modeling methods, in which the modeled agents are direct representations of the system compo-
nents. In the NATS, new operational concepts are enabled by incorporating new technologies and 
establishing new procedures to describe and direct human activities and behavior. Thus, the ideal 
structure-preserving model of NATS would use agents to model technologies directly in terms of 
their immediate functions within the system, and would use agents to represent procedures directly 
using the same language and format as they give the humans who are expected to execute them 
while all are operating in representations of the environment appropriate to the scenario. Such an 
ideal structure-preserving model of the system minimizes the loss of fidelity and applicability that 
can be incurred when translating and abstracting from reality to a computational model and back to 
reality.  
 
In these simulations of the NATS, the agents are established by technological functions, operating 
procedures, and coordination procedures that define the boundaries and interfaces by which agents 
interact with each other while operating in the environments represented in the scenario of the simu-
lation. This concept is diagrammed in figure 5.4.28, where the technological functions, operating 
procedures, coordination procedures, and operational environment are indicated as known (i.e., 
specified in the models and simulation) and there are two unknown emergent behaviors to be identi-
fied by the simulations. First, human performance may be viewed as an emergent behavior, as the 
human agents will be acting within an environment that obligates much of their activities; analysis 
of their activities may provide additional inferences about risk, such as concerns about environments 
that overload an agent or do not provide the agent with sufficiently accurate and timely information. 
Second, the systemwide behavior may also be examined, including multi-agent dynamics that have 
implications for probability of occurrence of a hazardous event, such as aircraft losing safe separa-
tion. Therefore, the objective is to use simulations to predict the unknown hazardous events or trends 
that could compromise the safety of the operations of the NATS. These hazards are a consequence 
of unknown (possibly emergent) behavior of the human agents the causal factors of which are an 
unknown confluence of environmental factors, technological factors, procedural factors, coordina-
tion factors, and, possibly, cultural factors. The aim of simulations is to gain insight into all these 
unknowns. 
 
                                                 
TPT
14 
TPTAn emergent behavior of a system is defined here as a behavior at one level of abstraction that cannot be predicted 
from another level of abstraction. 
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Figure 5.4.28. NATS knowns and unknowns. 
 
 
The results of the simulations that identified the hazards and the scenarios of interest in phase 1 were 
described in section 5.4.1. In this section, the focus is on broader issues associated with maximizing 
the utility of large-scale simulations for a reliable assessment of the probabilities of occurrences of 
the hazards identified in phase 1. A very large number of simulation runs is required to develop high 
confidence levels in estimating the probabilities of the occurrences of rare events such as the hazards 
of the very safe NATS. Even a single simulation may involve a significant amount of computational 
time, depending on its scope and detail. Likewise, a single simulation can produce a vast amount of 
output documenting continuously the behavior of every individual agent. The time required for an 
analyst to examine these data can be prohibitive. Therefore, in the ASMM Project, mechanisms were 
developed to minimize computational run time by using COTS networks of workstations, where 
each workstation provides independent replications of a scenario of interest. Also, data-analysis 
tools were imbedded into this simulation architecture to analyze automatically the data output of 
each simulation run to provide statistics on the probabilities of hazards. Taking this concept further, 
a closed-loop control mechanism depicted in figure 5.4.29 was developed, by which the performance 
metrics resulting from each simulation run were automatically examined statistically to decide on 
the conditions for the next run. The statistical analysis may follow a classical Monte Carlo design of 
simulation experiments (although this method is not an efficient way to study rare events), or it may 
command more simulations runs of the same scenario until sufficient data have been generated for 
that scenario to state the probability of occurrence of a hazardous situation with the desired level of 
confidence, or it may command proceeding to the next scenario until sufficient data have been gen-
erated for each of the various scenarios to be able to compare and rank them with a desired degree of 
statistical confidence. This closed-loop control ensured that the number of simulations runs (obser-
vations) was minimized by commanding additional runs only when the desired statistical confidence 
level had not yet been reached.  
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Figure 5.4.29. Automated simulation control: Closed-loop statistical control to maximize the utility
of simulations. 
 
 
It was not possible to analyze completely all the results that the phases 1 and 2 of this study gener-
ated before the AvSP ended. These results will very likely be reported in some subsequent paper(s) 
or presentation(s). However, one very interesting result can be reported here. 
 
The phase 1 study determined the human-performance characteristics that were most important to 
meeting minimum separation requirements using two procedures for managing dense traffic under 
various scenarios of wind, traffic, and visibility by running hundreds of simulations. The validity of 
the human-performance model used in these scenarios was established by statistical comparison with 
radar data of the human controller’s performance on nine observable metrics. Figure 5.4.25 showed 
the excellent agreement in the performance of the actual and the modeled controller in maintaining 
the three-dimensional separation distance between aircraft for the four scenarios of wind and visibil-
ity across the five sectors under TBM. 
 
During the phase 2 study, about 175,000 flight hours were simulated to gain reliable estimates of the 
very low probability of the occurrence of less-than-minimum separation in air traffic control (i.e., 
operational errors). The data in figure 5.4.30 produced by the phase 2 simulations show that the 
model made more operational errors than did the human controller, especially in the LFDR sector. 
The model had five operational errors across the runs, whereas the human operator in the same 
period had none. There are likely many reasons for this result. The most important is probably the 
fact that the model was designed to follow procedure as its primary guidance for action selection, 
whereas the human controller has the goal of preventing conflicts. During the phase 1 study, it was 
discovered that, when the model followed the TBM procedures as designed, there was no assurance 
of conflict-free traffic downstream of the fix and violations were likely. Consequently, the phase 2 
simulations identified the probability of the operational errors for the simulations, as shown in figure 
5.4.30, revealing a flaw in modeling the controller using the goal of following procedures rather than 
the pragmatic goal of the human controller of maintaining separation. The model did not have the 
long-term goal of no separation violations regardless of efficiency costs as the controllers do.  
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Airspace and controller modeling heuristics and constraints are inaccurate, but perhaps more impor-
tant was the discovery that TBM procedures are not infallible. (It is significant that this fallibility in 
TBM procedures was not being reported by the controllers, although the PDARS data showed 
clearly that, on frequent occasions, the controllers were compelled to maneuver aircraft so that they 
did not arrive over the fix at the specified time or did not fly over the fix at all in order to prevent 
conflict.) The human controller will not permit separation violations and will maneuver the aircraft 
as necessary to avoid a potential conflict. This fact was demonstrated in the results of phase 2 shown 
in figure 5.4.30, which shows that there were no separation violations in the Center sectors and only 
one in the LFDR identified by the radar data. 
 
This discovery of the simulations that following the TBM procedures did not always ensure conflict-
free air traffic was further validated by observing flight data as shown in figures 5.4.31 and 5.4.32. 
The simulated flight results for 1 hour of flight operations with TBM are shown in figure 5.4.31. 
Only the nominal flightpaths are shown in blue to minimize clutter. The short green segments are 
indications of vectoring that was deemed needed during that 1 hour of operations to avoid conflicts 
of the simulated flights at the merge point of Civet, reflecting the same information presented in 
figure 5.4.30 and portraying the potential for operational errors. A retrospective search using 
PDARS over 10 months of operation verified this prediction. In figure 5.4.32, each of the short 
green segments denotes the actual occurrence of an operational error during TBM. (Note that, as the 
airspace becomes more constrained in the feeder sector, the number of operational errors increases 
despite the reduction from 5 to 3 nautical miles as the separation standard.)  
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.30. Separation violations for TBM. 
LFDR 
LFDR Violation <3NM & < 1,000’ 
All others Violation <5NM & < 1,000’ 
Note:  Radar data may include aircraft using visual separation in 
the LFDR Sector and not subject to the above criteria 
Sector and Scenario 
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Figure 5.4.31. Results of TBM simulations of one-hour flights. 
 
 
KONZL 
CIVET 
Maneuvers observed to be required in simulation  
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Figure 5.4.32. Operational errors during 10 months from PDARS. 
 
 
The work performed under the element Modeling and Simulations demonstrated that: 
• In the cycle of proactive management of system-safety risk, monitoring and fast-time simula-
tion technologies play complementary roles. Monitoring of current operations provides the 
data needed for both verification and validation of fast-time simulation capabilities to iden-
tify hazards in current operations and their causal factors. This scenario establishes the credi-
bility of fast-time simulations needed to trust the predictions of the systemwide impacts of 
the interventions that are proposed to mitigate the occurrences of the identified hazards. 
• An integrated process of monitoring, modeling, and simulation has the potential to provide 
an important data-driven assessment of hazard likelihood.  
• Fast-time simulations can be used for a reliable systemwide perspective on assessment of 
likelihood of hazard occurrence. 
• The dynamic interaction among all the agents is the basis of unknown emergent behavior of 
the agents and, consequently, of the system performance that can be a critical aspect of  
system-safety-risk assessment.  
• Fast-time simulations are needed for sensitivity studies and for prediction of hazards in new 
operations. 
• The multi-tool approach supports different query types and analyses at various levels of  
system maturity and specificity. 
CIVET 
KONZL
KONZL
CIVET 
Operational Errors 
151 
• Customized model development, data analysis, and validation relevant to each new domain 
are now the primary limitations to the widespread use of fast-time simulations for predictive 
risk assessment. 
 
5.4.3 Human-Performance Models 
The Modeling and Simulations activity of the ASMM Project relied on an activity of another AvSP 
project named Systemwide Accident Prevention (SWAP). An element of SWAP named Human-
Performance Modeling provided the models of human performance used in the fast-time simula-
tions. The goal of the Human-Performance Modeling element of the SWAP project was to develop 
modeling capability for use in simulations like those described in the previous two sections to assess 
the efficacies of proposed technological and procedural solutions to operational problems and of 
potential mitigation strategies. The activities of the Human-Performance Modeling element of the 
SWAP project advanced the state of cognitive modeling with a focus on computational frameworks 
that facilitate the use of fast-time simulations for predictive analysis of human behavior in real-world 
environments. The work under ASMM associated with the development of fast-time simulations 
entailed a selection from among the hierarchy of models developed under Human-Performance 
Modeling and their adaptation to the requirements of the interactions among multiple human and 
nonhuman agents in each systemwide scenario. 
 
The work of the Human-Performance Modeling element of the SWAP project is described in the 
two papers included in appendix E. The first report, an overview of the state-of-the-art of human-
performance modeling, speaks of two development tracks: one of predictive human-performance 
models, the other of a prescriptive human-performance model. The second paper in appendix E 
reports on the results of an experiment in which five modeling teams from industry and academia 
developed human-performance models of pilots performing taxi operations and runway instrument 
approaches with and without advanced displays. The latter paper describes how the results of each of 
the five models are influenced by the architecture and structure of that model, the role of the external 
environment, and the specific modeling advances that these scenarios required. 
 
The human-performance model selected for the experiments conducted under ASMM was the Air 
MIDAS predictive human-performance model developed at San Jose State University. Each of the 
five predictive models described in appendix E has unique characteristics. Air MIDAS was found by 
the staff of the Human-Performance Modeling element to be the most appropriate for the particular 
scenarios and the queries of the experiments described previously. Important to the selection was the 
fact that Air MIDAS was also the easiest to integrate with the RFS simulation of the rest of the 
system required in each scenario. 
 
5.4.4 Human-Performance Modeling of Approach and Landing Operations 
Other projects of the AvSP had been developing augmentative technologies for enhancing safety in 
flight operations. These developments included a synthetic-vision system (SVS) for commercial 
aviation as well as for business jets and general-aviation operations. The system was designed to 
generate a texture-mapped (or wire-frame) display of the terrain in proximity to the aircraft. Text 
and other symbology was intended to be overlaid onto the terrain display to show, for instance, the 
aircraft itself, its velocity, a “follow-me” aircraft, a “tunnel-in-the-sky” indication of the route, and 
indications of other nearby aircraft. In addition, flight information (i.e., airspeed, attitude, pitch, etc.) 
were to be overlaid on the display.  
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In its concept of operations, the existing display elements of current aircraft would be maintained in 
addition to these augmentations in an SVS-equipped aircraft. Inclusion of both current-presentation 
modes and SVS-presentation modes offers a challenge in research into the operational concept of 
their joint usage. It was recognized by the developers that providing both of these sources of infor-
mation could be problematic. On one hand, they support cross-checking of flight-deck systems. On 
the other hand, two types of information that are similar in source and content but different in pres-
entation mode may cause transformation workload for the pilot. SWAP managers suggested that 
computational human-performance models could be used in early design phases of systems such as 
those proposed for the SVS to predict performance effects of introducing such augmented  
technologies.  
 
NASA’s SWAP Human Performance Modeling leadership defined an experimental scenario in 
which five teams of modelers would generate predictions of human performance under three visuali-
zation scenarios and under three conditions of approach and landing (see table 5.4 4.). NASA pro-
vided the detailed cognitive task analysis with which each team of modelers developed a model of a 
“normative” approach and of landing with and without augmented SVS display. NASA also pro-
vided performance and eye-tracking data obtained during a pilot-in-the-loop simulation of these 
scenarios for validation of the model. The predictions produced using the Air MIDAS model of 
human-system performance are described here because of their relevance to the ASMM’s Modeling 
and Simulations. Best, et al. (2004); Byrne and Kirlik (2004); Deutsch and Pew (2004); and  
Wickens, et al. (2005) give results using the other models. 
 
Figure 5.4.33 depicts the approach chart for the simulation. A GPS-VNAV/LNAV approach to 
runway 33L at Santa Barbara, California, was assumed based on the existing GPS approach proce-
dure to that airport. Initial position was located 5 nm north west of GAVIOTA; initial approach fix 
and flight using autopilot and auto throttle with VNAV and LNAV mode were assumed. Two Deci-
sion Altitudes (DAs) were assigned in order to examine the impact of SVS usage on DA selection 
for approach procedures. DA 650 feet is as high as the usual nonprecision approach decision alti-
tude, and DA 200 feet is as high as the Category I instrument approach decision height. A detailed 
missed-approach pattern was not prepared because the scope of the go-around simulation focused on 
the phase of making the decision to go around and initiating a go-around climb. The go-around 
simulation terminated when the aircraft achieved positive climb with gear up and flaps-5 configura-
tion. The landing simulation terminated when the aircraft touched down. No other aircraft were 
assumed to be in the area. 
 
 
TABLE 5.4.4. APPROACH AND LANDING SCENARIOS 
 
Display Configuration Baseline Baseline SVS 
Visibility VMC IMC IMC 
Nominal approach and landing Scenario #1 Scenario #4 Scenario #7 
Late reassignment – side step and land Scenario #2  Scenario #8 
Missed approach (go-around) Scenario #3 Scenario #5 Scenario #9 
VMC = Visual meteorological conditions 
IMC = Instrument meteorological conditions 
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Figure 5.4.33. Approach chart for Santa Barbara simulation scenario. 
 
 
The response of the Air MIDAS model and tests of the accuracy of the procedures implemented 
required calibration because this model was being used in the new environment imposed for the 
proposed SVS operation. An enhancement in the visual model within the Air MIDAS model gave 
the model a capability to perceive and respond to information from the environment that previously 
did not exist within the Air MIDAS structure. Specifically, this enhancement required the implemen-
tation of a scan-pattern policy (to be described later in this report) with which to model the flight-
crew’s information-seeking behavior. Data collected during human-in-the-loop simulations 
conducted by the Boeing Company were used as a basis for the scan pattern (see Mumaw et al. 
(2000)). The scenario for these human-in-the-loop simulations was an area navigation system 
(RNAV) (GPS) approach to 33L runway at Santa Barbara in daylight operations under calm winds. 
The aircraft was flown fully coupled to the autopilot down to DA at 650 feet afe. Experimenters 
served as flightcrew and air-traffic controllers. The accuracy of the scan-pattern model was  
checked against the Boeing source data in Mumaw et al. (2000) (using a split-halves validation 
methodology). 
 
An informal verification process was followed during Air MIDAS model development with refer-
ence to the calibration data from Mumaw et al. (2000). In the Mumaw study, in-cockpit eye fixations 
were recorded on a series of approach-to-landing operations. The visual scan patterns for the model 
(dwell fixations and dwell durations) were developed using the scan-pattern data taken from the 
human-in-the-loop simulation data developed by Mumaw et al. (2000). The Mumaw research data 
were used to parameterize the procedures and information-seeking behavior of the Air MIDAS 
model in all three scenarios: namely, approach under baseline without SVS, baseline with SVS, and 
side-step with SVS. Because the Mumaw study was conducted without an SVS system, SVS fixation 
data were not available from that study. An assumption was made that, in cases in which the  
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Mumaw data included out-the-window fixations, those would be implemented as SVS scans in the 
SVS mode of operation. The fixations provided the aircraft state data that were used to populate the 
equipment representation in the model. 
 
A strong correlation was found between the Mumaw flightcrew eye-fixation data and the Air 
MIDAS percent of visual fixations data across all scenarios. Correlations were R = 0.9936 for the 
baseline scenario and R = 0.9955 for the SVS scenario (figure 5.4.35). This result was viewed as 
evidence for verification that the model was accurately representing the data source for the initial 
scan pattern based on procedures. On the basis of the satisfactory statistical match between Boeing’s 
human-in-the-loop simulation data and the model-generated data, the scan-pattern-policy model of 
information seeking was used during an approach to landing into Santa Barbara in the scenarios of 
table 5.4.4. 
 
Figure 5.4.34 shows the fixation times on the respective elements within the flightcrew’s scan pat-
tern of the crew station and the external environment. This figure compares the results of the fixation 
times from the simulations using the Air MIDAS model to the data from the human-in-the-loop 
simulations reported in Mumaw et al. (2000). These results indicate that the procedural and visual 
sampling behavior that were encoded and run through the simulation largely replicate the data gath-
ered on human performance from human-in-the-loop simulations. This result verifies that the model 
behaves as designed.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.34. Pilot flying scan patterns: Air MIDAS model and Mumaw et al. (2000) results. 
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The approach to Santa Barbara was used in a study by NASA of SVS using human-in-the-loop 
simulation described in appendix E of the scenarios of table 5.4.4 to examine the use of SVS while 
performing a side-step maneuver late in approach. The predictive validity of the Air MIDAS model 
was tested by running the model through simulations of the same scenarios. Validation for appropri-
ate visual-scanning behavior on the part of the model was examined by looking at the model-
generated dwell frequency compared to the human flightcrew dwell-frequency patterns that were 
measured using eye-movement sensors in the human-in-the-loop simulation. It was found that “per-
cent of fixations” required in completing an approach and landing during the human-in-the-loop 
simulation correlated with the Air MIDAS performance data. As seen in figure 5.4.35, the correla-
tion between NASA’s human-in-the-loop part-task simulation (Foyle, Goodman, and Hooey, 
(2003)) and the Air MIDAS percent of fixations was R = 0.7608 in the baseline scenario, R = 0.8782 
in the baseline with SVS scenario, and R = 0.5538 in the SVS side-step scenario. The somewhat 
lower correlation of the model-generated side-step data to the human performance is likely due to 
the fact that no side-step conditions were available in the Mumaw data, which had been used as the 
source of the scan pattern. Therefore, the scan pattern of the model in the side-step scenario was 
predicted based on information requirements to achieve active goals. 
 
In the simulations, an aircraft dynamic model, PC PlaneP© P,TP15 PT was integrated with the human-
performance model so that the aircraft dynamics, which are critical in this approach phase of flight, 
were incorporated to impose the appropriate time pressures on the performance of the flightcrew 
model. Test scenarios for the simulation were developed and procedures were established that were 
based on established cockpit procedures for a current aircraft. Simulations were performed under the 
several conditions of table 5.4.4; i.e., approach and landing and go-around, both with “current day” 
technologies and with SVS cockpit configurations. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.35. Percent fixation correlations. 
 
 
 
                                                 
TPT
15
TPT PC Plane P©P was developed by NASA Langley Research Center and the NASA Ames Research Center. 
1 - Pearson Product Moment 
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The simulation scenarios follow: 
• Normal approach without SVS case was used as a baseline.  
• Two go-around situations: one go-around following controller's command, the other based 
on pilot’s decision. In the case of the controller’s command for go-around, two sets of the 
timing were used so that the interruption of pilot activities took place in both a busier and a 
less busy time during the approach. For the busier time scenarios, the controller’s command 
was issued about 100 feet before DA when pilot activities included the tasks of “runway-in-
sight” callout and “approaching-minimum” callout. In the less busy scenarios, the command 
for go-around was issued at 250 feet before DA, where no particular activity was expected. 
• Two different visibilities, which switched at a specified altitude associated with cockpit  
activities "runway-in-sight" callout and pilot's go-around decision. Visibility was set so that 
runway came in sight at 150 feet before DA except in the pilot's go-around-decision cases. 
Visibility in other scenarios was set so that a go-around event happens because of an inability 
to see the runway at DA. 
 
The system architecture of the Air MIDAS SVS simulation environment is shown in figure 5.4.36. 
Three modules, including PC Plane representation of the aircraft dynamics, Flight Management 
System/Control Display Unit (representing FMS/CDU), and Air MIDAS were integrated in the 
simulation. A set of Dynamic Link Library (DLL) functions generated cockpit-control input and 
time synchronization control to PC Plane through socket connection. DLL functions were invoked 
by the Air MIDAS module, which was written in List Processing (LISP) Programming Language, 
through JAVA network interface architecture. Time-synchronization control (functioning through 
coordination of the control function and the PC Plane response) maintained precise synchronization 
of Air MIDAS and PC Plane during simulation and enabled dynamic closed-loop simulation. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.36. Air MIDAS system architecture for SVS study. 
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The Microsoft Office Access database architecture was used to share flight and aircraft system 
parameters between the Air MIDAS SOM and the representation of the scenario external to the 
human model. Figure 5.4.37 depicts the functional architecture of the entire Air MIDAS SVS simu-
lation environment. As was described in section 5.4.1, the Air MIDAS model consists of a series of 
interlinked models. Working memory in the SOM contained domain knowledge and rules to invoke 
actions regarding cockpit procedures; namely, (1) approach and landing and go-around procedures, 
(2) standard callout, (3) checklist, (4) ATC communication, and (5) landing/go-around decisions 
were implemented. For this study, Working memory storages of Primary Flight Display (PFD), 
Navigation Display (ND), Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS), Synthetic Vision 
System (SVS), and out-the-window (OTW) were prepared as input data sheets (as shown in figure 
5.4.39) to be stored as the crew’s information about the aircraft state. Visual scan of information 
provided by cockpit display models (shown in figure 5.4.38) was passed into the SOM through its 
visual perception models. The Air MIDAS visual-scan-pattern model reads data from a particular 
data sheet (figure 5.4.39) when the agent fixates on a corresponding display. When this information 
was perceived through the scan pattern, it was passed into the UWR and it is used to trigger cockpit 
motor activities through the scheduler (figure 5.4.37). Because the subject of this research effort is 
an evaluation of a visual display concept, perceptual processes associated with the SVS system 
and/or OTW observations are critically important. 
 
On the left side of figure 5.4.37 are the “domain” models that represent the world, the equipment 
with which the operator interacts, and the mission/world characteristics that are required for the 
scenario of the simulation. These models can either be contained within the Air MIDAS model 
framework itself, or they can be an independent model of the domain that is linked to the air MIDAS 
human-performance model. In this study, PC Plane was used, and it updates all the parameters in the 
database as time proceeds. The right side of this framework represents the functions of the human 
operator. The system representation is a closed-loop control model with inputs coming from the 
external world representation on the left and action being taken by the human operator model that 
changes that world. The model provides psychological plausibility in the cognitive constructs of 
 
implies implementation for SVS application.  
Figure 5.4.37. Elaborations on Air MIDAS for study of SVS. 
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long-term, working memories (with articulation into spatial and verbal components of the theses 
models) and has sensory/perceptual and attentional components that focus, identify, and filter simu-
lation world information for the operator, action, and control. The cognitive function is provided by 
the interaction of context and action. Context is a combination of declarative memory structures and 
incoming world information that is mapped to the agenda manager that is taking the plan (overall 
mission). The agenda manager acts in conjunction with the plan interpreter to provide a series of 
procedures to be performed in order to meet mission goals and to handle contingent activities (such 
as interruption or plan repair). The human-operator model is resource constrained, i.e., it is limited in 
the cognitive, perceptual, and motor behaviors that can be performed simultaneously. Output of 
action on the external world is effected through the models of the operator linked to anthropometric 
representations (if they are invoked by the analyst). The action changes the external world and the 
cycle begins. 
 
Figure 5.4.39 illustrates the data and the parameters of those data that are stored as the information 
about the aircraft state and entered into the operator’s UWR as a consequence of visually scanning 
the displays shown in figure 5.4.38. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.38. Visual scan information sources. 
 
 
Figure 5.4.39. Display information source. 
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Figure 5.4.40 illustrates the logic of the Air MIDAS scan-pattern model. Scan pattern selects a 
display, selects its area where the Air MIDAS human operator model fixates its eyes, aggregates the 
values of displayed parameters, and then updates UWR. Failure of data aggregation was also simu-
lated before updating the UWR.  
 
A display, its area, and duration of fixation were randomly determined based on eye-fixation data 
obtained from human-in-the-loop simulations (Hooey and Foyle (2001)). After the display, its area, 
and duration of fixation were determined, then the fixation success/failure filter evaluated whether 
the fixation period was sufficient to aggregate the data successfully. It was assumed that all the data 
included in the area can be successfully perceived when the fixation duration was beyond the  
reading-time threshold and no data are perceived when the fixation duration was less than that 
threshold time. Consequently, Air MIDAS updated the parameters in UWR when the fixation dura-
tion on the corresponding display was longer than a specified threshold, but if shorter, it did not 
perform any UWR update.  
 
The cockpit was divided into viewing planes (i.e., areas of the cockpit that contain information). 
These areas are represented on the "x" axis of figures 5.4.41 and 5.4.42. The total number of fixa-
tions (i.e., movement from one point of regard (defined by a dwell time of larger than 500 ms) to 
another) was collected. The percentage of fixations on each of the viewing planes was calculated for 
the human flightcrew in their information-seeking and for the model as it too sought information 
from specific parts of the cockpit. Figures 5.4.41 and 5.4.42 show the correlations between the 
human and model with respect to information-seeking fixations as a function of the scenario and the 
cockpit equipment configurations.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.40. Scan pattern policy. 
Note: Magenta Color  denotes implementation for SVS application. t  l  
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Figure 5.4.41. Comparison of percentage fixation time on specific instruments between the 
Air MIDAS and the human pilots (without SVS). 
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Figure 5.4.42. Comparison of percentage fixation time on specific instruments between Air MIDAS 
and the human pilots (with SVS). 
 
 
The benefit of the visual augmentation implemented in the Air MIDAS model was that it appears to 
have been sensitive to the introduction of the SVS technologies. Given this information-source 
difference, the flightcrew is predicted to engage in different scanning patterns and engage in differ-
ent behaviors, depending on the phase of flight that they are completing. The modeled flightcrew 
focuses on scanning the portions of the display that will serve the flightcrew’s immediate goal of 
safely landing the aircraft as reflected by the performance-characteristics output from the approach 
and landing phases of Air MIDAS predictions. The information that is provided to the flightcrew 
from the SVS during these critical phases of flight is time-critical information. 
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Air MIDAS predicted higher fixation rate on the controls and the PFD than did the human data 
produced by the human-in-the-loop simulation, suggesting that the rules guiding human performance 
are different from those guiding the performance of the model. Based on their fixation patterns, the 
human pilot used the information on the ND to a larger extent than does the Air MIDAS pilot, while 
the Air MIDAS pilot fixated on the PFD to a larger extent than did the human pilots. Figure 5.4.41 
illustrates that mismatch for the case of approach to Santa Barbara under “low” (IMC) visibility 
conditions without SVS and without any request for side-step. 
 
The Air MIDAS model also predicted lower dwell times on the ND, the OTW scene, and the SVS 
displays than did the human simulation, suggesting that, when flying with the SVS display, the 
flightcrews looked at the SVS information to a greater extent than did the Air MIDAS model. It was 
postulated that the human flightcrew received PFD information from overlays in the SVS and the 
Air MIDAS model required looking at the PFD (not the SVS) for that information. Figure 5.4.42 
illustrates that difference. This figure showed the approach to Santa Barbara under “low” (IMC) 
visibility conditions with the availability of an SVS and without any request for side-step.  
 
Figure 5.4.43 shows flight and task sequence during one of the normal approach cases (scenario #1 
in table 5.4.4). Speed command setting, flap lever position, and gear position are the system parame-
ters, which were manipulated by Air MIDAS pilots. Since the aircraft was flown with autopilot 
(vertical navigation (VNAV) and lateral navigation (LNAV) modes) and auto-throttle (VNAV 
mode), control-surface parameters do not show any Air MIDAS manipulations. Figure 5.4.43 (a) 
shows the time histories of the key flight parameters during the approach and figure 5.4.43 (b) is the 
horizontal view of the flightpath. 
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Figure 5.4.43. Flight and task sequences of normal approach (Scenario #1 in table 5.4.4). 
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The information presented in figure 5.4.43 conveys the story of a normal approach (Scenario #1 in 
table 5.4.4). After initiation of the simulation (i.e., start of approach), airspeed was reduced by 
VNAV-programmed airspeed command regardless of the setting of the speed knob. When the air-
speed was reduced to 218 knots. at 131.7 seconds, the pilot-flying (PF) model ordered flap deploy-
ment and the pilot-not-flying model (PNF) set the flap lever to 5 degrees. At 134.5 seconds, the PF 
model decreased the airspeed to 160 knots, requiring further flap extension. This further airspeed 
reduction occurred before the aircraft had achieved the previous airspeed commanded. After passing 
800 feet afe, which is a boundary altitude of low- and high-visibility area, the PNF model called out 
"runway-in-sight" at 772 feet afe and 784.7 seconds. At that moment, the PNF model fixated on 
OTW. At 796.3 seconds, after passing DA (= 650 feet), the PF model decided to land and called out 
"Landing." The aircraft touched down on the runway at 845.4 seconds. 
 
Average workload, which was used to examine the contribution of each procedure to the overall 
workload, was defined by 
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where 
i: V(Visual), A(Auditory), C(Cognitive), or M(Motor) 
j: Procedures (Approach and landing, Go-Around, Scan Pattern, Checklist, Standard Callout, 
ATC, GA Decision, and Others) 
n: Number of accomplished activities  
n,j,iWL    : Workload of each task item 
n,j,it∆    : Duration of each task item (seconds) 
totalt    : Flight Time (seconds) 
   
Figures 5.4.43 (c) and (d) are time histories of the workloads of the PF and the PNF models during 
the normal approach. Both the PF and PNF models had a period of higher density of workload at 
around 130 seconds before they completed the configuration of landing flaps, airspeed, and gear. 
The PF model also had another period of higher density of workload period from around DA to 
touchdown. The PF model had maximum visual workloads of 7.0 when it performed speed reduction 
and ordered flap extension, and when it performed a landing/go-around decision where it also had 
maximum cognitive workload at 7.0. Maximum auditory and motor workloads were 5 in the simu-
lated flight. The PNF model did not have a moment when its workload value reached 7.0. 
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Figure 5.4.44 is an example of Scenario #8 in table 5.4.2 in which a sidestep maneuver resulted in a 
go-around. As in the previous example, this figure shows the flight and task sequence of this simula-
tion run. Figures 5.4.44 (a) and (b) show that at 812.6 seconds, a go-around command was issued by 
the air-traffic-controller model. Both pilot models heard it and the PF model called out “go around” 
at 812.9 seconds. Then the PF model pushed the go-around lever and set pitch attitude to 10 degrees. 
The PNF model set the flap lever to 5 degrees at 818.6 seconds, following the order from the PF 
model. After confirming positive climb, the PF model ordered gear up and the PNF set the gear lever 
to the up position at 821.5 seconds. 
 
Figures 5.4.44 (c) and (d) show the time histories of the workloads of the PF and the PNF models. 
These figures show that the PF model in this scenario had a higher level of visual, cognitive, and 
motor workload after hearing the go-around command (with auditory workload at 5.0) compared 
with the workload around DA in the normal approach flight (figures 5.4.43 (c) and (d)). This level 
was caused by the time criticality of the tasks required to perform the go-around. Time-critical tasks 
(i.e., tasks whose required completion time is equal to or less than the current simulation time plus 
the time required to perform the activities) are increased in the priority levels and scheduled in a 
noninterruptible mode (i.e., once initiated no other activity will be able to interrupt them). This result 
conveys the impact of an externally ordered go-around as compared with the lower workload density 
at DA in normal approach flight. 
 
The total visual, auditory, and cognitive average workloads of both the PF and PNF were 4.0, 0.2, 
and 1.0, respectively, in both normal approach and go-around cases. Total motor workload was 
about 2.5 for PF and 1.6 for PNF in both the normal approach and go-around simulations. The major 
differences in activities across the two scenarios were only in the short final phase, with no signifi-
cant impact on the total average workload. 
 
A summary of results follows: 
• Small delays of action initiation in flight control were observed in the approach phase with 
SVS operation. These delays occurred because the chance of fixation on each instrument, 
given a fixed scan time, was decreased by adding SVS to conventional display configuration, 
resulting in fewer fixations on other instruments.  
• No degradation in human performance or in delay of task initiation were observed in landing 
and go-around phases with SVS, though there were time shifts when the necessary actions 
were performed in the approach phase.  
• A scan-pattern model that simulates the pilot's instrument scan was validated by using the 
data of human-in-the-loop simulation.  
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Figure 5.4.44. Flight and task sequence of go around (Run 1, Scenario #8, in table 5.4.4). 
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6.0  SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
The aviation community has recognized that accident rate alone is an unreliable safety indicator. 
Fortunately, the NATS, especially in the U.S., is very safe and, although the ultimate metric is fatal 
accidents, it is not a practical metric against which to evaluate the efficacy of an intervention to 
mitigate the cause of an accident. It takes many years to verify a change in the probability of occur-
rence of this rare event because so few accidents occur each year. Furthermore, the circumstances of 
accidents vary greatly. This fact was recognized by the Aviation Safety Investment Strategy Team 
and, consequently, it was suggested that the challenge to NASA was to develop technologies and 
methodologies to identify accident precursors from the incident reports and from operational flight-
recorded data acquired. As stated previously, a precursor is an incident, event, or trend, that is identi-
fied as a hazard when it is the symptom of a systemic problem that, if left unresolved, has the poten-
tial to result in increased probability of an accident.  
 
NASA, under its Aviation Safety Program, established the Aviation System Monitoring and Model-
ing Project to provide the technologies and methodologies that would make it feasible to monitor the 
NATS continuously, convert the collected data into reliable information, and share that information 
among the stakeholders for collaborative decision-making so as to enable a revolutionary, proactive 
approach to managing the aviation system for prevention of accidents. The concept was that, by 
identifying and understanding the causal factors of the precursors of the next accident, total accident 
risk would be minimized by:  
• reducing the likelihood with which anomalous incidents occur, 
• reducing the likelihood that anomalous incidents will pose a severe hazard, 
• reducing the system exposure to hazards, and 
• reducing the likelihood that exposure to hazard will result in an accident. 
 
When the ASMM Project ended in 2005, it had produced: 
• validated automated capabilities to extract operationally useful information from any numerical 
data sources  
− that were tested and evaluated operationally on flight-recorded data and on radar-track data;  
• validated automated capabilities to extract useful and consistent information from any textual 
data sources and linked to numerical data  
− that were tested and evaluated operationally on ASRS and ASAP reports and linked to 
FOQA data; 
• a statistically sound, top-down survey methodology;  
• Measurement capabilities for ATC performance and information-sharing among ATC facilities 
over a secure network; and 
• Fast-time, system simulations incorporating human performance 
− that were validated against operational data.  
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The transfer of ASMM products to providers of current commercial data-analysis systems was a  
requirement of the project so as to extend the use of these safety-enhancing capabilities across a 
large sector of the aviation community. As previously indicated in table 5.3.1 regarding APMS, 
many of the individual ASMM analysis tools were commercialized, including:  
• Full-flight data storage, pattern search, and routine events became vendor standards. 
• Automated data integration was commercialized through a nonexclusive license to SAGEM  
Avionics, Inc. 
• ADIS weather archive was transferred to the FAA with Website access to all air carriers with 
FOQA programs. 
• The Morning Report of atypical operations was commercialized through a nonexclusive license 
to SAGEM Avionics, Inc. 
• The PDARS network operating at 20 Centers and 13 TRACONs was transferred to the FAA. 
 
In retrospect, the ASMM Project can be deemed highly successful. However, it did not achieve its 
original goal, because the capability to integrate information extracted from all of the diverse dis-
tributed data sources across the entire industry to identify, assess, and analyze systemic-level issues 
could not be demonstrated.  
 
Each of the ASMM products such as APMS, PDARS, and NAOMS demonstrated standalone capa-
bilities that will continue to evolve as the Data Analysis Tools continue to be adopted and commer-
cialized by the industry and continue to be adapted to meet the evolving needs of the stakeholders. 
However, while these standalone capabilities have advanced the analysis of individual data sources, 
mitigations designed from the perspective of the owner of any single data source may create risks to 
the others. The true and overriding value of the ASMM products is their use as an integrated suite of 
tools to enable a systemwide perspective on proactive management of the safety risk of the NATS. 
The AvSP ended before the ASMM products could be demonstrated as a capability to enable infor-
mation extracted from diverse data sources to be integrated and used for safety-risk assessment from 
a systemic-issue perspective.  
 
From the outset of the ASMM Project, the concept of operations was always that the tools and 
methodologies it developed are converged into an operating, integrated capability for sharing infor-
mation across the aviation community to enable continuous systemwide safety-risk assessment for 
the benefit of, and access by, the entire aviation industry. 
 
The criticality of this existing need has been recognized by the FAA, industry, and the Commercial 
Aviation Safety Team (CAST). They designated the Aviation Safety Information Sharing task 
(ASIST)TP16 PT Team to define an ideal future state for safety information-sharing in the commercial 
aviation community and to agree on a roadmap to implement the future state. ASIST developed a 
Concept Paper in response to its charter that is provided in appendix D. The concern about the cur-
rent inadequate sharing of safety information is expressed, for example, in the following statement 
taken from the ASIST Team’s Concept Paper:  
                                                 
TPT
16
TPT This Aviation Safety Information Sharing Task (ASIST) should not be confused with the previously mentioned 
NASA’s Aviation Safety Investment Strategy Team (ASIST). 
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 “Why Change is Urgent  
 
Recent studies have suggested that in many fatal accidents, information existed somewhere in the 
system that could have been used to prevent the accidents, had it been available to the right people 
at the right time.TP17 PT That is, existing information could have been used to identify the need to mitigate 
risks and thus prevent accidents. This is unacceptable – it means that we are not using existing 
safety data and information optimally in today’s environment.”  
 
The following is another statement from that Concept Paper that addresses the need to facilitate 
sharing of aviation-safety information:  
 
“A key element of future safety management systems will be a dramatic change in the way we col-
lect, manage, and share data and information. We envision a future state in which safety information 
from stakeholders is accessed through a safety information sharing process and is available to 
decision-makers for managing risks.”  
 
The ASIST team’s Concept Paper was endorsed by the CAST. It was also submitted to the JPDO’s 
Safety IPT and the need was reiterated in that team’s Action Plan. 
 
The following statement taken from the paper presented by the FAA Administrator, Marion Blakely, 
to the AIAA Air and Space Conference in Washington, D.C., on April 20, 2004, recognized the need 
for merging information from diverse data sources:  
 
“So far, our safety improvements have been limited to specific operators or specific locations. But 
now, we are on the threshold of being able to marry—to merge—the data that we gather through 
ASAP and FOQA. And that will be a major improvement for safety. You take the subjective—
ASAP—and view it in tandem with the objective—FOQA—and you have taken an important step 
toward increasing the overall safety of the system.” 
 
                                                 
TPT
17
TPT Accident Precursor Analysis and Management, Reducing Technological Risk through Diligence. National Academy of 
Engineering of the National Academies, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2004.  
Roelen, A. L. C.; Wever, R.; and Verbeek, M. J.: Improving Aviation safety by better understanding and handling of 
interfaces, a pilot study. NLR-CR-2004-025, National Aerospace Laboratory, Amsterdam, 2004. 
Commercial Airplane Process Study, An Evaluation of Selected Aircraft Certification, Operations, and Maintenance 
Processes. The Report of the FAA Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification, 2002. 
“Continuing Airworthiness Risk Evaluation: An Exploratory Study.” Flight Safety Foundation, Flight Safety Digest 
September–October, 1999. 
Improving the Continued Airworthiness of Civil Aircraft, A Strategy for the FAA’s Aircraft Certification Service. 
Committee on Aircraft Certification Safety Management, Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board, Commission on 
Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council, National Academy Press, 1998. 
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As was said, the ASMM Project was not able to meet this need. Implementation of various ASMM 
products as separate entities will improve ways to handle data and facilitate understanding from the 
perspective represented in a single data source, but automated integration of the information from 
these products was not demonstrated. Even with the advanced capabilities of ASMM, when a prob-
lem is discovered, analysts must laboriously seek out and examine information extracted from other 
data sources to gain the essential system perspective of the problem. Although concepts for linking 
information from diverse sources had been demonstrated, when it ended in 2005, the ASMM Project 
had not tested at operational levels a capability for merging information extracted from flight data, 
ATC data, survey data, simulations, experiential reports, and other heterogeneous data sources and, 
therefore, failed to achieve an operational capability for gaining an integrated systemwide and  
systems-deep perspective of risks. There remained a recognized need to converge the tools and 
methodologies developed under ASMM into an operating, integrated capability for systemwide 
safety-risk assessment for the benefit of, and access by, the entire aviation industry.  
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7.0  TOWARD THE FUTURE VISION 
 
Several studies conducted under the ASMM Project demonstrated the value of integrating informa-
tion from diverse sources of aviation-safety data. These sources showed that when the data-analysis 
capabilities developed in the ASMM Project can be applied across airlines, across ATC facilities, 
and across diverse data sources, it will be possible to gain insight into systemic operational issues.  
 
The study of In-close Approach Changes (ICACs) described in appendix B started with recognition 
by the analysts in the ASRS office that, based on reports, ICACs were causing problems for some 
pilots. The NAOMS survey revealed that the frequency of problematic ICACs was, indeed, much 
higher than had been suspected (or reported). The radar-track data from PDARS showed that flights 
that had been given a late runway change crossed the threshold somewhat higher on average. The 
flight data from APMS showed that ICACs frequently resulted in less stable approaches. All of the 
information extracted from these sources combined to show that problematic ICACs were frequent 
events that caused an increased safety risk sufficiently high to take some corrective action, but not so 
high as to prevent controllers from using this valuable procedure for maintaining smooth traffic 
flow. Analyses of the ASRS database and the results of the NAOMS survey suggested some of the 
possible causal factors of when an ICAC becomes a problem and led to the preliminary observations 
on changes that might mitigate anomalous consequences of ICACs (see appendix B). 
 
Another experiment under the ASMM Project was a comparative study of time-based metering 
(TBM) with miles-in-trail metering (MITM), both of which are methods used by controllers for 
sequencing aircraft into approach airspace during high-traffic-flow periods. (This study was  
described in section 5.4.) With the older technique, MITM, the controller manages the distance  
between arriving aircraft; with the new method, TBM, the controller manages the time of entry into 
the approach airspace. Radar-track data from PDARS were used to compare traffic patterns. Flight 
data from APMS were used to compare effects on flight operations, and fast-time simulations were 
used to compare controller workloads. The PDARS data showed that TBM resulted in advantage 
over MITM in time and distance flown in a sector and in more consistent descent profiles. The 
APMS data showed an advantage of TBM over MITM with regard to cockpit navigation workload 
and confirmed more consistent descent profiles shown by PDARS. The fast-time simulation study 
showed how these advantages could be realized as a consequence of a redistribution of workload 
between the Center controller and the TRACON controller. 
 
The analyses conducted of the high-energy arrivals described in section 5.3 were another example of 
the value of being able to examine an issue from various different perspectives. 
 
Many groups representing the industry have documented the need for integrating information from 
data sources across the NATS. See, for example, figure 7.0.1, taken from the report of the ASIST 
provided in appendix D, which was endorsed by the CAST, FAA leadership, and the JPDO Safety 
IPT. The challenge remaining after the ASMM Project was integrating information. 
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Figure 7.0.1. The vision of the future state (from ASIST report in appendix D). 
 
 
This challenge entails both political and technical aspects requiring an approach that:  
• builds up from sources that owners are willing to share and will require: 
− building trust, 
− demonstrating that sharing can do national good without individual or corporate harm, and 
− adding sources as trust and technology allow; and 
• builds tools for making data sources interoperable that: 
− build from individual sources of information, 
− do not force standardization on data owners, and 
− derive knowledge by merging information extracted from across distributed, heterogeneous 
data. 
 
In response to this challenge, NASA’s AvSP undertook two new projects: the Information Sharing 
Initiative (ISI) and Integrated Safety Data for Strategic Response (ISDSR), as the ASMM Project 
came to a close in FY05. 
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7.1 Information Sharing Initiative 
 
The Information Sharing Initiative (ISI) was initiated by NASA under the Aviation Safety and Secu-
rity Program in response to the industry’s request to develop the technology and infrastructure to 
enable a distributed archive of FOQA and ASAP data across U.S. air carriers.  
 
In 2003, the commercial aviation industry established the Voluntary Aviation Safety Information-
sharing Process (VASIP) to provide a means for the commercial aviation industry and the FAA to 
collect and share safety-related information and to use that information to proactively identify, 
analyze, and correct safety issues that affect commercial aviation. VASIP participants include more 
than a dozen air carriers, organized labor, the FAA, and NASA. 
 
The key to VASIP is the development of a technical process to extract de-identified safety informa-
tion from any participating airline Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) or Aviation Safety 
Action Program (ASAP) program, aggregate it with comparable information from across a distrib-
uted database, and make it accessible to appropriate industry stakeholders for analysis. Initially, the 
process is envisioned to focus on issues that have been identified through individual airline pro-
grams. Ultimately, it must be capable of analyzing those issues that are identified from the aggregate 
safety database as well.  
 
The FAA established the Voluntary Safety Information Sharing Aviation Rulemaking Committee 
(VSIS ARC) to serve as a forum for interaction between industry representatives and the FAA, to 
provide advice to FAA on safety-information sharing, and to prepare recommendations for rulemak-
ing. The distributed national archives were designed to be in compliance with the VASIP and to 
operate under the rules of engagement established by the VSIS ARC and the VASIP Executive 
Steering Committee (ESC). The Distributed National FOQA Archives (DNFA) and the Distributed 
National ASAP Archives (DNAA) data collection processes were to be distributed and secure. Air 
carriers would retain ownership of the data they provide to the national archives. These data would 
be fully de-identified before being placed in secure repositories located on the respective air carriers’ 
property. De-identification of these data was deemed essential to ensure the protection of proprietary 
information. Furthermore, analyses of the distributed archives were to be conducted only as directed 
by the VASIP ESC and the VSIS ARC, and would be overseen by the VASIP Rules and Procedures 
Subcommittee.  
 
The stakeholders in VASIP identified NASA as having the institutional background, resources, and 
expertise required to develop this technical aggregation framework, as well as the analytical tools to 
support the process. NASA’s AvSP agreed to undertake the development of these national archives 
in collaboration with, and acceptable to, all of the participants, including the owners of the FOQA 
and ASAP data, the vendors of the FOQA data-analysis software, and the FAA. Upon urging from 
the FAA, NASA began development of the ISI in 2004. ISI was to develop and implement the 
hardware, software, and networking to enable a demonstration within two years of an archive of 
distributed FOQA data with sufficient reliability that it could be handed off to an operating organiza-
tion at the end of that time. NASA further agreed to implement and demonstrate an extension of the 
FOQA archive for an archive of ASAP safety reports. ISI was accomplished in a collaborative part-
nership with participating airlines, employee organizations, and the FAA to demonstrate operational 
distributed national archives of FOQA and ASAP data by 30 September 2006. The FOQA reposito-
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ries are collectively known as the DNFA and the ASAP Archives are collectively known as the 
DNAA.  
 
The DNFA and DNAA physical infrastructure consists of servers located at each participating air 
carrier as well as DNFA-DNAA Central at NASA ARC in Mountain View, California. DNFA and 
DNAA employ a service-oriented, messaging architecture that allows DNFA-DNAA Central to 
communicate with air-carrier sites over a secure, private network to cooperatively accomplish safety 
analyses. DNFA and DNAA use methods and algorithms that accomplish system-level aviation-
safety assessments without moving raw FOQA or ASAP data from air-carrier locations. Instead, 
separate analyses are conducted at each participating air-carrier location. The results of these sepa-
rate, air-carrier-level analyses are de-identified and sent to DNFA-DNAA Central, where they are 
combined into a unified, system-level picture of the aviation-safety issue being examined. 
 
Figure 7.1.1 represents the infrastructure and process developed for the DNFA. Each gray rectangle 
at the top represents a participating airline. At the top of each of theses boxes is shown the local 
FOQA processing system for that airline. NASA has entered into contracts with Austin Digital, Inc. 
(ADI) and SAGEM Avionics, Inc. (who, between the two, provide FOQA processing services to all 
currently participating airlines) to transfer FOQA data. Each vendor was provided with the software 
to transform the data into a standard format across a NASA-supplied one-way firewall onto a 
NASA-supplied Local Archive Server (LAS). The LAS at each airline is shown in figure 7.1.1 at the 
bottom of each of the grey rectangles representing an airline. At each participating airline, all of the 
flight-recorded data from all aircraft equipped for FOQA are de-identified, processed into standard,  
 
 
Figure 7.1.1. The concept of distributed archives. 
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compressed files, and stored on each LAS as those data are acquired by at that airline by its FOQA 
vendor. De-identification, performed by the local vendor, entails encryption of airline and flight 
number and changing the date of all flights in a month to the first of that month.  
 
Each LAS communicates over a secure, private network to a Central Server housed at NASA ARC 
to respond to queries from the Central Server. These queries are made only of the archived data in 
support of an investigation of an issue that has been identified by the ESC appointed by the VASIP 
requiring access to, and research on, the archive. The ESC appoints a working group to study the 
issue, and that group defines specific queries to be processed by the archive. The Central Server 
issues commands for each query (indicated by the green arrows in figure 7.1.2) to each LAS, where 
searches are automatically conducted by software installed in the LAS for only those events that are 
relevant to the query and where calculations of summary statistics are accomplished.  
 
After these analyses are completed on each LAS, de-identified lists of flights meeting the search 
criteria and the summary statistics are forwarded to the central server, where they are aggregated. 
This response is indicated by the red arrows in figure 7.1.3. No raw data ever leave the premises of 
their owner. Added de-identification is imposed automatically if the results of a query could identify 
an airline because it is the sole operator of a fleet of aircraft or the only airline servicing an airport. 
Such flights are automatically deleted from the particular study, but not from the archive because 
they may be used in some future study. 
 
 
Figure 7.1.2. The concept of submitting a query to the DNFA. 
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Figure 7.1.3. The concept of accessing the DNFA. 
 
 
The Analysis Working Group reviews these aggregated analyses, summarizes findings into a report, 
and provides the report to the ESC. 
 
Figures 7.1.4 and 7.1.5 represent the comparable infrastructure and process for the distributed-
archive concept being developed for the DNAA. The primary differences in the process for DNAA 
from that of the DNFA are the participation in analyses by the University of Texas at Austin (UT) 
under a Cooperative Agreement with NASA, and the LAS connection to each airlines’ ASAP serv-
ers rather than to the FOQA processing systems. Whereas in the case of FOQA data the local ven-
dors are responsible for processing and storing the data in the LAS, it is currently the airlines 
themselves that are responsible for delivering the ASAP data to the DNAA. Some of these airlines 
have vendors (e.g., UT supplies its system to several participating airlines) to assist them in this 
work; others must accomplish it through their corporate Information Technology departments.  
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Figure 7.1.4. The concept of submitting a query to the DNAA. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1.5. The concept of accessing the DNAA. 
 
 
The ESC and Analysis Working Group roles in the DNAA are the same as they are in the DNFA, 
and the expectation is that each working group will, in practice, work with both archives to respond 
to ESC research issues. The FOQA data and the ASAP data are sources of complementary informa-
tion relative to most queries. The quantitative FOQA data provide the information about what hap-
pened, while the ASAP incident reports are the best available sources of information about why it 
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happened. Because the former is numerical data and the latter is textual data, the automated tools for 
extracting information from each are very different. A challenge that was discussed previously in 
this report is to be able to reliably automatically link information extracted from each that is relevant 
to any query. Figure 7.1.5 shows that the creation of reports by the Analysis Working Groups and 
their distribution to the VASIP ESC are the same for the DNAA as for the DNFA.  
 
In the current concept, queries can be initiated only from the Central Server. However, the infra-
structure diagrammed in figure 7.1.1 has been designed to be highly flexible so that queries could be 
initiated from any node if the VASIP should decide to do so. The capability to issue the command 
functions currently generated by the Central Server for information relative to each query could be 
installed in each LAS. In that configuration, issues could be identified and analyses could be con-
ducted within any node, and each participating airline could independently compare itself to the 
aggregated results of all the participating airlines (though not to any individual airline). 
 
The ISI in conjunction with the VASIP is as much a process for developing trust in data-sharing as it 
is a technology for accomplishing sharing functions. The airlines, their employees, and their repre-
sentatives need experience with sharing that demonstrates that industry-level good can be accom-
plished without individual or corporate harm. That demonstration requires procedural controls on 
when and how analyses are conducted, which are reflected in the policy documents governing the 
archive operation and, in some cases, written into software. Analyses and reports will be run only as 
directed by the VASIP ESC. 
 
The ISI project had the potential of enabling integration of information extracted from FOQA-data 
sources and from ASAP reports across a large sector of airlines. This step represented an important 
first step toward, and a demonstration of the feasibility of, extracting information from all of the 
safety data sources and integrating that information to gain insight into the full picture of systemic 
issues. However, this initial demonstration has significant limitations. FOQA and ASAP are two 
very important sources of information, but there are others (e.g., ATC data) that are equally impor-
tant for a full picture. The analysis tools exercised in this initial demonstration were limited to those 
that were currently in use for FOQA and ASAP analyses. These tools are not state-of-the-art. They 
do not, for example, permit the advanced automated capabilities for atypicality analyses of flight 
data or text mining of free narratives. The architectures of DNFA and DNAA were designed to 
support the use of these tools, but they were not implemented during the two-year demonstration of 
the ISI project. Further, the integration of information extracted from the DNFA with that from the 
DNAA will be accomplished by the human labor of the working groups and not by automated analy-
sis tools.  
 
The ISI two-year plan for the implementation and demonstration of the DNFA and the DNAA called 
for the Wide-Area Network to be connected and Local Archive Servers deployed by January, 2006, 
to those airlines that had agreed in 2004 to participate. Queries and analyses could then be accom-
plished on data from those airlines. By October 2006, hardware, software, and networking were 
scheduled to be deployed to all airlines that have agreed to participate by October 2005. NASA was 
scheduled to hand off the operation of the DNFA and DNAA to another agency on 30 September 
2006. 
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7.2 Integrated Safety Data for Strategic Response 
 
Another challenge in making diverse, heterogeneous data sources interoperable was undertaken in 
October 2005 as an AvSP five-year sub-project called Integrated Safety Data for Strategic Response 
(ISDSR) just prior to the end of the AvSP. The ISDSR was expected to build upon the work of the 
ASMM Project to develop and demonstrate the technology necessary to assess aviation-system 
safety risk by integrating information extracted from distributed, diverse types of safety data.  
 
To develop and demonstrate analysis tools that make heterogeneous data sources interoperable, 
NASA planned to build a working prototype with representative samples of data, as diagrammed in 
figure 7.2.1. NASA expected to enter into agreements with owners of different types of aviation-
safety data to obtain de-identified samples to be stored on computer workstations networked within 
the NASA firewall. Each computer was to contain a sample of de-identified data as a representation 
of the data source held or owned by an organization.  
 
 
Figure 7.2.1. The ISDSR prototype. 
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The objectives of the ISDSR were to develop automated capabilities to: 
• ensure acceptable levels of security when accessing full populations of de-identified data,  
• monitor each data source for aviation-system safety issues to discover a potential vulnerability,  
• identify other sources of information relevant to that potential systemic issue and gather that 
additional evidence,  
• integrate all of the information relevant to the identified systemic issue and display a summary of 
the issue with explanation, 
• use the same capabilities to respond to any query from an authorized stakeholder regarding a 
specific safety issue by extracting relevant information from across all data sources and display-
ing a summary of results, and 
• produce reports of such investigations of diverse data sources in integrative, linked analysis 
reports.  
 
Three general operating concepts envisioned for the prototype that are consistent with demonstrating 
the achievement of these objectives are illustrated in figure 7.2.2. In the System-Push mode (at the 
left of figure 7.2.2), automated tools for vulnerability discovery would nearly constantly monitor all 
data sources as they are being updated, looking for anomalies that might be precursors of incidents 
or accidents. When such an event or trend is discovered, these tools would alert a monitoring team to 
the potential safety issue. In the Interactive-Analysis mode (in the center of figure 7.2.2), the moni-
toring team would use the automated evidence-gathering tools to guide a search of all of the data 
sources for additional information to assist them in identifying the frequency of occurrence and the 
causal factors of the potential precursors. These automated tools will translate the issue that was 
alerted into search criteria applicable to other data sources. Tools will then gather relevant informa-
tion from all sources and accomplish an integrative analysis to help the monitoring team understand 
and determine the operational significance of the alerted issues. In the User-Pull mode (at the right 
of figure 7.2.2), the integrative automated analysis is initiated in response to a query from the moni-
toring team. Sometimes the source of a safety concern will be the observations of industry experts 
rather than an automated alert. These automated analytical tools would translate the issue in question 
into search criteria applicable to all data sources. Just as in the Interactive-Analysis mode, these 
tools would then automatically gather and integrate relevant information to help the monitoring team 
understand the issue they raised. 
 
The ISDSR prototype was to be designed with scalable implementation in mind; that is, the opera-
tional concept portrayed in figure 7.2.2 could be applied intramurally to the multiple data sources 
within a single organization (for example, an airline as shown in figure 7.2.3) or it could be imple-
mented to gain a systemwide perspective. 
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Figure 7.2.2. The operating concept of the ISDSR. 
 
 
 
182 
 
 
Figure 7.2.3. The intramural use of the ISDSR. 
 
 
If the VASIP process and other initiatives overcome the significant barriers to information-sharing 
among all these organizations, the ISDSR prototype could become operational by connecting  
directly to copies of de-identified data at each participating organization, just as VASIP/ISI is doing 
with FOQA and ASAP data at participating airlines (see figure 7.2.4.).  
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Figure 7.2.4. The systemwide concept of the future ISDSR. 
 
 
The ASMM products have made the operational concept described previously for the ISDSR proto-
type feasible. However, although the advancements in technology required for the implementation of 
this concept appear reasonably probable, the risks are sufficiently high to discourage commercial 
vendors from undertaking their development. There is the political risk that some owners of essential 
data may be unwilling to grant a commercial vendor access to, and sharing of, their trade-sensitive, 
proprietary data. There is also the market risk of a limited customer base for this capability. Conse-
quently, there is an effective role for NASA in the development of a demonstration of the feasibility 
and the value of an ISDSR prototype.  
 
 
Other 
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7.3 Conclusions 
 
In summary, the work initiated under ISI and proposed for ISDSR represented NASA’s recognition 
that, although the ASMM Project advanced the capability to analyze diverse individual data sources, 
it did not enable the integration of information extracted from these various sources. Further, NASA 
recognized that such integration is essential to gaining a full picture of systemic hazards and the 
systemwide assessment of their risks. The ISI project will develop and implement, on behalf of the  
industry and the FAA, the hardware, software, and networking to enable a demonstration within two 
years of a distributed archive of FOQA and ASAP data with sufficient reliability that it may be 
handed off to an operating organization. The ISDSR Project was designed to build a prototype of a 
capability to monitor individual data sources for events or trends that could compromise safety, to 
gather evidence from distributed databases about that event, and to interrogate across all databases 
for information related to any safety-related query. The implementation of the prototype would be 
scaled to the data volume and to political reality. In the process, the industry partners that enter into 
SAAs would benefit from the advanced analysis capabilities that develop. The goal of the ISDSR 
Project was to demonstrate to the industry the feasibility and value of identifying systemic issues. 
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9.0  MAJOR AWARDS 
 
APMS received the NASA Group Achievement Award in 1999. 
 
PDARS received the Administrator’s Award for Transferring Goals into Reality in 2003. 
 
ADIS received the NASA Group Achievement Award in 2005. 
 
The Morning Report of Atypical Flights received an R&D 100 Award for 2005 and also the Editors’ 
Choice Award for the product most likely to impact public safety. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
THE FLIGHT OPERATIONAL QUALITY ASSURANCE (FOQA) PROGRAMS 
 
 
FOQA is the acronym for Flight Operational Quality Assurance. The term describes the proactive, 
routine use of flight-recorded data to create a true quality assurance program in the area of flight 
operations. Worldwide, FOQA programs are given a variety of names and acronyms by airlines, but 
the goals and methods of their programs do not differ widely.  
 
FOQA is a program to improve flight safety through the routine collection and analysis of digital 
flight data generated during line operations. The benefit of FOQA is that it provides a greater under-
standing of the total flight operations environment. The development of newer data-acquisition 
devices that allow quick, inexpensive access to flight data, along with sophisticated analysis soft-
ware, have now made it possible to routinely collect and analyze flight data. The information and 
insights provided by FOQA analyses can be used to reduce operational costs and significantly  
enhance training effectiveness and operational procedures. FOQA data are unique because they 
provide objective information not available through any other methods. 
 
Aircraft operators and airlines operate their own internal FOQA programs. They are supported by 
regulations and forums sponsored by the FAA. The airlines usually retrieve the data from a Quick 
Access Recorder (QAR) that operates in parallel with the Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) on 
board their aircraft. Data from the data bus are recorded on Quick Access Recorders installed on 
board the aircraft. These data are downloaded at periodic intervals on the ground and sent to the 
airline’s FOQA office. The data are processed and analyzed using one of the commercially available 
systems for processing FOQA data. The automated search focuses on identifying prescribed  
exceedances. Exceedances are flight parameters that fall outside of normal operating ranges during 
some phase of flight as determined by the organization's operational and training standards, as well 
as the manufacturer's aircraft operating limitations. The flight data for flights with identified  
exceedances are available to a FOQA monitoring team designated by the airline, which consists of 
personnel from various flight operations and maintenance disciplines. Line pilots are typically  
included in this process because of the operational insights they can provide. This group identifies 
areas where corrective action is needed, determines what corrective action should be taken, and then 
closes the loop by tracking the effectiveness of the corrective action. 
 
Some airlines have had FOQA-type programs in operation for more than 40 years. A pioneer in this 
arena is British Airways, which started its program in 1962 to validate airworthiness criteria through 
the use of flight-recorder data. In 1991, the FAA contracted with the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) 
to examine the technology, benefits, and other issues arising from the FOQA-type programs used by 
non-U.S. airlines. As a result of this study, the FSF recommended that the FAA initiate a program to 
examine the benefits that FOQA programs might provide to U.S. airline operators. At the January 
1995 Department of Transportation (DOT) Aviation Safety Conference, it was recommended that 
the FAA encourage and help U.S. airlines voluntarily establish FOQA programs. In particular, it was 
recommended that the FAA sponsor FOQA demonstration studies, in cooperation with the airline 
industry, to develop guidelines for such programs, and to assuage the concerns of airlines and flight-
crews regarding the appropriate use and protection of recorded flight data.  
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Today, over 40 airlines worldwide have FOQA programs. In the U.S., there are now 12 major air 
carriers and 1 regional carrier with FAA-approved FOQA programs. In addition, several other major 
and regional air carriers have FOQA programs under development. The FAA instituted a program to 
assist airlines in establishing their FOQA programs with both financial and technical assistance. 
UTRS, Inc. was selected by the FAA to provide services to U.S. air carriers under this program. 
Airlines may voluntarily agree to participate and share their lessons learned about FOQA with other 
carriers participating in the program. UTRS serves as a clearinghouse for this shared knowledge, and 
provides resources and technical assistance to participating airlines. As airlines see both the safety 
and economic benefits of such a program, it is expected that many more will participate. 
 
Airlines carefully consider their decision to implement a FOQA program for several reasons. First, 
there has been concern about whether the government or the media would gain access to data gath-
ered under a FOQA program. Second, a considerable investment of time, human, and financial 
resources is necessary to create a successful program. Third, pilot associations have been concerned 
about privacy and the possibility that data would be misused against their members. Finally, airlines 
are concerned about FOQA information being obtained and used in civil litigation.  
 
In the U.S., a significant change occurred as a result of the January 1995 Joint Industry-Government 
Aviation Safety Conference. One of the recommendations of this conference was that the FAA 
should encourage airlines to establish voluntary FOQA programs, and provide assistance in getting 
such programs established. Further, the FAA Administrator issued a letter in February 1995 stating 
that the FAA would not use data gathered under an approved FOQA program in enforcement actions 
against either airlines or their employees. In December 1998, the FAA Administrator issued a FOQA 
Policy Statement announcing that the FAA will not use de-identified FOQA information to under-
take enforcement actions except under special circumstances, such as in the conduct of a criminal 
investigation, or if there were an intentional disregard of safety. These protections have now been 
embodied in aviation regulations, giving them the force of law (see refs. 1 and 2). In competition for 
scarce resources within an airline, FOQA programs need to go through the same cost-justification 
process as any other program. Although there are clear and compelling benefits for a FOQA pro-
gram to identify and reduce operational risks, they are often difficult to quantify. As U.S. airlines 
have become more familiar with FOQA, they have discovered uses of the data that have resulted in 
extended engine life, more efficient routings, and other areas that save money. Airlines with FOQA 
programs have found that these improvements, coupled with safety enhancements, have more than 
justified their cost. Pilot associations still have concerns about the collection and use of FOQA data, 
but have been agreeable to a FOQA program when appropriate protections are in place. Both labor 
and management also share a common interest in promoting safety. They have entered into binding 
agreements that cover the uses of FOQA data and the de-identification of individual crewmembers. 
With these agreements in place, there has been no misuse of FOQA data, and new bonds of trust 
have been built within the airlines. (For additional information about the FOQA program, see refs. 3 
and 4.) 
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APPENDIX B 
 
A CASE STUDY: IN-CLOSE APPROACH CHANGES (ICAC) 
 
The following is an excerpt from the paper: Statler, I. C.; Morrison, R.; and Rosenthal, L. J.: Beyond 
Error Reporting Toward Risk Assessment. In Proceedings of the 12th Biennial International 
Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Dayton, Ohio, April 14–17, 2003.  
 
During 2002, a milestone was achieved with the application of some ASMM computational tools 
and methods to a potentially hazardous scenario encountered in air-carrier operations. The approach 
involved using each of the ASMM tools in a set of (nearly) independent studies of the same 
operational scenario with the following goals: 
• Demonstrate the kinds of information that each ASMM tool can contribute to gaining insight 
into the complete picture of an event;  
• Show the methodology for utilizing each of the tools in a complementary and synergistic process 
of causal analysis and safety risk assessment. 
 
The operational implications of the analysis are still under evaluation, and are presented at the end of 
this paper as preliminary observations. The primary purpose of this report is to present the process 
for identifying and evaluating event precursors using ASMM tools.  
 
The scenario selected for the demonstration, In-close Approach Change (ICAC), involved changes 
to a landing runway assignment while on approach to the airport. ATC sometimes issues clearance 
changes to air-carrier pilots late in the approach to expedite traffic flows and resolve traffic conflicts. 
Pilots can usually accommodate these clearance amendments, but sometimes they experience 
unwanted consequences such as unstable approaches and hard landings. The research question was 
whether operationally significant risks were entailed in ICAC events, and if so, how could they be 
minimized. Figure B-1 illustrates the approach to addressing these questions using ASMM tools 
 
In main text of this report, each of the ASMM tools is described individually as a stand-alone 
capability for extracting information from available data. The study of ICAC was intended to show 
how the ASMM tools could be used together in analyses of diverse data sources to provide further 
insight into safety from a systemic perspective. Each of the ASMM tools was used in (nearly) 
independent studies of the same scenario (ICAC) and demonstrated the feasibility and the value of 
merging information from heterogeneous databases to aid causal analyses and risk assessment. This 
study was intended solely to demonstrate the kinds of information that each data source can 
potentially contribute to gaining insight into the complete picture, and the method for utilizing each 
of the tools in a complementary and synergistic process of causal analysis and safety risk 
assessment. The results of this study were not intended to provide definitive conclusions regarding 
ICAC, the safety of its utilization, or mitigations should they be deemed necessary. The accuracy 
and reliability of the results of this demonstration was limited because of the small percentage of the 
general population of each data set that was available for the purpose. This is simply a description of 
the process illustrated in figure B-1 and its potential value. 
 
200 
 
Figure B-1 – The Case Study Process  
 
 
The pointer to a potentially hazardous aviation scenario could come from any data source. In this 
instance, it was ASRS analysts who first identified potential problems in pilots’ accommodating 
changes to their runway assignment, altitude, or speed when close to an airport during approach. The 
ASRS report analyses set the stage for a more thorough examination of the problem.  
 
Insights from the NAOMS Survey Tool 
 
The first step was to incorporate specific questions regarding ICAC’s in a NAOMS survey of air 
transport pilots. With sufficient data, this can provide reliable quantitative information on the 
frequency of occurrence of an event such as an ICAC.  
 
In general, data obtained by NAOMS could not be published because of possible sensitivities. Also, 
care must be exercised in interpreting the results because the survey was mostly limited to 
commercial airline pilots and they may not represent the full population of the NATS on certain 
issues. Table B-1 is just a small representative sample of the results of the questions put to the 
commercial pilots regarding ICAC. 
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TABLE B-1 - PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH ICAC 
 
 
NAOMS data available for this study suggested that somewhat less than 10 percent of all air carrier 
approaches involve ICAC’s, but there is a great deal of variability among locations. A fraction of 
these ICAC’s are followed by unwanted events such as unstabilized approaches, hard landings, and 
airborne/ground conflicts. The ICAC’s do not necessarily cause all of these unwanted outcomes—
they might have occurred even without the ICAC. However, a reasonable conclusion from the 
NAOMS data is that ICAC’s contribute to many of these unwanted events. It appeared that the 
results of the NAOMS survey validated the concern identified by the ASRS analysts and further 
investigation was justified.  
 
The NAOMS survey data provided input on the potential seriousness of the event and also 
contributed to the characterization of the contextual factors contributing to anomalous consequences 
of ICAC’s that are reflected in the results section of this report.  
 
Insights from the ALAN Tool 
 
ALAN was used to cluster a subset of 179 ASRS reports related to ICAC’s spanning the period of 
January 1988 to August 2000. An ICAC is only reported to the ASRS when it results in a reportable 
event such as a hard landing. Therefore, even the total number of ICAC reports in the ASRS 
database is likely to be much fewer than the number identified by the NAOMS interviews. The small 
subset of these was selected for this study in order to fulfill the purposes of the demonstration within 
the available resources. The purpose was to demonstrate the capability to identify groups of related 
events in these reports. Operational experts assisted in characterizing the clusters identified by 
ALAN. ALAN identified the following primary event clusters and sub-clusters: 
• External factors causing approach difficulties 
− Distraction during approach leading to procedural lapse 
− Approach change to an ILS runway 
− Landings with visibility near legal minimums 
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• System providing information about approach problems 
− Communication with another aircraft on takeoff 
− TCAS advisories during approach 
− ATIS providing RVR 
• Issues primarily relating to larger/newer aircraft 
− Issues with use of FMS 
− Interactions with a wide-body aircraft 
− Issues involving specific approach characteristics 
• Issues resulting in approach/landing procedure problems 
− STAR procedures and restrictions 
− Winds at landing and landing speed 
− Problems with cockpit automation 
− Approach plates and briefings for changed runway 
 
The selected subset of ASRS reports on ICAC (179) was small enough so that domain experts could 
read them all and correlate their evaluations of the factors entailed in the event with the automated 
analyses of ALAN. The experts used a structured analytical approach that confirmed the results of 
the automated analyses of the ALAN tool, and contributed to some of the observations in the Results 
section.  
 
Insights from PDARS Tools 
 
PDARS used radar-track data to quantify the traffic patterns during ICAC events at two metropolitan 
airports. One month’s data for San Francisco International (SFO) and Los Angeles International 
(LAX) airports were used as representative samples for this study. Both airports have parallel 
runway configurations that are often used by ATC for “side-step” ICAC maneuvers. 
 
PDARS was able to identify aircraft trajectory patterns during final approach that indicated the 
designated landing runway changed from one runway to another parallel runway within the last 15 
miles to touchdown. PDARS tools identified the time and position of this side-step maneuver.  
 
At SFO, an average of 11.3 ICAC’s occurred each day. The average time from the side-step 
maneuver to the runway threshold was 93.3 seconds with a standard deviation of 50.7 seconds, and 
the average distance was 3.37 NM with a standard deviation of 1.83 NM. 
 
At LAX, an average of 22 ICAC’s occurred each day. The average time from the side-step maneuver 
to runway threshold was 95.8 seconds with a standard deviation of 62.0 seconds, and the average 
distance was 3.46 NM with a standard deviation of 2.24 NM. 
 
The consistency in the average time of the maneuver before runway threshold is speculated to be due 
to the fact that controllers need to wait until they are certain of their ground situation before they 
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approve a runway change. Experienced pilots seldom have a problem executing a side-step 
maneuver within about 95 seconds of threshold. However, the time is short enough so that a problem 
may occur if other adverse aircraft or environmental factors exist (Schade et al. (2002)). 
 
Insights from APMS Tools  
 
APMS was used to gain further insight into ICAC events by examining aircraft flight-recorded data. 
An objective was to demonstrate that an aircraft operator could use flight data and APMS tools to 
aid in the assessment of the risk associated with an identified issue. In this study, APMS tools were 
used to demonstrate how flight data might be a source of information about the frequency of 
occurrence and the severity of consequences associated with ICAC events. The referenced report  
(Chidester et al. (2002)) is for internal NASA use only because it includes references to the 
proprietary data to which NASA was granted access by the air carriers for the purpose of this study.  
 
The APMS team developed search criteria to identify approach and runway assignment changes and 
applied existing APMS tools to examine their consequences. The definition of an In-close Approach 
Change used in this study was a change that occurred after being established on final approach and 
below 2,500 ft. afe.  
 
The database for this study was extremely limited by the data available to be accessed for analysis. 
The study sample consisted of 2680 flights, including 577 arriving at LAX, 881 at SEA, and 283 at 
ANC. Of the 577 flights at LAX, 27 flights (4.7%) were found to have experienced close-in runway 
changes, of 881 flights at SEA, 65 flights (7.4%) experienced close-in changes, and of 283 flights at 
ANC, 3 flights (1%) experienced close-in changes.  
 
The APMS team also demonstrated the capability to assess the consequences of ICAC using the 
Routine Events tool, which documents the distribution of key parameters relevant to standard 
operating procedures at specific points during a flight. This permits a comparison between the key 
parameter distributions at times during approach for all flights to that airport that have experienced 
an in-close change to the same set of parameter distributions for all flights landing at the same 
airport. If close-in runway assignment increases risk of incident or accident, these approaches may 
differ on average or be more variable on some Routine Event parameter distributions. These Routine 
Event parameter distributions are tied to stabilized approach criteria and reveal how closely a group 
of flights comply with those criteria by plotting the distributions of airspeed, localizer deviation, 
glide-slope deviation, vertical speed, and N1 (a measure of engine thrust) at 1,500, 1,000, 500, and 
100 feet above the runway. Stabilized approaches will group together around the average on each 
distribution. Unstable approaches will gravitate towards the tails of the distribution. If in-close 
runway changes produce problems, they may differ from the general population on average or 
variance, showing greater spread towards the extremes of the distribution of each parameter.  
 
Figures B-2 and B-3 are examples of the many results obtained. These two figures show a 
comparison of the Routine Event parameter distributions for flights arriving at LAX to contrast six 
parameters at four points on the approach. These distributions are amenable to standard inferential 
statistical tests. Differences on average from all flights landing at an airport were evaluated for 
significance using t tests. Differences in variance were evaluated using the F test. 
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Figure B-2 – LAX – All Arrivals (557). 
 
 
Figure B-3 – LAX – In-close Runway Changes. 
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When compared to distributions based on all flights landing at LAX, flights experiencing a close-in 
runway change showed greater localizer deviation at 1,500, 1,000, and 500 ft. above field elevation 
(afe) were higher on the glide slope at 1,000 ft. and lower at 500 and 100 ft., and had greater nose-
down pitch at 500 and 100 ft. These flights were more variable on the localizer throughout the 
approach, in airspeed and vertical speed at 500 and 100 ft., and N1 at 100 ft. (All probabilities 
< .01).  
 
In summary, while in-close runway assignment changes no more frequently resulted in unstable 
approaches, they differed on average and were more variable on a variety of dimensions making up 
a stable approach. Flights with in-close runway assignment changes become less stable, but not so 
extremely as to trigger unstable approach criteria based on current FOQA exceedances. Findings 
from this small study sample suggest that ICAC’s frequently result in less stable approaches, 
implying greater risk. The small database was not necessarily representative of the full population, 
but this study demonstrated the kind of information that could be extracted from flight data using the 
APMS tools that complement the information from other data sources.  
 
Insights from PROFILER Tools 
 
PROFILER was applied to both APMS flight recorded data and PDARS radar track data to see 
whether it provided automated identification of patterns resembling runway changes, and 
“meaningful” clusters (singletons, atypical clusters) that correlated with the experts’ analyses. 
PROFILER used APMS test data for a single carrier, and a limited number of flights, to examine 
recorded data parameters for the last 5 minutes of flight. PROFILER was able to identify flights that 
landed on a different runway than the majority in their cluster, and within this sub-cluster, to identify 
three flights that were ICAC candidates. Human experts agreed that two of these flights were 
ICACs. Using a month’s worth of PDARS radar data, PROFILER examined 20,767 flights for an 
airport and identified 1,412 (7 percent) as potential ICAC candidates. These results were partially 
confirmed by a separate analysis. 
 
Preliminary ICAC Case Study Observations 
 
In this brief summary of this experiment, some examples of the information derived from the data 
were presented. . After integrating all of the information extracted from the various data sources 
(i.e., ASRS, NAOMS, flight and radar data) using the ASMM analysis tools (i.e., ALAN, 
PROFILER, Pattern Search, APMS, PDARS, and the Cinq-Demi Method), factors that could 
possibly contribute to the anomalous consequences of an ICAC were identified. 
 
These factors are presented as hypotheses, because of the limited available data. . For example, as 
stated above, the NAOMS project surveyed only the commercial pilot community, the ATC 
perspective is represented to only a minor extent from ASRS reports as ASRS reports these are 
submitted primarily by the pilot community, and only a very small representative set of flight data 
were available for analyses with the APMS statistical tools..  
 
Nevertheless, considerable insight was gained into the potential safety-risk of ICAC’s drawn from 
the quantitative and qualitative data. Certainly, ICAC’s contribute to a large number of unwanted 
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consequences annually, and these unwanted consequences are likely associated with certain factors. 
Preliminary observations on changes that might mitigate anomalous consequences of ICAC’s are:  
• ATC issuance of ICAC clearances may be problematic in relation to the following factors: 
− Failure to appreciate the visual conditions from the perspective of the cockpit  
− Altitude at which clearance is given 
− Distance from airport at which clearance is given 
− Unfamiliarity with, or failure to consider correctly, the capabilities of the type of equipment 
being flown  
− Runway configuration  
• Air Carrier operating practices may be vulnerable to problems related to: 
− Acceptance of in-close approach changes vis-à-vis go-around  
− Response to in-close approach changes (e.g., reprogramming the automatics vs. flying on 
raw data)  
 
Whether and how these insights result in changes implemented to the system are the responsibilities 
of the FAA and the air carriers 
 
Summary 
 
The study was not able to arrive at definitive conclusions regarding the factors that may be causing 
pilots to have problems associated with ICAC or clear recommendations for interventions to 
mitigate them. However, the value of using the suite of ASMM tools to assist domain experts in 
gaining insight into an event was demonstrated.  
 
Proactive management of safety risk starts with having in place a method for continuously 
monitoring the performance of the system, and a capability for comparing performance to 
expectations, to uncover and to understand potential risks of human error. Simply saying that one or 
more of the humans in a system may have made a mistake is not constructive. Analyses of the 
quantitative databases will help the domain experts understand exactly what happened. Analyses of 
textual databases and narrative reports are needed to understand why. That is the essence of an 
approach that will take the NATS beyond human error to proactive management of safety risk. 
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APPENDIX C  
 
THE AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM (ASRS) 
 
 
ASRS is a highly successful and trusted program that has served the needs of the aviation commu-
nity for over 30 years, and is available to all participants in the national aviation system who wish to 
report safety incidents and situations. The ASRS was established in 1976 under an agreement be-
tween the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and NASA. This cooperative safety program 
invites pilots, air traffic controllers, flight attendants, maintenance personnel, and others to voluntar-
ily report to NASA any actual or potential hazard to safe aviation operations. The FAA provides 
most of the program funding. NASA administers the program, ensures confidentiality, sets policies 
in consultation with the FAA and aviation community, and receives the reports submitted. 
 
ASRS Data Are Used to Promote Safety 
 
The ASRS collects and responds to voluntarily submitted incident reports to lessen the likelihood of 
aviation accidents (figure C-1). ASRS data are used to: 
• identify aviation system deficiencies for correction by appropriate authorities, 
• support aviation system policy, planning, and improvements, and 
• strengthen the foundation of aviation human-factors safety research. 
 
The ASRS analysts with expertise in all of the domains of aviation operations identify reports of 
events or circumstances that have implications of compromised safety and, after discussions with the 
FAA, issue Alert Bulletins or For Your Information letters to the appropriate authorities. A percent-
age of all of the reports are processed by the analysts and then entered into the database. The ASRS 
database has proven to be a very valuable resource over the years for many studies of human-factors 
issues.  
 
 
Figure C-1. Report processing. 
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ASRS routinely produces the following: 
• Alerting messages are sent to individuals in positions of authority so that corrective action can be 
initiated when the ASRS receives a report describing a hazardous situation.  
• CALLBACK is a monthly bulletin issued to more than 85,000 personnel in the aviation commu-
nity. It contains extracts of the ASRS reports, summaries of research, and related safety informa-
tion.  
• Database search responses are issued when search requests are received from parties wishing to 
access information about particular subjects.  
• Operational support is provided to the FAA and NTSB during rule-making, procedure and 
airspace design, and accident investigations by collating relevant information from the database. 
• Topical research is carried out and the results of the research (mainly human-performance  
issues) are published.  
 
ASRS Reporters Are Protected 
 
The FAA offers those who report to the ASRS two important guarantees: confidentiality and limited 
immunity. The FAA offers these guarantees because of the value of the safety information obtained 
through the ASRS program. 
 
Reports Are Held in Confidence 
 
Reports sent to the ASRS are held in strict confidence. More than 600,000 reports have been submit-
ted since the beginning of the program without a single reporter’s identity being revealed. ASRS 
removes all personal names and other potentially identifying information before entering reports into 
its database. Reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual 
who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. 
 
Reporters Receive Limited Immunity 
 
ASRS reporters are also guaranteed limited immunity by the FAA, meaning that the FAA will not 
use information that has been filed with the ASRS in an enforcement action, and will waive fines 
and penalties for unintentional violations of federal aviation regulations that are reported, as long as 
violations are reported within 10 days of their occurrence. However, accidents and criminal activities 
are not protected from enforcement actions, and should not be submitted to the ASRS. 
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ASRS Benefits Reporters 
 
In addition to immunity provisions associated with the ASRS program, reporters often mention other 
equally important motivations for using the program: 
• Satisfaction in knowing they are helping to improve the aviation system by giving safety informa-
tion to the ASRS, and 
• Increased understanding of the factors contributing to their safety incident. 
 
For the ASRS databases, a reasonable general rule is that each report occupies about 75 KB of stor-
age, including all associated indices and, because it currently holds approximately 150,000 active 
records, an estimate of its size is approximately 10 GB. 
 
Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS statistical data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submit-
ted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. 
Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, air carriers, or other participants in the aviation system are 
equally aware of the ASRS or equally willing to report to it. Thus, the data reflect reporting biases. 
These biases, which are neither fully known nor measurable, may influence ASRS statistics. A 
safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated 
in area “A” than area “B” simply because the airmen who operate in area “A” are more supportive of 
the ASRS program and more inclined to report to the ASRS when an NMAC occurs. 
 
 
 
Figure C-2. ASRS reports received annually. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
COMMERCIAL AVIATION SAFETY INFORMATION SHARING PROCESS: CONCEPT 
PAPER AND ROADMAP 
 
 
Synopsis 
 
This document defines a future state and roadmap for safety information sharing that will help 
achieve an accident-free national air transportation system. Studies suggest that in many fatal 
accidents, information existed somewhere in the system that could have been used to prevent the 
accidents, had it been available to the right people at the right time. Currently there are many 
uncoordinated safety information collection and sharing efforts in the air transportation industry, 
which were typically initiated in response to specific needs. While industry is progressing in the 
development of many safety data sources, there has been no systemic effort to integrate this 
information across organizations and stakeholders in a process directed at improving overall system 
safety. Hazards to safe air carrier operations will always emerge in our rapidly changing and highly 
stressed national airspace system. New approaches to safety management and safety information 
sharing are required, to better detect these hazards and manage the risks before they cause air 
carrier accidents.  
 
A key element of future safety management systems will be a dramatic change in the way we 
collect, manage, and share data and information. We envision a future state in which safety 
information from stakeholders is accessed through a safety information sharing process and is 
available to decision-makers for managing risks. Such a process would enable the industry to more 
effectively utilize its limited resources in maintaining and improving safety.  
 
The aviation industry has developed several information sharing programs that show how 
beneficial this process can be. It is imperative that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and 
commercial aviation industry provide the leadership, commit the resources, and allocate funding to 
achieve the envisioned future state. Success depends on several critical factors, including 
committed leadership that will consistently champion the cause and maintain a long term-
commitment to this effort. Cultural changes and tool development for this new approach to safety 
information management will take time. Unless we begin immediately, we risk resurgence in fatal 
air transportation accidents as air traffic volume increases threefold by 2025.TP18 PT  
 
Background 
 
FAA, industry, and the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) leadership identified a need to 
define an ideal future state for safety information sharing in the commercial aviation community, in 
order to better understand and manage current activities and to agree on a roadmap to implement 
the future state. CAST designated the Aviation Safety Information Sharing Task (ASIST) Team to 
                                                 
TP
18
PT T“Next Generation Air Transportation System, Integrated Plan,” FAA JPDO, 2004. 
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address this need. The ASIST team includes representatives of various organizations within the 
FAA, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the air carrier industry, and 
manufacturers of large transport airplanes. Representatives from the air traffic community were not 
included on the team, but are identified as a major stakeholder for future work. ASIST developed 
this Concept Paper in response to its charter. 
 
The ASIST team’s products are also required to support the Joint Planning and Development Office 
(JPDO). Congress established the JPDO in December 2003 with the goal of transforming the 
current aviation system into the “Next Generation Air Transportation System” (NGATS) by the 
year 2025, working across six government agencies. To meet this goal, eight Integrated Product 
Teams (IPT) have been formed. FAA’s Office of Regulation & Certification is leading the Safety 
Management IPT, which as part of its mission is defining steps to achieve a cross-agency 
information sharing and analysis capability. The ASIST team products will be provided to the IPT 
in order to support this mission from the aviation perspective, for inclusion in the inter-agency 
JPDO strategic plan for 2025.  
 
Why Change is Urgent  
 
Recent studies have suggested that in many fatal accidents, information existed somewhere in the 
system that could have been used to prevent the accidents, had it been available to the right people 
at the right time.TP19 PT That is, existing information could have been used to identify the need to 
mitigate risks and thus prevent accidents. This is unacceptable – it means that we are not using 
existing safety data and information optimally in today’s environment.  
 
Meanwhile, the U.S. air transportation system is straining under rapidly growing demand, capacity 
limitations, and rapid technological change. This is not new – the commercial aviation industry has 
been in a constant state of change through its entire existence, and we must assume that change is a 
constant. But as the national airspace system (NAS) continues to increase in size and complexity, 
safety information proliferates across the system. Our static and reactive data-handling methods do 
not support change well. We must develop safety information sharing processes that can evolve to 
meet growth needs, and can ensure that safety information is consistently available to key decision-
makers to mitigate risks, therefore preventing accidents.  
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Commercial air carrier operations in the U.S. are very safe today, and accidents are prevented every 
day. We can expect the public to demand an increasing level of safety -- defined by freedom from 
accidents. However, because of the currently low accident rate, industry will rely more on safety 
management processes to systemically reduce the risk of accidents. Ironically, associated resources 
to improve processes may be difficult to secure when fewer accidents are occurring, due to 
increased public complacency – making implementation of safety management and information 
sharing processes more problematic. 
 
Vision for the Commercial Aviation Safety Information Sharing Process 
 
An integrated, over-arching process is required to optimize sharing of aviation safety information 
across the commercial air transport industry. We envision a future state in which safety information 
from stakeholders is rapidly accessed through a safety information sharing process and is easily 
available to decision-makers for managing risks. The process must support industry safety 
management processes in order to position the NAS for the tremendous change predicted from now 
through 2025. TP20 PT We must make better use of valuable but frequently “stove piped” safety 
information systems, to support safety management processesTP21 PTP Pthat identify hazards, assess their 
risk, assist in development of mitigation strategies, and measure effectiveness of corrective actions. 
We must end the era in which an accident occurs because an existingTP22 PT hazard was not discovered 
and addressed. 
 
The figure ‘Future State’ depicts the envisioned end state to which we strive, and the capabilities 
that safety management and safety information sharing must provide to achieve that future state. It 
should be noted that risk will still exist within the system, and accidents may still occur. This 
should in no way dilute the urgent need to develop safety management and safety information 
sharing processes in order to strive for this future accident-free environment. 
 
                                                 
TP
20
PT “Next Generation Air Transportation System, Integrated Plan,” FAA JPDO, 2004. 
 
TP
21
PT Among the excellent sources for discussion of risk management are Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents, 
James T. Reason (Ashgate Publishing, Limited, January 1998), and System Safety Handbook: Practices and Guide-
lines for Conducting System Safety Engineering and Management (FAA, December 30, 2000).  ASIST team  
acknowledges that risk will always exist within the system; the objective is to manage the risks in order to avoid 
accidents. 
 
TP
22
PT The ASIST team notes that current data and information systems focus on detecting existing hazards in the aviation 
system.  We foresee a need to improve our ability to anticipate future hazards and risks and eliminate, avoid, or miti-
gate them when we design the future aviation system; however, we have not addressed that prognostic capability in 
this analysis.  The European Joint Safety Strategy Initiative (JSSI) is attempting to do this via their Future Aviation 
Safety Team (FAST).  FAST and possible other hazard prognostication methods would ideally be developed to  
address future hazards. 
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Future S tate
The future  a ir transportation  system  is  accident-free
M anaging  risks requires 
inform ation to discover 
unkn ow n hazards and to 
validate risk m itigation
H O W ?
D ata and in form ation  from  all stakeholders are accessed  
th rough  a safety in fo rm ation   sharing  process 
and availab le to  decision m akers fo r m anaging risks
H azards are 
discovered and risks 
are m anaged before
they  cause accidents
T hrough a safety  m anagem ent 
process, decision m akers at all 
levels prevent accidents by 
m anaging  risks
 
 
 
Key Attributes of Future State
5.   Comprehensive Sharing of Relevant Safety Information
-- Participants agree on sharing goals
-- Capability is Evolvable and Agile as needs change
6.  Interoperable across Disparate Information Systems
-- Affordably accommodates sharing across existing systems
7.   Dependability
-- Assures the reliability, completeness, validity, timeliness, consistency, accuracy 
and accessibility of the information shared. 
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1.   Just Culture
-- Information Sharing  depends on,  and facilitates, a culture that promotes safety 
via a secure, trusted, sharing environment
2.    Supports Safety Management Processes across Organizations
-- Process makes information available for safety management activities
-- Inclusive, solution-oriented process
3.    Managed by Stakeholders
-- Data Owners are involved in safety management system processes, including analysis
-- Stakeholders manage access and sharing processes
4.   Value-Based
-- Incentives to ensure stakeholder participation
-- Stakeholders experience benefit from participating in the information sharing process
Pe
op
le 
& 
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The necessary characteristics, or requirements, of the envisioned safety information sharing process 
are shown in the figure ‘Key Attributes of Future State. 
 
The ASIST Team believes each Attribute identified here is necessary in order for safety 
management and safety information sharing processes to succeed in the commercial aviation 
industry.  
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The first four Attributes address “People & Environment” -- the required involvement of 
stakeholders across the community, as well as evolution toward a ‘safety culture’. The last three 
Attributes describe the required characteristics of the eventual enabling safety information sharing 
technology and processes. Additional description of the Attributes is provided to insure the team’s 
intent for each is clear. 
 
1. Just Culture: The safety information sharing process requires, but also facilitates, a just 
culture that promotes information reporting and sharing within a trusted environment,TP23 PT 
providing security for the data and withstanding challenges from litigants, media, and 
special interest groups to prevent misuse of information. The process entails emphasis on a 
“learning culture” rather than a blame culture, and the stakeholders are persuaded that there 
is “shared risk” in contributing information. That is, the stakeholder must have reasonable 
confidence that by contributing information, it will not be exposed to increased adverse 
consequences in relation to other stakeholders. 
 
As part of this cultural change, the regulatory authority would retain its responsibility for 
oversight of regulatory compliance, but also would recognize and foster the safety benefits 
of a systems approach to risk management and the industry’s role in accomplishing this. 
This will require promotion of safety through sharing of data and information in an 
environment that removes barriers caused by fears of punitive response or misuse of the 
information. 
 
2. Supports Safety Management Processes across Organizations: There must be a systematic 
safety management process to which safety information sharing is linked, to identify 
hazards, analyze causal factors, develop recommendations, implement mitigating strategies, 
and monitor implementation results. The process must be scalable to accommodate local 
issues up to national/international industry issues. Information to identify hazards and assess 
and manage risk, as well as to assess the health of the system, will be collected through the 
information sharing process. The process will enable information to be provided to decision 
makers. 
 
Additionally, methods must be defined to measure the health of the safety system in regard 
to information sharing, and insure processes are in place to measure and make 
improvements where needed. This is a component of any safety system, but will be 
especially important given the need to evolve and change quickly to meet changing needs. 
 
3. Managed by Stakeholders: The process will provide for complete stakeholder 
communication, coordination, and cooperation as necessary. The process will support data 
owners being involved in the safety management processes, and aid broad assessment of 
systemwide risks involving more than one stakeholder. Stakeholders will appropriately 
manage access and sharing processes for safety needs. The process will not include non-
safety interests, because information shared is limited to use for identifying, solving, or 
                                                 
T23 T A Roadmap to a Just Culture: Enhancing the Safety Environment, Global Aviation Information Network (GAIN) 
Working Group E: Flt Ops/ATC Safety Information Sharing, First Edition, 2004. 
 
 218
following up on safety or operational issues only. Based on this “need to know,” the process 
will be mutually supportive, and secure, with success derived from an involvement in 
outcomes.  
 
Although the flight operations community is leading current information sharing efforts, all 
stakeholders (manufacturers, repair stations, the Air Traffic Organization, accredited safety 
research activities, industry associations, etc.) must be included for comprehensive safety 
information sharing. The future state and attributes must be refined to meet all stakeholder 
needs and validated to a common end state as the goal. Interim steps will include increasing 
stakeholder access to de-identified, aggregate data as part of their participation in industry 
safety sharing processes. 
 
4. Value-Based: The process will focus on data, information and knowledge that can be acted 
upon and provide incentives to participation: stakeholders will experience benefit from 
participating in the information sharing process, including the realization of intrinsic safety 
benefits and accreditation by the regulator. Examples include alternate methods of 
compliance to current reporting requirements for participants in information sharing 
prototypes; use of safety information to reduce and/or target regulatory oversight based on 
more risk-based oversight methods; and action by regulators to reduce data access needs 
based on better understanding of information needed for effective oversight.  
 
Participants may also find other safety and cost benefits as a result of sharing information. 
For example, operators may learn of adverse experiences from other operators with similar 
equipment and operating environments, and may be able to reduce costs by implementing 
preventive measures to avoid the same experiences. 
 
5. Comprehensive Sharing of Necessary Safety Information: Information accessed will be 
only that which is necessary to manage safety. All contributors will provide this information 
under a common definition and understanding of its use. The process will be agile and 
flexible to allow for evolution of the aviation system. The future process will not just link 
existing data sources; that would simply produce a bigger haystack. Reaching our goals will 
require automated processes to identify issues of potential risk: monitoring of each database 
for potential safety issues and integrating events, incidents, and issues across sources of data 
to provide an understanding of possible contributing factors of these events. 
 
Additionally, safety information sharing must include a process for introducing new 
information providers to the trusted community. The process must provide protection for 
stakeholders of different types, guaranteeing anonymity while allowing data query and 
discussion, and allowing data owners to manage access. This would occur within a 
community of stakeholders and would facilitate data and information sharing while the 
envisioned ‘just culture’ of trust is continuing to develop.  
 
6. Interoperable across Disparate Information Systems: Safety information consists of a 
variety of data sources distributed across organizations and stored in organization-specific 
formats. An effective safety information-sharing process requires routine analysis across 
data sources in their native format without imposing data structure across data systems, 
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stakeholders, and domains, so that risks identified in any given source of data may be 
examined from multiple perspectives represented in heterogeneous data. The process must 
accept information and enable analysis within and across all heterogeneous data types and 
systems and organizations. The process will facilitate a safety information sharing process 
that is low-cost, flexible, and scalable.  
 
Multiple parallel research and application projects will be required to make these distributed 
data sources available for routine, collaborative analysis and response by stakeholders. The 
increasing complexity and sophistication of the NAS demands that we facilitate these 
multiple perspectives to better be able to “connect the dots” and prevent accidents by 
analyzing operational and other data rather than having to analyze accidents. 
 
7. Provides Dependability: Development of technology and processes must assure the 
reliability, completeness, validity, timeliness, consistency and accuracy of the information 
shared, and become a vital element of stakeholders’ safety management systems. 
 
Safety Information – Barriers to Sharing 
 
Barriers exist that adversely affect the efficient sharing of safety data and information among the 
participants. These barriers are largely culturally induced, based on fears that the information may 
be used against the provider, through disciplinary action, litigation, enforcement, or public 
disclosure. Also, studies show that current data collection efforts often suffer from inefficiencies, 
lack of focus, and lack of coordination, duplication, or “stove piping”, and declining quality. Stove 
piping is common -- an organization may have information that could be of great significance to 
another organization or discipline but is not shared because the structure of the current system has 
not widely institutionalized information sharing.  
 
As an example, the first airline to implement a program under the FAA’s Aviation Safety Action 
Program (ASAP, a voluntary reporting program further discussed below) was able to identify errors 
resulting from revisions in the Pre-Departure Clearances (PDC). In these cases, PDC revisions were 
not effectively communicated to flight crews, resulting in crews flying the original clearance route 
while ATC is expecting the revised route to be followed. The airline changed the PDC procedures 
and the events stopped. The airline communicated this information concerning the potential for 
PDC errors to other operators and by NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) in the 
form of an Operations Bulletin.  
 
Unfortunately, other operators did not follow this guidance. It was not until other airlines’ ASAP 
were initiated following the FAA issuance of regulations allowing ASAP programs across airlines 
in 2001 that these same PDC errors were detected at the other airlines. The remaining operators 
then implemented the same resolutions used by the initial airline. Identifying this issue within one 
airline and alerting by our nation’s safety reporting system did not result in correction across 
airlines. Only re-discovery within additional airlines’ ASAP produced these needed changes. 
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This can be construed as a failure of information processes from several perspectives: 
• At the beginning, only one airline had access to this information internally, though events were 
happening across airlines. 
• Though the national-level reporting system alerted the problem as likely cross organizational, it 
was not tied to a change process. 
• Though the identifying airline discussed its internal changes fairly publicly, other airlines did 
not recognize the need to act within their organizations. 
• Organizations implemented internal change only when internal ASAP programs were 
established at multiple airlines. 
 
All of these events represented some risk of in-flight collision. This is a specific example of why 
our industry needs an information-sharing process tied to inter-organizational safety management 
processes that ensure that identification of an issue by one stakeholder is sufficient to provoke 
evaluation throughout the national air transportation system and accomplish systemic change when 
required. 
 
Safety Information – Experiences in Sharing 
 
There are many data and information systems within the NAS and the various aviation 
communities. These provide a starting point for data and information collection, analysis, and 
sharing. In certain cases, the industry has implemented some limited programs to share information 
among certain stakeholders, addressing issues of trust and pro-active analysis with acceptable 
protections. These programs demonstrate the safety value of greater openness among appropriate 
stakeholders. They also demonstrate the wealth of data and information available in the industry, 
particularly within the air carrier industry, and how powerful these data and information can be 
when integrated across organizational lines and accessed by the right decision makers. Specific 
examples are relevant within air traffic, airframe manufacturing, and maintenance. 
 
In the air traffic community, FAA's Office of Performance Management has implemented the 
Performance Data Analysis and Reporting System (PDARS). Using radar data, PDARS calculates a 
range of performance measures including traffic counts, travel times and distances, traffic flows, 
and in-trail separation. PDARS has been implemented at all US Air Route Traffic Control Centers 
(ARTCC) and the Command Center and is being extended to Regional Offices and Terminal Radar 
Approach Control (TRACON) facilities. Using these data, Air Traffic facilities have accomplished 
performance analysis, route and airspace design, noise abatement analysis, training, support for 
search and rescue, and research by FAA and NASA on future improvements. Similarly, the 
National Airspace Information Monitoring System (NAIMS) has been developed for sharing air 
traffic control safety event reports. 
 
Aircraft and engine manufacturers generally have individually tailored systems for obtaining and 
sharing safety information. Input from operational events, customers, bulletin boards, and field 
representatives, is collected for internal analysis and action. Required reporting of events to FAA 
can be augmented through voluntary agreements such as the Boeing/FAA Continued Operational 
Safety Program (COSP) agreement. 
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Much like the airframe manufacturing community, the maintenance/repair/overhaul (MRO) 
community has several unique processes for obtaining and sharing relevant safety information. 
MRO events are reported and shared among several community stakeholders including operators, 
repair stations, manufacturers, and the FAA. One such sharing process is the Rotor Manufacturing 
Induced Anomaly Database (RoMAN). Within RoMAN, 11 engine manufacturers report and share 
high energy rotor events induced by manufacturing anomalies. The FAA’s Service Difficulty 
Reporting System (SDRS) is yet another example of a MRO community sharing system. Operators 
and maintainers of aircraft report in-service events, such as defects, malfunctions, and failures. 
 
Working across multiple communities, NASA has operated the Aviation Safety Reporting System 
(ASRS) on behalf of the FAA since 1976. It receives, processes, and alerts in response to safety 
reports from pilots, dispatchers, mechanics, and flight attendants. 
 
In the airline flight operations community, Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) is a 
process that enables a systems safety manager to analyze continuous, pre-planned, flight data from 
all individual fleet aircraft across a common time interval from the aircraft’s Digital Flight Data 
Acquisition Unit. ASAP is a pro-active safety process that encourages air carrier and repair station 
employees to voluntarily report safety information that may be critical to identifying potential 
precursors to accidents. FOQA and ASAP are examples of progress in developing a safety culture 
that places a higher value on reporting and learning, rather than enforcement and punitive action. 
Under the FAA’s regulations, air carriers that implement approved FOQA programs must provide 
the FAA with aggregate FOQA data. Except for criminal or deliberate acts, the FAA will not use 
that FOQA data against the operator or its employees.  
 
This sharing to date has been limited to sharing of issues in stakeholder meetings. The data-sharing 
process negotiations have been ongoing for several years, culminating in the Voluntary Aviation 
Safety Information-sharing Process (VASIP). VASIP is an activity that will integrate two key 
safety information systems, FOQA and ASAP. VASIP is intended to accomplish two 
complementary objectives. One objective is the development of a technical process to provide 
access to de-identified safety data from any participating airline’s FOQA or ASAP program, 
aggregate it, and make it accessible to appropriate industry stakeholders for analysis. The other is 
the development of a comprehensive, structured process among all stakeholders that will permit 
them to analyze aggregate safety information, identify problem areas, develop and implement 
appropriate corrective action plans, measure the effectiveness of those actions, and share the 
conclusions with stakeholders.  
 
We highlight VASIP here as a leading example for the direction safety information sharing should 
take, in collaboration among stakeholders and building the environment of trust and cooperation 
with regulators. Additionally, the CPS Response Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) in 2004 
prototyped a secure data sharing approach, validating the technological capability to guarantee 
anonymity to data providers while allowing for data query and follow-up investigation. The ASIST 
team recognizes VASIP and similar sharing approaches as building blocks in the roadmap toward 
the future state. Industry and government must expand these sharing concepts, building an 
environment of trust that provides incentives for timely and effective sharing of quality data and 
adequate protection for the information and the providers. 
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Conclusion 
 
The leadership to attain the safety information sharing future state would be provided by a high-
level leaders’ group that would work with decision-makers to promote the understanding of the 
benefits of information sharing in a non-punitive environment, and allocate necessary resources. 
The group would draw from, and integrate as appropriate with, the substantial experience and 
history built by CAST, the ASAP and FOQA ARCs, and industry representative groups. The group 
would identify the stakeholders, enlist their participation, and work with these stakeholders 
throughout government and industry to drive long-term efforts necessary for effective safety 
management systems and safety information sharing processes within and across organizations.  
 
Two roadmaps are provided in this document, a 20-year long-term broad view and an 18-month 
short-term detailed view. These roadmaps describe actions, decision points, and approximate 
timelines to progress from the current state of mostly disconnected data and information systems to 
a process in which safety information is consistently available to aviation decision makers for use 
in the management of risk and prevention of accidents. Each roadmap depicts the anticipated 
evolution of society’s expectations of air transportation safety over the given timeframe, along with 
the evolution of the state of safety information sharing over the same period. It also shows that the 
broad activity areas that will be necessary to move the industry toward the future state and its 
attributes.  
 
Implementing the future state safety information sharing process will require change leadership to 
develop the environment, culture, and people, and expert technical leadership to develop the 
enabling technology and processes. The team believes the single most important factor to success 
can be found within the commercial aviation community -- FAA and industry leadership to 
consistently champion the cause and maintain a long term-commitment to achieving the future state 
of safety information sharing. 
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APPENDIX E  
 
HUMAN-PERFORMANCE MODELS 
 
 
This appendix comprises two summary papers describing the work on developing human-
performance models that was conducted under the System Wide Accident Prevention (SWAP) 
project of the Aviation Safety Program, and some summary comments from the meeting session at 
which they were presented. 
 
The first paper (Foyle, Goodman, and Hooey, (2003)) is the introduction to a conference 
proceedings and provides an overview of the activities, the state of modeling human performance at 
the end of 2002, and a description of the future activities planned for 2003 and 2004. It appears in 
the proceedings of the NASA Aviation Safety Program Conference on Human Performance 
Modeling of Approach and Landing with Augmented Displays, NASA Conference Proceedings 
NASA/CP-2003-212267, 2003.  
 
The second paper is a summary paper describing the modeling efforts that was presented as a panel 
presentation on the topic at the 2005 Human Factors and Ergonomics Society meeting. It appears in 
the Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 49th Annual Meeting, Santa 
Monica, Calif., 2005. 
 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE NASA AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM (AVSP)  
SYSTEMWIDE ACCIDENT PREVENTION (SWAP) HUMAN PERFORMANCE 
MODELING (HPM) ELEMENT 
 
David C. Foyle 
NASA Ames Research Center 
Allen Goodman 
San Jose State University 
Becky L. Hooey 
Monterey Technologies, Inc. 
 
Abstract 
 
An overview is provided of the Human Performance Modeling (HPM) element within the NASA 
Aviation Safety Program (AvSP). Two separate model development tracks for performance 
modeling of real-world aviation environments are described: the first focuses on the advancement 
of cognitive modeling tools for system design, while the second centers on a prescriptive 
engineering model of activity tracking for error detection and analysis. A progressive 
implementation strategy for both tracks is discussed in which increasingly more complex, safety-
relevant applications are undertaken to extend the state-of-the-art, as well as to reveal potential 
human-system vulnerabilities in the aviation domain. Of particular interest is the ability to predict 
the precursors to error and to assess potential mitigation strategies associated with the operational 
use of future flight deck technologies.  
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HPM Element Goals 
 
This report provides a summary review of recent research activities conducted in support of the 
Human Performance Modeling (HPM) element within the Systemwide Accident Prevention 
(SWAP) Level 2 project of the NASA Aviation Safety Program (AvSP). In March 2003, a one-day 
conference was held at NASA Ames Research Center to present the interim results of the HPM 
element. Specifically, the 2003 NASA HPM conference was focused on scenarios related to 
approach and landing with synthetic vision systems (SVS). 
 
The overall 5-year goal of the HPM element is to develop and advance the state of cognitive 
modeling while addressing real-world safety problems. To this end, the HPM element continues to 
develop and demonstrate cognitive models of human performance that will aid aviation product 
designers in developing equipment and procedures that support pilots' tasks, are easier to use, and 
are less susceptible to error. The modeling focus is on computational frameworks that facilitate the 
use of fast-time simulation for the predictive analysis of pilot behaviors in real-world aviation 
environments. 
 
Rationale 
 
More than two-thirds of all aircraft accidents are attributed to pilot error. Identifying when 
equipment and procedures do not fully support the operational needs of pilots is critical to reducing 
error and improving flight safety (Leiden, Keller & French, 2001). This becomes especially 
relevant in the development of new flight deck technologies, which have traditionally followed a 
design process more focused on component functionality and technical performance than pilot 
usage and operability. To help counter this bias and to better understand the potential for human 
error associated with the deployment of new and complex systems, advanced tools are needed for 
predicting pilot performance in real-world operational environments.  
 
As noted in the literature on aviation safety, serious piloting errors and the resultant accidents are 
rare events (for a review, see Leiden, Keller & French (2001)). The low-probability of occurrence 
makes the study of serious pilot errors difficult to investigate in the field and in the laboratory. 
These errors characteristically result from a complex interaction between unusual circumstances, 
subtle "latent" flaws in system design and procedures, and limitations and biases in human 
performance. This can lead to the fielding of equipment, which puts flight safety at risk, 
particularly when operated in a manner or under circumstances that may not have been envisioned 
or tested.  
 
When combined with nominal and off-nominal scenario human-in-the-loop real-time testing, 
human-performance modeling in non-real–time (usually, fast-time) simulations provides a 
complementary technique to develop systems and procedures that are tailored to the pilots' tasks, 
capabilities, and limitations. Because of its use in fast-time simulations, human-performance 
modeling is a powerful technique to uncover "latent design flaws" -- in which a system contains a 
design flaw that may induce pilot error only under some low-probability confluence of precursors, 
conditions and events  
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Human performance modeling using fast-time simulation offers a powerful technique to examine 
human interactions with existing and proposed aviation systems across an unlimited range of 
possible operating conditions. It provides a flexible and economical way to manipulate aspects of 
the task-environment, the equipment and procedures, and the human for simulation analyses. In 
particular, fast-time simulation analyses can suggest the nature of likely pilot errors, as well as 
highlight precursor conditions to error such as high levels of memory demand, mounting time 
pressure and workload, attentional tunneling or distraction, and deteriorating situational awareness. 
Fast-time simulation is the only practical way to generate the very large sample sizes that are 
needed to reveal low-rate-of-occurrence events. Human-in-the-loop real-time simulations are too 
costly to use for this purpose. Additionally, this can be done early in the design cycle, without the 
need to fabricate expensive prototype hardware. 
 
HPM Models 
 
The AvSP HPM element is organized along two model development tracks (see figure E-1). The 
first model development track is Predictive Human Performance Models, in which multiple 
predictive models of human performance simultaneously address several well-specified problems 
in aviation safety. The second model development track is the Prescriptive Engineering Human 
Performance Model, which consists of a model of error detection (specifically a prescriptive 
engineering model of operator performance in context). The six models comprising the AvSP HPM 
element are described below. 
 
Figure E-1. Two model development tracks of the HPM element: Predictive Human Performance 
Models with multiple predictive models investigating a set of common problems; and, 
Prescriptive Engineering Human Performance Model. 
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Predictive Human Performance Models 
 
From an initial review of past efforts in cognitive modeling, it was recognized that no single 
modeling architecture or framework had the scope to address the full range of interacting and 
competing factors driving human actions in dynamic, complex environments (Leiden, Laughery, 
Keller, French, Warwick & Wood, 2001). As a consequence, the HPM element sought to develop 
and extend multiple modeling efforts to further the current state of the art within a number of HPM 
tools. In 2001, five modeling frameworks were selected from a large group of responses to a 
proposal call for computational approaches for the investigation and prediction of operator 
behaviors associated with incidents and/or accidents in aviation. This was, in essence, a request for 
analytic techniques that employed cognitive modeling and simulation. The proposals were peer-
reviewed with selection criteria including model theory, scope, maturity, and validation as well as 
the background and expertise of the respective research team.  
 
All five of the predictive human performance modeling frameworks share common, important 
human characteristics. The models are:  
(1) Generative -- Output results from the flow of internal model processes and is not "scripted";  
(2) Have stochastic elements -- Simulation runs are not identical, even when all parameters  
defining the environment external to the human operator are held constant;  
(3) Context sensitive -- Changes in the task-environment effect changes in simulation output.  
 
Four of the five selected modeling frameworks were based on mature, validated, and integrative 
architectures which linked together embedded component processes of cognition with capabilities 
to construct representations of the task-environment and for simulations. The fifth modeling 
framework (A-SA) is a set of computational algorithms, more limited-in-scope, focused on 
attentional processes and the assessment of situational awareness that will be described below.  
 
Additional characteristics of these five models are summarized in figure E-2.  
 
The five predictive human performance models are: 
 
ACT-R (Rice University; University of Illinois). Atomic Components of Thought-Rational 
is an experimentally grounded, open-source, low-level cognitive architecture developed at 
Carnegie Mellon University. ACT-R is based on the assumption that human cognition 
should be implemented in terms of neural-like computations on a very small time scale 
(50 ms–200 ms). A cognitive layer interacts with a perceptual-motor layer to create 
activation levels which determine both knowledge accessibility and goal-oriented conflict 
resolution. 
 
Air MIDAS (San Jose State University). Air MIDAS is a version of the Man-machine 
Integration Design and Analysis System (MIDAS) developed as a joint Army-NASA 
program to explore computational representations of human-machine performance. Air 
MIDAS is driven by a set of user inputs specifying operator goals, procedures for achieving 
those goals, and declarative knowledge appropriate to a given simulation. These asserted 
knowledge structures interact with, and are moderated by, embedded models of cognition 
for managing resources, memory, and action. 
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A-SA (University of Illinois). Attention-Situational Awareness is a computational model 
developed at the University of Illinois. The underlying theoretical structure of the A-SA 
model is contained in two modules, one governing the allocation of attention to events and 
channels in the environment, and the second drawing an inference or understanding of the 
current and future state of the aircraft within that environment. Four factors are used to 
compute attention allocation within a dynamic environment; salience, effort, expectancy, 
and value. In turn, attentional allocation modulates situational awareness. 
 
D-OMAR (BBN Technologies). The Distributed Operator Model Architecture was 
originally developed by BBN Technologies under sponsorship from the Air Force Research 
Laboratory. D-OMAR supports the notion of an agent whose actions are driven not only by 
actively seeking to achieve one or more goals, but also by reacting to the input and events of 
the world. It was designed to facilitate the modeling of human multi-tasking behaviors of 
team members interacting with complex equipment. 
 
IMPRINT/ACT-R (Micro Analysis and Design, Inc.; Carnegie Mellon University; Army 
Research Laboratory). This hybrid framework integrates Improved Performance Research 
Integration Tool (IMPRINT), a task network-based simulation tool developed by Micro 
Analysis and Design and Atomic Components of Thought-Rational (ACT-R), a low-level 
cognitive architecture developed at Carnegie Mellon University. This approach is meant to 
exploit the advantages of top-down control with the emergent aspects of bottom-up 
behavior for evaluating human performance in complex systems. 
 
 
Figure E-2. The five predictive human performance models, type of model, and 
demonstrated sources of pilot error.  
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Prescriptive Engineering Human Performance Model 
 
CATS (San Jose State University/NASA Ames Research Center). The Crew Activity Tracking 
System (CATS) is a prescriptive engineering model which provides a representation of the task that 
the user is attempting to complete, a representation of how the task should be completed, and the 
capability to track and compare actual performance against prescribed performance. The model 
allows for error-detection and is being expanded to include mechanisms that produce observed 
operator errors.  
 
HPM Element Approach and Scope 
 
The 2003 HPM Conference and the resulting Conference Proceedings focused on the particular 
aviation safety-related problem of approach and landing with and without augmented displays. By 
plan, only the predictive human performance models addressed this problem. For this reason, the 
Prescriptive Engineering Human Performance Model, CATS, is not included in these proceedings. 
For more information, the reader is referred to articles on that topic (e.g., Callantine, 2002). The 
problem and approach described below refers only to the five predictive models of human 
performance. 
 
The approach used in the AvSP HPM element involves applying different cognitive modeling 
frameworks to the analysis of a well-specified operational problem for which there is available 
empirical data of pilot performance in the task (see figure E-3). In 2001, the five different modeling 
frameworks were used to analyze a series of land-and-taxi-to-gate scenarios taken from a high-
fidelity full mission simulation study that produced an extensive data-set of pilot performance. This 
completed 2001 effort is represented by the left-most panel of figure E-3. Overall, this approach 
enables the HPM Element to assess and contrast the predictive ability of a diverse range of human 
performance modeling frameworks while encouraging the advancement of these frameworks. For 
2002-2003 (figure E-3 center panel), the five predictive modeling frameworks have been extended 
to the more complex problem of modeling pilot behaviors during approach and landing operations 
with and without the availability of a synthetic vision system (SVS)). This is in accord with the 
HPM Element’s 2002 milestone objective requiring the development of cognitive models of an 
approach/ landing scenario with an augmented display. In 2003-2004 (figure E-3 right panel), these 
five models will focus on other specific approach and landing scenarios. A schematic representing 
the multiple off-nominal conditions (e.g., late runway reassignment; SVS display malfunction; and 
"go-arounds" because of cloud cover and runway traffic) to be investigated in the last years of the 
program is shown in the rightmost panel of figure E-3. 
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Figure E-3. Three phases of aviation safety-related problems addressed by the five Human 
Performance Modeling predictive models during 2001-2004. 
 
 
Current HPM Efforts and Findings 
 
In these conference proceedings, papers describing current accomplishments of the predictive 
human performance models of the HPM element are presented. The first two papers serve to set the 
stage for the modeling efforts which follow. The first paper in these proceedings describes a 
cognitive task analysis of the approach and landing phase of flight conducted by Keller, Leiden and 
Small. Next, is a discussion of a part-task human-in-the-loop simulation, the tested scenarios, and 
the data supplied to the five modeling teams by Goodman, Hooey, Foyle and Wilson. Following 
these two papers in these proceedings are descriptions of the modeling efforts and their results to 
date. Summaries of these five predictive human-performance-modeling efforts are given below. 
 
In the first modeler’s report in these proceedings, Byrne and Kirlik describe three central principles 
which guided their modeling approach: 1) the desire to create a dynamic, close-loop model of pilot 
cognition in interaction with the cockpit, aircraft, and environment; 2) the presumption that pilots 
are knowledgeable and adapted operators; and, 3) a focus on the allocation of visual attention as 
crucial to yielding important design and training-related insights. Their model, implemented in the 
ACT-R/PM cognitive architecture and referencing a statistical description of the environment, 
produced high-level predictions of gaze time that fit well with human-in-the-loop simulation data. 
Additionally, the model proved sensitive to the local properties of the SVS display, demonstrating 
that the type and format of presented flight symbology is a strong determinant of SVS usage. This 
suggests one line of focused investigation in which model predictions are used to assess a range of 
small variations to the symbology set of the SVS display in order to optimize pilot performance. 
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Next, in the report by Corker, Gore, Guneratne, Jadhav and Verma, the authors document their 
efforts to augment the standard Air MIDAS modeling architecture with an advanced vision model 
incorporating the affects of contrast legibility and visual search/reading time to better account for 
performance using a SVS display. To gain additional accuracy, the visual sampling model was 
calibrated and verified with an extensive, alternate empirical data set. The revised model generated 
predictions of pilot visual scanning behavior over three approach and landing scenarios. These 
model predictions explained 31% to 77% of the variance of the human-in-the-loop simulation data. 
Output from model simulations also permitted detailed inspection of the executed task sequences 
for both the pilot flying and pilot not flying. Analyses of these sequences indicate differences in 
task completion ordering, timing, and success between scenario conditions. This suggests possible 
vulnerabilities in crew coordination and timing resulting from specific situational demands. In 
another finding, the authors acknowledge that a better understanding of how flight crews select 
from redundant information sources is needed to improve fidelity. 
 
Deutsch and Pew describe their efforts to implement a dedicated model of approach and landing 
within the D-OMAR simulation framework. The cognitive architecture evolved for this application 
focuses on multi-task behavior, the role of vision, and working memory. In simulation, the resultant 
models of the Captain, First Officer, and Air Traffic Controller working in concert demonstrated a 
commendable robustness by executing successful landings across five different scenarios 
circumstances. The model’s prediction that the availability of the SVS display would reduce time 
devoted to HSI display is matched in the human data. This finding supports the implication that 
information redundancy on the SVS display may reduce workload. The authors also note that 
additional scenario complexity can lead to better models by teasing out flaws. This was the case 
when certain D-OMAR model shortcomings only became apparent when a distracter aircraft was 
added to the scenario.  
 
The paper by Lebiere, Archer, Schunk, Biefeld, Kelly and Allender details the unique integration of 
the low-level cognitive architecture, ACT-R, with the task network simulation tool, IMPRINT, to 
provide a viable approach for modeling complex domains. Functionality of the resulting model of 
approach and landing operations permitted sensitivity analyses of mission success rates to global 
parameters regarding latency of procedural, visual, motor, and auditory actions, as well as 
stochastic manipulations of decision-making times. These analyses provided important inferences 
regarding effective design objectives for both information display and procedures. Among other 
findings, the model found that pilot performance is very sensitive to the speed of visual shifts 
between widely separated information sources. Similarly, pilot performance proved highly sensitive 
to the overhead of communications with increases in the number and/or duration of 
communications acts rapidly deteriorating performance. Noteworthy in these modeling analyses 
was the apparent "performance tipping point" in which near-perfect mission success rates would 
suddenly plummet with only the slightest increase in parameter latency.  
 
Wickens, McCarley and Thomas describe the modification of their algorithmic SEEV Model of 
attentional allocation in dynamic environments to the prediction of visual scanning during approach 
and landing operations. The refined algorithm for this application is based on the parameters of 
effort, expectancy, and value. This revised model, the Attention-Situation Awareness (A-SA) 
Model, accounted for roughly 30% - 80% of the variance in the scanning behavior seen in the 
human data. Surprisingly, the effort parameter added no predictive power to the model beyond 
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expectancy and value in this application. The authors do make a qualitative distinction between 
"good" and "poor" SA pilots based on latency to execute go-around maneuvers. They find that 
deviation from model predicted dwell times to the outside world clearly discriminated between 
these two categories of pilots. This is seen as supporting the model's ability to infer pilot SA. The 
authors also note that the large observed variance between individual pilot scanning behaviors (and 
resulting impact on model fit) may be attributable to one of two causes: 1) different pilot strategies 
of accessing information from redundant displays; or, 2) less-than optimal scanning behavior from 
some pilots. Again, it is asserted that the model can make that discrimination. 
 
As will be seen in the following papers in these conference proceedings, the HPM predictive 
modeling efforts resulted in both design solutions and procedural recommendations to enhance the 
safety of SVS systems. The models identified potential problems that merit further investigation 
through human-in-the-loop simulations. Significant advancements to the state of human 
performance modeling were achieved by broadening the scope of the five models to include the 
aviation domain, and through the augmentation and expansion of specific modeling capabilities. 
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HUMAN PERFORMANCE MODELS OF PILOT BEHAVIOR 
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Five modeling teams from industry and academia were chosen by the NASA 
Aviation Safety and Security Program to develop human performance models 
(HPM) of pilots performing taxi operations and runway instrument approaches with 
and without advanced displays. One representative from each team will serve as a 
panelist to discuss their team’s model architecture, augmentations and advancements 
to HPMs, and aviation-safety related lessons learned. Panelists will discuss how 
modeling results are influenced by a model’s architecture and structure, the role of 
the external environment, specific modeling advances and future directions and 
challenges for human performance modeling in aviation. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
More than two-thirds of all aircraft accidents are attributed to pilot error. Identifying when 
equipment and procedures do not fully support the operational needs of pilots is critical to reducing 
error and improving flight safety (Leiden, Keller, & French, 2001). This becomes especially 
relevant in the development of new flight deck technologies that have traditionally followed a 
design process more focused on component functionality and technical performance than pilot 
usage and operability. To help counter this bias and to better understand the potential for human 
error associated with the deployment of new and complex systems, advanced tools are needed for 
predicting pilot performance in real-world operational environments. Serious piloting errors and 
accidents are rare events and the low-probability of occurrence makes the study of pilot error 
difficult to investigate in the field and in the laboratory. These errors characteristically result from a 
complex interaction between unusual circumstances, subtle “latent” flaws in system design and 
procedures, and limitations and biases in human performance. This can lead to the fielding of 
equipment that puts flight safety at risk, particularly when operated in a manner or under 
circumstances that may not have been envisioned or tested. 
 
Human performance modeling, when combined with nominal and off-nominal scenario human-in-
the-loop testing, provides a complementary technique to develop systems and procedures that are 
tailored to the pilot’s tasks, capabilities, and limitations (Leiden, Laughery, Keller, French, 
Warwick, & Wood, 2001). Because of its fast-time nature, human performance modeling is a 
powerful technique to uncover “latent design flaws” -- in which a system contains a design flaw 
that may induce pilot error only under some low-probability confluence of precursors, conditions 
and events. Human performance modeling also offers a powerful technique to examine human 
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interactions with existing and proposed aviation systems across an unlimited range of possible 
operating conditions. It provides a flexible and economical way to manipulate aspects of the task-
environment, the equipment and procedures, and the human for simulation analyses. In particular, 
modeling and simulation analyses can suggest the nature of likely pilot errors, as well as highlight 
precursor conditions to error such as high levels of memory demand, mounting time pressure and 
workload, attentional tunneling or distraction, and deteriorating situation awareness. Fast-time 
simulation permits the generation of very large sample sizes from which low-rate-of-occurrence 
events are more likely to be revealed. Additionally, this can be done early in the design cycle, 
without the need to fabricate expensive prototype hardware. 
 
Five modeling teams from industry and academia were chosen by the NASA Aviation Safety and 
Security Program to develop human performance models (HPMs) that address two problems in the 
aviation domain that have significant implications for aviation safety, and that are representative of 
general classes of problems faced by the aviation industry today. First, modeling teams addressed a 
current-day aviation problem within the realm of surface operations safety, by identifying causal 
factors of navigation errors and potential error mitigations (procedural, technical or operational). 
The notion of understanding causal factors of human error, and the importance of being able to 
predict when human operators might be vulnerable to error, and predicting which potential 
mitigating strategies might be successful is pervasive throughout every phase of flight. Second, the 
modeling teams modeled pilot performance during the approach and landing phases of flight for 
both a baseline configuration representing today’s glass cockpit and a configuration that also 
included a Synthetic Vision System (SVS). The research issues inherent in this problem are 
common to the design, development and integration of any advanced cockpit display technology. 
 
Human-In-The-Loop Studies 
 
Effective HPMs require extensive understanding of the task and the domain environment in order 
to produce valid and meaningful results. HPMs are most informative when supported by empirical 
data derived from laboratory studies, human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulations, and field studies. To 
enable model development, information was provided to the modeling teams including task 
analyses and objective data and subjective ratings from two HITL simulations that were conducted 
at NASA Ames Research Center. The HITL data were used in two different ways in this project. In 
some cases the data were used by the modeling teams to populate and develop their models, and in 
other cases, the data were used to validate the model output.  
 
Airport Surface Operations. A high-fidelity surface operations HITL simulation was conducted to 
understand the factors that contribute to taxiway navigation errors and potential mitigating 
solutions (Hooey, Foyle, & Andre, 2001). The simulation, conducted in NASA Ames Research 
Center’s high-fidelity, glass cockpit Advanced Concepts Flight Simulator (ACFS), compared taxi 
performance under current-day baseline operations with a prototypical cockpit display system 
called the Taxiway Navigation and Situation Awareness (T-NASA) system which is comprised of 
an electronic moving map (EMM), a head-up display (HUD), and auditory alerts and warnings. The 
simulation trials required pilots to land and taxi to the gate following an ATC-issued taxi clearance. 
All trials were conducted in low visibility at a high-fidelity rendering of Chicago O’Hare airport. 
The study included common taxi scenarios including hold short instructions and route amendments 
as well as off-nominal taxi events that represented failures or errors in the system. In current-day 
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operation (baseline) trials, pilots made navigation errors on approximately 20% of the trials, while 
these errors were eliminated with T-NASA. NASA provided the HPM teams with data including 
taxi speed, navigation errors, intra-cockpit communications, pilot-ATC communications, workload, 
and situation awareness to enable the teams to develop models of the pilot tasks and taxi scenarios 
necessary to predict taxiway navigation errors.  
 
Synthetic Vision Systems (SVS). A part-task HITL simulation study was conducted to investigate 
the effect of new synthetic vision systems (SVS) on pilot performance, visual attention, and crew 
roles and procedures during low-visibility instrument approaches (Goodman, Hooey, Foyle, & 
Wilson, 2003). The HPM teams were provided with a cognitive task analysis of the approach phase 
of flight and human performance data including eye movements, communications, and control 
panel responses from the NASA part-task simulation of instrument approaches with and without the 
SVS. Events such as no visibility at decision altitude (forcing a missed approach/go-around), a 
misalignment between instruments and the out-the-window view, and a late runway reassignment, 
were included in the scenarios to yield a robust set of human performance data.  
 
 
OVERVIEW OF HPM APPROACHES 
 
From an initial review of past efforts in cognitive modeling, it was recognized that no single 
modeling architecture or framework had the scope to address the full range of interacting and 
competing factors driving human actions in dynamic, complex environments (Leiden, Laughery, 
Keller, French, Warwick, & Wood, 2001). As a consequence, the decision was made to develop 
and expand multiple modeling efforts to extend the current state of the art within a number of HPM 
tools. Five modeling frameworks were selected based on a peer-reviewed process with selection 
criteria including model theory, scope, maturity, and validation as well as the background and 
expertise of the respective research team.  
 
In Phase 1, each team modeled some aspect of the airport surface operations domain problem with 
an emphasis on replicating or predicting pilot error. In Phase 2, each team built on their existing 
model capabilities to address issues relating to SVS design and integration. The approach and 
specific research questions were left to the discretion of the modeling teams yielding diverse 
models with a demonstrated capability of answering a variety of important aviation domain 
questions. In the sections that follow, each modeling team will briefly describe their model 
architecture, augmentations to the models, and significant findings for the aviation community. 
 
Attention-Situation Awareness (A-SA) 
C.D. Wickens (Panelist) and J. McCarley 
 
The Attention-Situation Awareness (A-SA) model has two components. The first (attention, A) 
describes the way in which three factors of the visual environment – the salience, expectancy and 
value of events – drive attention allocation, as this allocation is inhibited by a fourth factor, the 
effort required to scan between information sources within that environment. All four factors can 
be quantified, to make ordinal predictions of the degree to which areas of interest will be fixated as 
assessed by visual scanning (Wickens, Goh, Helleberg, Horrey, & Talleur, 2003). Such visual input 
supports the second component: situation awareness (SA), or understanding of the current and 
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future state of the aircraft. SA is based on a belief updating module, such that SA is updated any 
time a new piece of information is encountered. The pieces are weighted based on the value of the 
information to the task such that the current value of SA is increased or decreased. SA decays when 
no new pieces of information are encountered. The model has both an analytic and a real-time 
dynamic version. The model augments classical optimal scanning models to include the design-
layout related factors of salience and effort, to accommodate auditory channels, to consider 
circumstances related to task priority and those in which there is a one-to-many mapping between 
fixation areas and tasks. 
 
The surface operations simulation data were used to exercise the model, which predicted both 
intersections where errors were likely because of degraded SA, and the benefits of the T-NASA 
display in mitigating those errors. The SVS simulation data from NASA Ames, as well as SVS data 
collected at the University of Illinois were used to validate the attention allocation component of 
the A-SA model as inferred from visual scanning measures. The latter data, involving a low altitude 
flight through a terrain-challenged environment, revealed that the model accounted for an average 
of 85% of the variance in scanning behavior across the five areas of interest in the cockpit, for eight 
pilots (Wickens, McCarley, Alexander, Thomas, Ambinder, & Zheng, 2005). Model fit was not 
improved by considering the inhibiting role of effort, above and beyond that of expectancy and 
value, suggesting that pilots were quite optimal. Furthermore, greatest deviations from model 
predictions were shown by those who suffered greater decrements in flight path tracking and hazard 
detection performance, thereby suggesting that variations in optimality of attention allocation 
translated to variations in performance. 
 
ACT-R Version 5.0 
M.D. Byrne (Panelist), A. Kirlik and M.D. Fleetwood 
 
Our models are detailed closed-loop, pilot-displays-aircraft system models. That is, for both tasks, 
the ACT-R model of the pilot was connected to an executable model of the aircraft and relevant 
visual environment and both models run in real time. ACT-R provides a platform to support 
modeling at a fine temporal detail; the output of an ACT-R model is a time-stamped series of fairly 
primitive behaviors, down to the individual saccade. ACT-R models are also knowledge-intensive 
and require extensive task analysis and consultation with subject matter experts to supply the model 
with the knowledge necessary to actually execute the task. Taxiing and autopilot-guided instrument 
approach are, in fact, substantially different tasks, and the two models overlap in the general 
approach taken and the kind of outputs provided but less so elsewhere.  
 
The ACT-R cognitive architecture was originally designed to model the results of laboratory 
psychology experiments, which typically consist of simple tasks requiring little knowledge and 
performed in restricted environments. While ACT-R has an extensive track record of being 
successful in such domains, how ACT-R would “scale up” to aviation-relevant tasks was not 
entirely clear for both technical (e.g., software integration) and theoretical (e.g., could we represent 
environmentally-based constraints appropriately in this formalism) reasons. We thus conclude that 
ACT-R is indeed a viable option for serious HPM research (Byrne & Kirlik, 2005). 
 
Cognitive modeling efforts have traditionally focused on “in the head” cognition, but one of the 
important lessons learned in these modeling projects is the importance of a high-fidelity 
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representation of the environment; both of our models are highly sensitive to the structure of the 
environment. The taxiing model, for example, is very sensitive to the fact that the physical layout of 
Chicago’s O’Hare airport generates taxi routes that are systematically different from typical taxi 
routes at other airports. This, in turn, contributes to errors in taxiing. The SVS modeling work 
revealed how a new display with information that is redundant with other cockpit instrumentation 
has a substantial impact on pilot scanning behavior, even in phases of flight where such changes 
were not the system designers’ intent. 
 
Air-MIDAS 
K.M. Corker (Panelist)  
 
Human performance models were developed and applied to surface and flight operations in order to 
predict errors, and evaluate the impact of new information technologies and new procedures on 
flight crew performance. The human performance model component of these studies was developed 
using Air-MIDAS (Man Machine Integrated Design and Analysis System). The model was used to 
represent the flight deck crew responding to information systems and ATC.  
 
The first study on surface operations represented flight crew responses to ground control commands 
for post landing roll out and taxi. The model used working memory limits, interference processes, 
and heuristics to successfully predict errors observed in the HITL simulation. The second round of 
studies concentrated on the use of SVS technologies to allow pilots to continue approach under 
visual minima. The perceptual model (visual sampling of information) was both statistically 
verified and validated against calibration data and HITL simulation data. With the validated model 
in place, we analyzed approach and go-around performance under standard and SVS technologies, 
and under conditions of approach and go-around decisions based on flight crew decisions and based 
on air traffic controller performance. The conclusions of this examination of SVS were that:  
• SVS would not adversely affect the flight safety in approach, landing, and go-around phases 
regardless of the decision altitude and go-around triggers including the pilot-flying’s intention 
at decision altitude and ATC’s command, while it would allow approach and landing in 
conditions that would otherwise be unattainable; 
• Small delays of action initiation in flight control were observed in the approach phase with SVS 
operations. This occurred because the chances of fixation on each display was decreased by 
adding the SVS to the conventional display configuration; and, 
• No human performance degradation and no delay of task initiation were observed in the landing 
and go-around phases, although there were time shifts in the approach phase. 
 
D-OMAR 
S. Deutsch (Panelist) and R.W. Pew 
 
The Distributed Operator Model Architecture (D-OMAR) provides an event-based simulator and a 
suite of representation language -- a frame language, a procedure language and a rule language -- 
that we have used to instantiate a cognitive architecture that is the basis for our aircrew and air 
traffic controller models. Using the procedural language, we have constructed a set of basic person 
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procedures -- perceptual, cognitive, and motor processes that are the building blocks for the 
expertise exhibited by aircrews and controllers. 
 
As a general purpose simulator, D-OMAR has enabled us to also construct models for the essential 
elements of the commercial airspace: aircraft and their flight decks, ATC workplaces, airports with 
their runways, taxiways, and concourses, and the airways and navigation aides. 
 
Our approach to examining aircrew error has been to build models that exhibit the robust behaviors 
of aircrews and then probe the models for the seams along which error can intrude (Deutsch & 
Pew, 2004). The infrequent errors in which aircrews mistakenly turned away for their designated 
concourse attracted our attention. Our analysis suggested that this was a point at which habit might 
intrude and lead to such an error. And indeed, one of the modeled competing sources for the action 
to take at an intersection was grounded in habit. Subsequent review of the human subject data 
validated the models prediction of the source of the error. In a similar manner, we modeled a case 
in which an aircrew, contrary to the ground controller’s directive, turned toward their destination 
gate. To open the window for these errors, we constructed situations that prevented the first officer 
from prompting the captain on the correct turn to take at the intersection based on notes taken when 
the ground controller provided the taxi routing. 
 
One aspect of our modeling of the use of the SVS, focused on our observation that it might be 
utilized as a second primary flight display (PFD) leading to an inefficient scan pattern. A review of 
the human subject data suggested that this might well be the case. To counter this potential 
problem, we designed a single attitude instrument combining PFD and SVS functionality. Model 
trials then predicted that the more efficient baseline scan pattern would be restored when using the 
combined PFD-SVS. 
 
In each problem area addressed, the model and its underlying theory led to important new insights 
into the sources of aircrew behaviors. 
 
IMPRINT / ACT-R  
C. Lebiere (Panelist) and R. Archer 
 
The approach that was used by our team to perform the approach and landing modeling task was an 
integration of the Improved Performance Research Integration Tool (IMPRINT) and the Adaptive 
Control of Thought – Rational (ACT-R) cognitive architecture. We found that a natural integration 
of the two tools had IMPRINT assuming the role of implementing the simulation and ACT-R 
assuming the role of the cognitive agents, i.e., the pilots. The IMPRINT model represents the state 
of the aircraft, its controls, and the environment. The ACT-R model represents the cognitive state 
of the pilots and their decision-making process. The two models communicate through a general, 
scalable, reusable interface called Link IMPRINT/ACT-R (LIA) that reduces the burden of 
integration from weeks or months of effort down to days. This approach of combining the strengths 
of task network and cognitive modeling for different portions of the same modeling scenario makes 
an important contribution to the capabilities of Human Performance Modeling: It allows complex 
simulations to be assembled in a modular fashion that makes explicit all communications 
requirements and enables high-fidelity cognitive modeling to be deployed where needed most in a 
tractable, affordable manner.  
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The cognitive models were built to emphasize the mechanisms and constraints of the cognitive 
architecture. Errors result from inherent limitations in the architecture’s cognitive and perceptual 
abilities. Conversely, the model also exploits the architecture’s powerful learning mechanisms to 
adapt to the introduction of new technology and other changes in its environment. We varied a 
number of parameters representing both variations in individual cognitive, perceptual and motor 
abilities as well as changes in the composition of the environment (e.g., by the addition of an SVS 
system) that affect the cognitive, perceptual and motor operations of the human operator (and 
cognitive model). This sensitivity analysis provides an indication of where the primary benefits of 
technological aids are likely to reside, as well as the most likely sources of error (Best, Lebiere, 
Schunk, Johnson, & Archer, 2004). 
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ADVANCES AND LESSONS LEARNED 
 
K. Leiden (Panelist), D. C. Foyle and B. L. Hooey 
 
Advances in Human Performance Modeling 
 
Each of the HPMs discussed in this paper has extended their capabilities significantly to support the 
surface operations and SVS display modeling efforts. Considerable effort has been expended for 
the development of the external models to represent the aircraft flight dynamics, flight deck 
displays, and the communication link between external environment and HPM tool. (Some teams 
expended between 50-70% of their effort to represent these functions.) The ACT-R 5.0 and Air-
MIDAS teams connected their models to higher-fidelity flight simulators and thus are poised to 
tackle future problems in which the closed-loop behavior between the pilot’s action and the 
aircraft’s response (or vice versa) is a key factor. 
 
The usefulness of HPMs to the design and evaluation of new technology is determined to a 
significant extent by the core capabilities – visual attention allocation, workload, crew interactions, 
procedures, situation awareness, and error prediction. For example, the A-SA and ACT-R models 
focused specifically on what drives visual attention from a bottom-up (e.g., effort to move the eyes) 
as well as top-down perspective. Hence, if visual attention allocation needs to be understood for a 
particular technology, the ACT-R and A-SA modeling frameworks would more easily facilitate the 
analysis. In contrast, multiple operator models (e.g., pilot-flying and pilot-not-flying) are more 
easily accommodated by Air-MIDAS and D-OMAR. Thus, if flight crew or pilot/ATC interactions 
are expected to be significant drivers to a future modeling effort then the Air-MIDAS and 
D-OMAR frameworks would be more straightforward to apply. Of course, the respective HPMs 
and capabilities are dynamic. Each successive modeling effort in a complex environment such as 
aviation most likely adds to a framework’s repertoire of capabilities.  
 
Lessons Learned for the Aerospace Community  
 
The modeling efforts revealed that HPMs, even those cognitive architectures that have traditionally 
been used in the context of psychological laboratory experiments, can indeed be useful tools for 
complex, context-dependent, domains such as aviation. Specifically, the tools can be used to 
address the design and evaluations of aviation displays, procedures, and operations. 
 
Error Prediction and Mitigation. Across all of the modeling efforts, the tools were able to predict 
errors, or error vulnerabilities, that occurred because of situation awareness degradation, memory 
degradation and interference, airport layout, pilot expectation and habit, distraction, and workload. 
Further, it was shown that HPMs can be used to identify and evaluate the effectiveness of various 
technologies in the mitigation of such errors.  
 
Display Design and Information Allocation. The models proved useful as tools to estimate the 
impact of new display technology on pilot scanning behavior. As such, HPMs can be used to 
inform display design and the allocation of information so as to optimize efficient scan patterns and 
increase the uptake of relevant information in a timely manner. As a salient example, the models 
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showed that when redundant information is overlaid on an SVS display (e.g., altitude, heading, 
speed on both traditional and SVS displays), pilots altered their baseline scan pattern to attend to 
the more easily acquired redundant information (based on saccade latency). Thus, the time spent 
attending to traditional displays under the SVS configuration was reduced significantly compared 
to the baseline configuration. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Under NASA’s Human Performance Modeling Project, five models of human performance have 
been applied to a specific set of aviation problems. As a result, we are in a unique position to 
characterize some of the different ways in which specific models interact with the problem, and to 
note similarities and differences in how model representations affect the characterization of the 
modeling problem. The present panel discussion addresses this topic, and, in the near future, this 
will be documented as part of the HPM effort. 
 
Some of the specific model characterizations include: 1) Model architecture and structures - To 
what extent do the specific architectures and structures in the various models impact: the user’s 
choice of a modeling tool; the ability to describe/predict the data; and, the validation of results?; 
2) Role of the external environment - How is the external environment captured in the model; how 
does the model interact with the external environment?; 3) Model predictive ability - To what 
extent do the specific modeling tools accurately model/predict behavior, produce emergent 
behavior, are predictive vs. simulation in nature, and, allow for the extrapolation to other non-tested 
display/procedural conditions?; and, 4) Usefulness/implications of the modeling results - What 
specific implications do the models make regarding procedures, communication, ATC - pilot 
interactions, intra-cockpit interactions, and, SVS display issues? Additionally, the future directions 
and challenges for human performance modeling in aviation are discussed and addressed. 
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